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
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THE
ANDOVER REVIEW:
A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.

VOL. XIII.—FEBRUARY, 1890.—No. LXXIV.

WHAT IS REALITY?

PART VI. MECHANISM TRANSFORMED.

WHEN we were trying to establish the propriety of extending our knowledge of living organisms to the interpretation of the universe, we took the ground that the limits of organic being are not necessarily coincident with the limits of protoplasm. It is legitimate, we argued, and in accordance with scientific procedure, to assume that other forms of matter *may be* the vehicle and expression of other forms of being, organized on a far more extended scale than anything in the protoplasmic order. We therefore made the hypothesis that the universe is the manifestation of a Being; and that every part of it bears something the same relations to this Being that the various members of a human body bear to the ego that they serve and represent.

Now, before we venture on the justification of this particular hypothesis, it may be well for us to consider, as widely as possible, the bearings of our principle. What other equally legitimate application may it have? And do any of these applications involve absurdities? I think there can be no question that it is equally open to us, when once we have broken through the protoplasmic order, to extend our analogy on a descending as well as on an ascending scale. If we may believe that a soul, at the centre of the universe, is the efficient reality of the great sum of things, why may we not believe that a soul is also the essential reality of a compound molecule? And why, when we reach the simple atom, the ultimate unit of science, should we not postulate an atomic soul as the inner *elementary* reality of the world of things? It might,

indeed, be alleged that the two cases stand on an entirely different footing, in that one presents us with an infinite complexity of adjustments, which everywhere suggests an organism; while the other, the ultimate unit, is assumed to be absolutely simple.

But let us ask ourselves, what do we know about the simplicity of elementary atoms? All we can say of them is that they are the least complex things of the world. They are assumed to be ultimate only as *indivisible*. They are units; but their unity may involve an inner complexity,—a complexity of nature. And, in fact, the phenomena of chemistry oblige us to affirm such a complexity. For how can absolutely simple elements, when brought together, give rise to a great variety of responses or reactions? Every hypothetical unit of chemistry has unmeasured possibilities of operation, according to its environment. If, therefore, complexity of behavior is any indication of complexity of constitution, we have the most abundant evidence that the simplest elements of the world are only relatively simple; that they are, in fact, of many different kinds, endowed with radically different natures.

There is, indeed, a dream of chemistry, in which all the differences of things are imagined as arising from differences of position and form and grouping, brought about by a varied play of forces among the atoms of one homogeneous substance. But this is really a dream of physics and not of chemistry. The phenomena of isometric compounds, it is true, show that the very same atoms may give rise to molecules of different substances having wholly different qualities, when they are arranged in different relations of position to each other. But unless there were an inner response of such atoms, their differences of position could not, in any case, give rise to chemical phenomena; that is, to that mysterious union in which different atoms merge all their distinctive characteristics in the formation of a new substance having no resemblance whatever to its constituents. As Professor Cooke has expressed it, "If nature were made out of a single substance, there would be no chemistry, even if there could be intelligences to study science at all. Chemistry deals exclusively with the relations of different substances."¹

So far as natural phenomena are concerned, therefore, I think we may affirm that it is just as legitimate to entertain the hypothesis that the elementary realities of the world are atomic souls, as it is to assume that there is one all-embracing, supreme Being at

¹ *The New Chemistry*, p. 14.

the head or centre of the universe. And, in what follows, I shall endeavor to show that both these hypotheses are not simply legitimate, but that the progress of thought, in science as well as in philosophy, has rendered them indispensable.

Are we, then, about to abandon one side of reality, and to deny that there is any such thing as matter? On the contrary, having with much pains laid the foundation of an all-comprehensive realism, we mean to build squarely upon it; and we unequivocally affirm the *reality* of that which has been, and will undoubtedly continue to be, called matter. But we wish, at the same time, to persuade the reader that the quality of an atom which we may call its materiality is only one aspect of its reality, and not the most essential or vital one. It is no part of our endeavor to displace the concept *material atom*. That concept has had, and must continue to have, its legitimate and indispensable uses, even though we fully recognize its inadequacy.

Let us look, for a moment, at the origin of the word "matter." I do not mean its formal etymology, but the necessity of thought that called it into existence. Things naturally fall, in our experience, into two great classes. On the one hand are ranged those that seem to be centres of spontaneous activity and originating power, and on the other those that appear to be absolutely passive. This distinction runs all through our thinking. We cannot do without it. Always it is the *man* who works and effects the changes, it is the *material* that is worked upon and changed. We cannot abandon this way of regarding things, because clearness of thought is attained only by making sharp distinctions. The inertness of matter is a palpable fact as related to many of our dealings with it; and this fact we must express by some word, even though we know that this word does not embody the exact truth. We pursue identically the same method when we have to express some of the most familiar relations of space. For instance, before the days of science, men accustomed themselves to call certain portions of space *empty*, to distinguish them from certain other portions that were occupied by tangible objects. But now it has been demonstrated that what we call emptiness is, in reality, only a somewhat modified form of what we call fullness. None the less, however, do we continue to speak of empty spaces. The scientific truth is an all-important one in its place, but it is quite out of relation to the special distinction that the requirements of living make it necessary for us to express when we use the word *empty*.

So it is with regard to the word *matter*. Even though we should succeed in demonstrating that matter is not the absolutely passive, inanimate thing that it appears to be, this would have no bearing upon the popular or even upon the purely scientific use of the word in its old signification. For however clearly science may recognize the fact that its solid, impenetrable, inelastic atom is only a symbol derived from a crude and one-sided conception of the true nature of matter, it may nevertheless be useful for a long time to come, to treat it, in some connections, as if it were the very thing that it is assumed to be.

The position here taken, let it be observed, is in advance of that contended for in the last number of this series. There it was said to be legitimate to use a single aspect of a thing, in certain connections, as the representative of its full reality. Now we have to recognize that different aspects of one and the same thing, different abstractions from a given reality, may be continued in use at the same time for the exploration of different fields of thought. The attainment of a higher point of view, the discovery of a concept lying nearer to the heart of things, does not necessitate the abandonment of the lower point of view, or the cruder concept. I have called particular attention to this, because we have now to exhibit the relation that the concept *mechanism*, retained in popular thought and in the science of physics, sustains to the concept *atomic-soul*, made use of in the higher ranges of science and in philosophy. Or, to put it in other words, we have to show why it is necessary to think of the universe as a living organism, every atom of which has a spiritual nature, while at the same time we continue to treat it, in other relations, as a vast machine.

The justification of the concept *mechanism* is to be found in the history of its experimental use. It has been practically tested, first in ordinary life, and then in the combinations of science. By its aid, the science of physics has sprung into being. It has been to the explorer of nature's instrumentalities what vessels have been to navigators. We may say that without it we should never have had an organized science. And, further, we have to say that now it is just as useful, just as indispensable, and just as intolerant of the intrusion of other views as it ever was.

Even though our hypothesis of a universally animated nature should be established beyond a doubt, the physicist would have no occasion to take account of it. While prosecuting his particular quest, he not only has no need to avail himself of the analogies

derived from the relations which spiritual beings sustain to each other, but he is debarred from paying any attention to such relations by the requirements of his work. The inventor of machinery, whose mind is teeming with mechanical details that are constantly changing their forms and their relations to each other, would not advance his work by turning his attention to that other aspect of the same process that is represented by nerve-cell combinations; and the compositor who should neglect his type-setting to criticise the treatise that he has to set up for printing would not be a valuable man in his place. Just so, the student of physics who does not adhere closely to the external aspects of the phenomena that he is investigating betrays the trust for which he is specially responsible.

The very same is true of that familiar form of anthropomorphism that concentrates attention upon the *external* aspects of the relations that the Supreme Being sustains to the universe. In the symbolism of this view, the world is divided into mind and mechanism, and the action of the former upon the latter is construed after the analogy of man's relations to the machines that he invents and superintends. Such a conception has its legitimate place. It represents clearly and forcibly one very important aspect of reality. It makes the thought of God, as the designer, creator, and protector of the world, one that may be easily grasped. And, furthermore, in so far as the world is rightly conceived of as a mechanism, such a symbolism represents the truth. All the actual machinery of our experience, from which the idea of the world as a mechanism is derived, is the product of mind. Every machine appears, externally, to be a complex of relations between inanimate things; but before it took this form, it was a complex of relations between nerve-cells and fibres, the living instruments of man's inventive spirit. When, therefore, we look upon an elaborate piece of mechanism, we may affirm that it *is* human mind expressing itself in outwardly embodied forms.

Metal and wood and belting do not constitute a machine, any more than printer's ink and paper constitute a treatise. All the relations of materials and of parts that really *are* the machine have had their beginning in the mind of some man; and, having once existed there, they are made to express themselves in external forms, just as the ideas that make a treatise assume, for useful ends, the guise of ink and paper. In short, the idea of a machine that is not the product or expression of mind is a pure abstraction. And the mechanical aspect of nature, taken by

itself, is unintelligible. It is like part of an inscription found on a broken slab: it has no meaning till we supplement it with the idea of mind; then the meaningless becomes intelligible. We know that we have found the other half of the slab, because this justifies its relation to the first half by making sense out of nonsense.

But valuable as the symbolism thus derived is, I have now to show that the mechanical explanation of nature is as inadequate to serve the necessities of science, as the thought of a God external to things is to meet the requirements of theism; that the one, as the other, demands a symbolism that shall express more comprehensive relations.

We will consider the case of science first; and then we shall be able to see whether the wider concept that meets its wants can be successfully applied to those of philosophy and theology. The insufficiency of the mechanical theory to which I shall first direct attention grows out of the logical development of that theory itself. It grows out of it through the application of that general principle of science known as *the law of continuity*. This law is the assumption that the order that *has been* is the order that *will be*, — that the relations known to exist within the range of our experience exist, in some more or less modified form, under similar circumstances, beyond our experience. It is, in fact, another name for the principle of the uniformity of nature. All the great generalizations of science are based upon it. That pan-mechanical idea of the universe that we have already considered is a product of it. So, also, is the doctrine of the persistence of force, and that of the transmutation of forces. These theories have been gradually established by a long succession of discoveries, each one of which has enlarged the field of a principle once thought to be limited in its application. Each new discovery has lessened the probability that the principle in question has any limit at all. And so the mind has been gradually coerced into the belief of its universality.

It was easy, as we have seen, to confuse this idea of universality — of all-extensiveness — with the closely related idea of all-comprehensiveness. But the falseness of this inference was soon made apparent by the fact that mind was thus excluded from the world. Mind was excluded, not because it appeared to be unnecessary for the explanation of the world, but because there was no longer any room for it. In the mechanical sequence, the energy of each physical change was seen to be taken up in producing its physical

effects; there was none left over, at any point, to account for mental phenomena. But mental facts could not be altogether ignored. Hence the hypothesis that there are two parallel sets of phenomena, intimately associated, but not connected as cause and effect. The physical facts, it was said, go along absolutely sufficient to themselves; and the mental facts, with a like independence, go along by themselves.

This conception, which strongly suggests the old one of a "pre-established harmony," has taken on many forms under modern philosophical treatment. Professor Bain and Mr. Herbert Spencer are essentially agreed in their representation of the twin series as *one*, that presents to our apprehension two aspects. Mr. Spencer calls feeling and nervous action "the inner and outer faces of the same change." But Professor Bain further calls attention to the fact that this two-sidedness is limited, in our experience, to a special class of physical sequences. "If," he says, "all mental facts are at the same time physical facts, some one will ask, what is the meaning of a proper mental fact? Is there any difference at all between mental agents and physical agents? There is a very broad difference, which may be easily illustrated. When any one is pleased, stimulated, cheered by food, wine, or bracing air, we call the influence physical; it operates on the viscera, and through these upon the nerves, by a chain of sequence purely physical. When one is cheered by good news, by a pleasing spectacle, or by a stroke of success, the influence is mental; sensation, thought, and consciousness are part of the chain, although these cannot be sustained without their physical basis. The proper physical fact is a single, one-sided, objective fact; the mental fact is a two-sided fact, one of its sides being a train of feelings, thoughts, or other subjective elements. We do not fully represent the mental fact unless we take account of both the sides."¹

In both these cases, it will be observed, mental phenomena are produced, but in the one case they are the result of *antecedents* that have no mental side. But how shall we account for the difference? If there is but one fact, why should it have two sides in certain special cases and only one in all the rest? The special case points to some special cause, but under the purely mechanical view there is no such cause; for mental phenomena are nothing more than the concomitants of physical changes.

This consideration led Professor Clifford to make the very hypothesis that we are advocating. To avoid the assumption that

¹ *Mind and Body*, p. 133.

acts of consciousness, occurring only here and there in connection with physical changes, are creations out of nothing, he supposes that consciousness, in some rudimentary form, is a necessary characteristic of all matter in motion; and that this, in organisms of great complexity, gives rise to that which we call mind. He says: "The only thing that we can come to, if we accept the doctrine of evolution at all, is that even in the very lowest organisms, even in the amœba which swims about in our own blood, there is something or other, inconceivably simple to us, which is of the same nature with our own consciousness, although not of the same complexity. That is to say (for we cannot stop at organic matter, knowing as we do that it must have arisen by continuous physical processes out of inorganic matter), we are obliged to assume, in order to save continuity in our belief, that along with every motion of matter, whether organic or inorganic, there is some fact which corresponds to the mental fact in ourselves."¹

To one who has not considered attentively the phenomena of nature as an indefinitely extended series of gradations, such a conclusion as this will seem a simple absurdity. Does it not involve the reversal of all our common-sense judgments about things? Are not rocks and earth and metal the antithesis, in every respect, of mind? Is fire made of atomic souls? Is all the dust and corruption of the world to be thought of as alive, or capable of life? A thousand such questions, starting up from as many pre-judgments about the nature of things, press in a motley throng to hustle such a conception out of the companionship of sane ideas. But if the reader to whom it is a novelty will have patience, I think he will confess that there is a good deal more to be said for it than at first sight appears possible.

In the first place, by way of getting such an objection into a receptive mood, I will call attention to the fact that the law of continuity has been justified in a great number of cases, which, at first, seemed quite as unpromising as the one before us. In treating of this law, Dr. Jevons makes the following general remark: "One common result of the progress of science is to show that qualities supposed to be entirely absent from many substances are present, only in so low a degree of intensity that the means of detection were insufficient. . . . We are rapidly learning that there are no substances absolutely opaque, or non-conducting, non-electric, non-elastic, non-viscous, non-compressible, insoluble, in-

¹ "Body and Mind," p. 731, *Contemporary Review*, December, 1874.

fusible, or non-volatile. All tends to become a matter of degree or sometimes of direction."¹

In illustration of this tendency, the same writer adduces, among other examples, the following: Newton believed that most bodies were quite unaffected by the magnet; Faraday and Tyndall, on the contrary, have rendered it very doubtful whether any substance whatever is wholly devoid of magnetism. So with regard to electricity: the inconceivable rapidity with which an electric current passes through pure copper wire, when compared with the apparently complete manner in which it is stopped by a thin partition of gutta-percha, seems, at first sight, to demonstrate an absolute diversity of nature, as regards electricity, in these two substances. And for a long time it was believed that electrical conductors and insulators formed two opposed classes of substances. But Faraday demonstrated that these were but the extreme cases of a chain of substances varying in all degrees in their powers of conduction. Even the best conductors, such as pure copper or silver, offer some resistance to the electric current, while other metals have considerably higher powers of retardation. And, on the other hand, the best insulators allow of an atomic induction which is the necessary antecedent of conduction. Hence the inference that, whether we can measure the effect or not, all substances discharge electricity more or less. Another very remarkable case of unsuspected continuity was revealed when it was successfully shown that the liquid and gaseous conditions of matter are only remote points in a continuous course of change.

Further illustration would not help us to understand the principle; and as to the number of such unexpected verifications of the law of continuity, it is sufficient to say that they have made it necessary to almost reverse the rule laid down by Newton on the subject. "Those qualities of bodies," he held, "which are not capable of being heightened and remitted, and which are found in all bodies on which experiment can be made, must be considered as universal qualities of all bodies." But, in the light of more recent discovery, Dr. Jevons declares the contrary to be more probable; namely, that "qualities variable in degree will be found in every substance in a greater or less degree."

Another consideration that ought to make us tolerant of seemingly wild hypotheses, in the application of this law, is the fact that, in most of the cases where a given property has been proved to belong to a great number of substances in varying degrees, this

¹ *The Principles of Science*, by W. Stanley Jevons, LL. D., chap. xxvii.

property has first attracted attention by manifesting itself in a conspicuous and intense manner in some particular substance. Owing to this, it has often been the case that such a property on its first appearance has been regarded as the isolated peculiarity of this substance. "Every branch of physical science," says the author above quoted, "has usually been developed from the attention forcibly drawn to some singular substance. Just as the load-stone disclosed magnetism, and amber frictional electricity, so did Iceland spar show the existence of double refraction, and sulphate of quinine the phenomena of fluorescence. When one such startling instance has drawn the attention of the scientific world, numerous less remarkable cases of the phenomenon will be detected, and it will probably prove that the property in question is universal to all matter."

Carrying these general considerations with us, let us now attack the problem in detail. Matter, it is said, has certain characteristics that separate it absolutely from mind. Mind has certain characteristics that make it in all respects the antithesis of matter. Is this true? It may be that mind and matter, though so sharply contrasted in our thought, are not mutually exclusive. It may turn out, as it has in so many other cases, that each shares, only in different degrees, the essential characteristics of the other. The first quality of matter to be questioned shall be its *uniformity of action*. The laws of matter, we say, can be accurately ascertained, so that, when we have discovered how a given combination of substances *has acted* under certain well-defined circumstances, we know exactly how it will always act. The circumstances being the same, there will be no shadow of variability in its behavior. Mind, on the contrary, is characterized by an indeterminate element. It has within it a principle of freedom, or self-determination. Its action cannot be certainly predicted.

Starting from the side of matter, we have little difficulty in showing that the particular characteristic which we have regarded as distinctive of it is shared by mind. The operations of mind are very largely calculable. They are for the most part governed by a routine as rigid as that of operations that we call purely mechanical. Even when we confine our attention to the most complex manifestation of mind, we have to recognize the fact that individual human beings differ very widely as to the predominance of calculable action in their behavior. When we contrast the mental activity of an inventor with that of an unskilled laborer, who plods through almost the same identical round from

day to day, we seem to have fallen almost more than half-way toward a form of mind the action of which might be accurately determined. And if we follow down, step by step, the scale of animated existences, we find ourselves led, by almost imperceptible stages, to a point where it is difficult to say whether what we behold has an indeterminate element or not.

Should we not state the case more exactly, then, if, instead of saying incalculable action is a distinguishing peculiarity of mind, we should say, *incalculable action is a characteristic of the higher forms of mind*? It would certainly be straining the law of continuity to assume, in its name, that the manifestation of a given quality will be the same in every case, no matter what the degree of that quality. On the contrary, to quote Dr. Jevons once more, "we should bear in mind that phenomena which are in reality of a closely similar or even identical nature may present to the senses very different appearances. Without a careful analysis of the changes which take place, we may often be in danger of widely separating facts and processes which are actually instances of the same law. Extreme difference of degree or magnitude is a frequent cause of error."

We are not trying to show that an atom is possessed of *all* the qualities that characterize the most highly developed form of mind, but that it may be possessed of certain fundamental qualities that belong everywhere to mind as such. Incalculable action, we hold, is not a necessary concomitant of mind. It may be only a characteristic of its more complex forms. We are careful to say *may be*, for indeterminateness of mind is known to us only *subjectively*; and what the subjective aspect of the activities of an atom may be, we do not know.

What, then, we may very properly be asked, are the fundamental qualities that everywhere distinguish mind as such? We will venture to say that *spontaneity of action* and *consciousness* are essential attributes of every form of mind. By *spontaneity* I do not mean movement in the absence of an external stimulus, but movement from within in response to an external stimulus; I am thinking, in fact, of that class of movements that are made known to us in the transformations of chemistry. When matter is moved in bulk by an outwardly applied force which does not affect the inward constitution of its molecules, there is nothing, it seems to me, to suggest mental action; but when a compound molecule is broken up, and its constituent atoms seek and enter into new combinations in response to a changed environment, there is something that closely resembles psychical action.

It is certainly significant, in this connection, that eminent physiologists are unable to agree as to where, on the scale of existences, psychical action ends and chemical begins. For instance, M. Charles Richet affirms that "the laws of irritability act in all their simplicity and rigor among simple beings. In fact, in every instance of investigation into the nature of simple organisms, or such as appear simple by the optical instruments at our disposal (a fact that does not always prove their simplicity), as bacteria, for example, we find that chemical irritability is the apparently sole law of movement. What else, indeed, are the movements of these bacteria so thoroughly studied by M. Englemann, if not an affinity for oxygen, — in other words, the simplest and most universal chemical phenomenon in all nature?"¹ To this M. Alfred Binet replies: "We believe that, as yet, no one has demonstrated that the movements of a living being, in moving towards a distant object, however simple they may be, can be explained merely by a chemical affinity acting between that being and that object. It is certainly not chemical affinity that is acting, but much rather a psychological need."

It is clear, I think, that one great point of difference between these two eminent physiologists lies in their different attitudes to the law of continuity. M. Richet holds that simple beings have a simple psychology. He does not mean to affirm that this simple psychology, because it may be expressed in the terms of chemistry, is therefore not psychical. On the contrary, he elsewhere calls it "elementary psychic life." But M. Binet, seeing in chemical affinity something very unlike psychical or physiological need, assumes that there is no community of nature between the two. And in so doing he seems to me to be drawing one of those arbitrary lines, which have been so frequently laid down only to be obliterated by the onward movement of scientific investigation.

The origin of such lines, if I am not mistaken, is to be found in the idea that, at some point on the scale of existences, all complexity of nature ceases; and that there are such things in the world as absolutely simple elements, — an idea which we have found to be the contradiction of experience. The same way of thinking has operated to restrict the recognition of consciousness below a certain line; so that we find the greatest diversity in biological writers as regards the freedom with which they impute this char-

¹ Translated from the *Revue Philosophique* for the *Open Court*, December 27, 1888.

acteristic to the lower orders, and often the greatest pains taken to define the limits within which it may be believed to exist. It is assumed that, until we reach a certain degree of complexity of constitution, there is nothing in the world but mechanical action; and that consciousness supervenes as an absolutely new product.

The simple fact is that consciousness cannot be *proved* to exist at any point. Its recognition is always a matter of analogical inference. And I believe no good reason can be alleged for refusing to extend our analogy to existences that display so great a variety of operation, in response to irritation, as the elementary atoms of chemistry. If consciousness in man is the concomitant of complex chemical changes, is it not reasonable to infer a simple form of consciousness as the attendant of chemical changes that are relatively simple?

We cannot dwell longer on this point, for we have to consider another of the characteristics of what we call inanimate matter. The immobility of many of the materials that surround us seems to render the idea that they have any psychical element too improbable. We hold in the hand a coin that a thousand years ago was just what it is now, and say, is it thinkable that the atoms of which this coin is composed are beings with the possibility of anything like mental responses or consciousness? Ages upon ages before this coin was formed, the molecules of copper of which it is composed laid immovable in the earth. Certainly it does seem almost too heavy a thought for the imagination to lift; and we eagerly search through the psychic life with which we are familiar for all possible analogies that may illustrate these long intervals of inactivity and unconsciousness.

Even in the most complex beings we have the phenomenon of deep, dreamless sleep. We have also the phenomena of coma and catalepsy to remind us that the most highly developed minds may continue long in a state bordering upon absolute inactivity. And when we descend the biological scale, we find, in the hibernating animals, much more remarkable instances of suspended animation. Creatures that are so frozen as to appear to be simple fragments of ice will reassume, on the application of heat, all their functions. The simpler the combinations into which elementary beings enter, the more lasting should we expect these combinations to be, and the longer, therefore, the possible intervals between their active states; for we know that consciousness, and psychic activity of every kind, is the concomitant of chemical change.

But we are apt to deceive ourselves when we picture to the im-

agination the deadness of matter. We forget that civilization is engaged in a hand-to-hand and never-ending conflict with the eternal restlessness of this same dead matter. Unless carefully guarded, very few of the things that we use last long, not simply because they wear out or meet with violent ends, but more especially because the elements of which they are composed are forever changing their alliances. We forget, moreover, how incessant and powerful are the changes that are continually taking place on a vast scale around us; how oxidization and the vicissitudes of cold and heat are keeping the world of apparently inanimate matter in a state that, could we see it as it is, would present a scene of the liveliest animation.

And, finally, we have to remind ourselves that all these analogies are perhaps useful only as illustrating a condition of relative immobility; that there is, probably, no such thing as absolute rest. The molecules of solids are not thought of by science as isolated particles, but are believed to be constantly moving bodies that determine each other's orbits by their mutual attractions. And, further, all solids are convertible into gases, — a form in which their molecules, according to the kinetic theory of gases, resemble "a swarm of innumerable solid particles incessantly moving about with different velocities in rectilinear paths of all conceivable directions."

To get on with our argument, then, let us assume that a hylozoic view of the world is admissible, and proceed to determine its bearings upon the mechanical theory. Does it materially alter the situation as regards that theory? It certainly does. For these two categories, mechanism and mind, if they are coextensive in the universe, cannot dwell together on an equal footing. It is true that the physical realists would have us believe that they can; and Mr. Spencer thinks that he has so presented them to us in his philosophy. It seems to him that he has given both these aspects of reality an impartial treatment and an equal standing when he presents us with the conclusion that there is *one* inscrutable reality, and that this manifests itself to us with *two* faces, that cannot by any effort of the imagination be reconciled with each other. But, as matter of fact, these two aspects do not stand on the same level in the dynamics of his philosophy. All the movement in his system is obtained by treating the objective, mechanical side as the representative of the causative element, and the subjective side as the effect.

His evolution proceeds upon the assumption that force is ante-

cedent to mind, — that force without mind has elaborated a large part of the world as we see it, and then has given birth to mind. It is true that he seems sometimes to state the opposite belief, as when he says: "On tracing up from its low and vague beginnings the intelligence which becomes so marvelous in the highest beings, we find that, under whatever aspect contemplated, it presents a progressive transformation of like nature with the progressive transformation we trace in the universe as a whole." But when he illustrates this thought he goes no further back than the simplest forms of the nervous system; and all through the earlier part of the evolution the physical *aspect* is treated as a physical *reality* that, working by itself, performs wonders, without any assistance from the mental aspect. Mr. Herbert's remark on the use that Mr. Spencer makes of his two *aspects* seems to me a most just one. He says: "It seems fair to describe the objective face (as used in the "Synthetic Philosophy") as *essential*, and the subjective as *non-essential*." ¹

Take away, now, from the realistic philosophy this unwarrantable assumption of the efficient nature of the mechanical side of things, recognize clearly, in accordance with the law of continuity, that it had no precedence of the mental side in the order of time, and the whole view of things elaborated by this philosophy vanishes. If the mental and the mechanical side coexisted from the beginning, we are obliged to assume a subordination of principles of an exactly opposite kind from that implied in physical realism. The two categories cannot stand on an equal footing. The category of mind, as we have elsewhere argued, is the category of causation. It is from our subjective consciousness of the originating power of mind, and from this alone, that we have derived the idea of cause.

If, then, there has been, from the beginning, a psychical element, this must be regarded as the cause; and the mechanical aspect of the world, as the form which that cause assumes when viewed from the outside. There is here no hiatus between mind and mechanism like that which appears in the schemes of physical realism. We do not have to say that there are two faces of reality, having a "difference that transcends all other differences," two manifestations of an inscrutable reality that "no effort enables us to assimilate." On the contrary, we have *the* reality, the *efficient element of the world*, manifesting itself in a character that is perfectly homogeneous with mind as made known in our

¹ *Modern Realism Examined*, by Thomas Martin Herbert, M. A., p. 85.

experience, but having the quality of calculable action in an extreme degree.

Nor is this all that we gain for scientific coherency by doing justice to the principle of continuity. Having cleared our consciences with regard to this law, the prospect brightens, like the path of the just, at every onward step. A difficulty equally fundamental with the one we have been discussing troubles the physical realists in view of the law of evolution. For if we postulate inanimate atoms and forces as the original essential realities of the world, it is not only impossible to evolve mind from them, it is impossible to evolve anything. And this is a fact, although Mr. Spencer's philosophy appeals to us as a system founded upon evolution. Let us see how the mechanical and the evolutionary conceptions of the world stand related to each other historically and logically.

Evolution found the scientific world possessed by the mechanical idea. This in its purity took no note of origins, or of a *process of becoming* in the world. It viewed the world as an independent mechanism, complete in itself, — a mechanism that had been struck out all at once, each part dependent, from the beginning, upon every other part. In opposition to this view, evolution concentrated attention upon the thought of the world as a mechanism that in the beginning was no mechanism, but an aggregate of homogeneous atoms and varying forces. The mechanism had been slowly elaborated by successive modifications that had at length resulted in great complexity. This view was not altogether new. It had held a place, in speculative philosophy, alongside of the mechanical concept, without coming to any definite terms with it. But the prominence and positiveness into which it was brought by the hypothesis of evolution made some sort of an adjustment between it and its rival imperative.

The mechanical view, though not designed or fitted to express this phase of reality, had at the outset the advantage of an old, established priority; and its advocates, insisting upon its all-inclusiveness, could use this advantage with the arbitrariness that unlimited power makes possible. The philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer is a forcible application of the old concept with the intention of bringing all the phenomena of the new absolutely within its limitations. He employs, from the beginning, a method that handicaps all honest investigation of phenomena, by prescribing in advance what their testimony shall be. If it chances not to be thus and so, it must be ruled out as false. The principle is thus stated in the "Synthetic Philosophy": "The task

before us, then, is that of exhibiting the phenomena of evolution in synthetic order. . . . And it has to be shown that this universality of process results from the same necessity which determines each simplest movement around us, down to the accelerated fall of a stone or the recurrent beat of a harp-string. In other words, the phenomena of evolution *have to be* deduced from the persistence of force. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down, and on this a rational synthesis *must* build up.”¹

I have ventured to italicise the words *have to be* and *must* in this quotation, because Mr. Spencer's scheme of evolution hangs by its whole weight upon them. If it is true that the doctrine of the persistence of force is an exhaustive expression of the known reality of the world, then we may proceed as he has done. The phenomena of evolution can have nothing to say for themselves. They *must* fit into the grooves prescribed for them. They are like a consignment of emigrants whose indentures of bondage have been signed and sealed in advance. Any apparent protests they may offer are not to be attended to. In fact, they must not be regarded as protests at all, but as expressions of perfect satisfaction in a language which we do not altogether understand.

But if, on the other hand, as we have argued in our earlier chapters, it is *contrary* to reason and experience to assume that the doctrine of force is exhaustive of known reality, then the phenomena of evolution are entitled to a new trial, in which their testimony shall be received without a prejudgment of what it *must* or of what it *must not* be.

But, it may be urged, Mr. Spencer does not mean to affirm that the phenomena of evolution must be *forced* into the terms of his ultimate principle; on the contrary, he claims that they can be *deduced from* it, and that his philosophy is a satisfactory explanation of the genesis of all known reality. True, this *is* his claim. But we have already shown that one half of reality refuses to be so derived, and now it remains for us to show, more particularly, that the other half is equally recalcitrant; in short, that *none* of the phenomena of evolution can be deduced from the doctrine of the persistence of force; that they must all either be perverted and made to appear what they are not, or be stated in terms other than those of mechanism.

There is only one way by which the world-process can be made to appear purely mechanical; that is, by postulating an aggregate of homogeneous atoms as its antecedent. Unless we have this

¹ *First Principles*, sec. 147.

common standard of unity, the problem is not a purely mechanical one. But having it, and nothing else, how are we going to get diversity out of it? With force acting upon homogeneous atoms, we can get no differences other than those of number and position. No matter how unequally the force may be applied, or how variously the atoms may be combined, the results must always remain homogeneous. No differentiation of qualities can be reached through the merely formal variation produced by force, conceived of as acting from without upon homogeneous units. In order to get started on that career of qualitative variation which constitutes evolution, we must assume a difference of original nature to the units. Whether these be regarded as material atoms, or as mere centres of force, they must be intrinsically different.

But having conceded this original, inner nature to the units of combination, the mechanical theory is at once so radically modified as to deprive it of all its power to exclude agencies other than mechanical. This theory may, as we have already said, legitimately ignore, for its own purposes, the existence of this inner nature of things. All it requires for its operation is that each unit shall retain the same nature when not in combination. But we have always to remember that this exclusion of the inner nature of things from the field of reality is only provisional, not absolute. As Lotze has expressed it: "After experience has taught us that the internal states of atoms — if such they have — exert no modifying influence on the regularity of their working, we can leave them out of account as regards phenomena, without having at the same time to banish them from our view of the universe. On the contrary, further considerations would soon bring us back to the idea that forces do not attach themselves to a lifeless inner nature of things, but must arise out of them; and that nothing can take place between the individual elements until something has taken place within them."¹

Grant this conception of an inner nature, with manifold possibilities of response, and evolution moves on apace. In the contact of atoms so endowed, we may have innumerable combinations; and every change may be productive of beings or substances with new characteristics. But already in this conception the mechanical thought is lost sight of. We have unwittingly adopted in place of it an exceedingly attenuated anthropomorphism. The very words *response*, *reaction*, — and we can find no others to express the idea, — betray the origin of our hypothesis. On every

¹ *Microcosmos*, vol. i., p. 49.

side we postulate internal movements called out by contact with other natures. There is here no stagnation, no rigidity of constitution. Each element at the moment of its internal change is conceived of as *acting*. It is, during that moment, radically different from what it was before, and from what it will be afterward.

We cannot yet proceed to make an application of this view to the problems of philosophy or theology; for there are other important considerations that must first be laid before the reader. Up to this point we have reached the following conclusions: We have seen that we must accept mind as a distinctive reality of the world. We have seen, further, that, if mind is *real*, it cannot be an excrescence, an external product of one part of the world-process; but that it must be the inmost essential reality of things, the very spring of the process itself. And, lastly, we have seen that there is the same reason for postulating the continuity and universality of mind that there is for assuming the continuity of force.

F. H. Johnson.

ANDOVER, MASS.

UNFAIR BURDENS ON REAL PRODUCTION.

THE opinion ordinary men have of our legislators is this: they wish to make a "sack." They do nothing for weeks, postponing all business till the last moment. They then rush bills through on the principle of their own individual interest, passing the bills they are paid higher to pass than to kill, killing those they are paid more to kill than to pass. They are mostly men who know nothing about making laws, and who are totally incapable of making laws. I heard two men of the working-class conversing in a restaurant express these opinions. "You do not believe in bribing legislators?" a representative of the capitalist side inquired. "No," I replied. "Well, I do," he continued. "It is the only way we can protect ourselves. Periodically bills destructive to business interests are brought in, and we must prevent their passage by buying the legislature, or suffer heavy losses. What else can we do? In two years the same bills will appear again, and again the law-makers must be purchased." I said, "At least you do not make very much progress by your method, if every session or two the thing has to be done over again."

What supports the whole outlay falling under direct and indirect bribery? Legitimate business must do it, and ultimately real production, wherever that may be found and whatever it is. But the effects of this single item, bribery, on business, are far greater than the mere money outlay. The time and vitality of captains of industry are required by it. It is distinctly one of the prime elements of uncertainty. More capital is needed to conduct every business in consequence of it.

There are many forms of parasitic business. Companies are formed for the purpose of giving a few persons offices and salaries, and often there is no other reason for their existence. Or, they enter a legitimate field, but one in which fewer companies with fewer buildings, offices, officers, and agents could do all the business, and possibly much better. A heavier burden is put upon every other business because of the excessive costliness of what this performs. A body of men are withdrawn from some legitimate activity. Capital is applied to superfluous undertakings, and useful projects cannot obtain it. In the end, real production sustains the pressure.

If these facts are followed out, they indicate that a great many people, apparently productive, are supported by actually productive industry without rendering anything, or, if anything, any fair proportion, in return. Much of the business that is done consists not of production, or of anything that aids production, but is a scheme and device for getting possession of some part of the product. It is a war of brains, and of brains from which the moral element has been dropped. Living by one's wits is characteristic of the American temper, and it obtains among us as much, or nearly as much, respect as legitimate business and hard, solid production. But the two things are wide contraries, and the former is a sucker upon the latter.

Now the great bane of business is uncertainty. Steady application and the greatest foresight do not insure success. The business man cannot look ahead to a point where the spectre of failure does not lurk in his path. Uncertainty is inherent in a system of highly organized competition; but the difficulties and uncertainty are immensely increased by the illegitimate elements just referred to. Every man who enters business with honest aims is the prey of a pack of persons who live by managing the business machinery. Their function is to get away the profits of producers by manipulation. They are the highway robbers and the thieving tricksters of industry. And yet, as I have said, their part is con-

sidered a respectable one. One reason for this is that unreal transactions are so complicated with real, and performed by the same persons, that it is hard to discriminate them.

There can be but one issue of this state of things. The business man will spare no effort to acquire the largest fortune in the briefest time. He will try to amass sufficient wealth to enable him to retire and live on safely invested capital free from care, or he will endeavor through the magnitude of his undertakings or by combination to lift himself above the breakers of competition and uncertainty. Thus, through dread of dangers of business and anxiety to escape them, these very persons multiply the dangers and make the struggle harder. An intelligent business man reasons somewhat in this wise: "The question for me is not simply whether I can meet the heavy expenses of this year and next and ten years from now and make a living, but whether I can sustain my business through twenty-five years in order then to have a living. There are before me many unforeseen difficulties and times of great strain, and I must provide against these while the way is smooth. I must, therefore, be closer in my management than I would otherwise be or than I like to be. I must hire help cheap and get all I can out of my help, and do other things in a similar spirit." This is the genesis and explanation of some of the apparent and real meanness of employers to those who work for them. But the principal thing to notice here is that the life of the average employer in the present reign of uncertainty is very unenviable. The heaviest curse in modern industry is not labor, but uncertainty.

Up to this point, then, the problem as we see it is to lighten the burden on actual production, especially by diminishing the uncertainty.

Let us now turn to a familiar argument and see how what we are saying affects it. Computation, we are told, shows that if all the wealth of the United States were divided equally among the people, each person would have but the equivalent of \$900 in money. Likewise, dividing total income, each individual would have somewhat less than \$394 per annum.¹ In this estimate children and women have been included, so that the property and income of a family may be obtained by simple multiplication. Say there are five persons in a family, the capital will be \$4,500, the yearly income \$1,970.

Far from being a poor showing, as the author of it assumes, it

¹ *Ultimate Finance*, by William Nelson Black, pp. 2, 3.

is extremely encouraging. There are now many families in the country containing five and more than five persons whose income is less than that allotted to each unit in this estimate, namely, \$394. The writer, nevertheless, says:¹ "Men are apt to think that there is privation only because wealth is unequally or unjustly distributed. But they could not take a more erroneous view." "Look upon this subject in any light of which it is capable, and we see that the great want of the world is capital, or the power of producing income. Until this want is supplied there can be no general amendment." His own figures show the possibility of a very remarkable general amendment simply by better distribution of the capital we already have.²

But the point that I wished to make is this. We have seen that a considerable part of what is produced goes to persons who have not only no claim to it, but who actually hamper its production. What would be the effect if these persons in their present capacity were eliminated from the industrial machinery and compelled to become producers?

As already remarked, the strain of business would be greatly relieved, and now, translating this into terms of actual income, the actual wealth of each individual in society would be happily augmented. A single person can live in comfort upon \$350 a year, and save from \$394. If \$25, or \$50, or \$100 were added to this, a man would be opulent.

But one very important class of non-producers has not been taken count of. There are persons who receive an income from society without any pretense of taking active part in production. This class is likewise supported by those engaged in actual production, and they add to their burden. This opens the question of the retired capitalist and the children, children's children, and remote descendants of the retired capitalist, provided they are inactive. They do nothing, but others feed, clothe, and house them, give them carriages, and supply them with funds to travel over the world and buy bricabrac. If they invest their money wisely, and ideas on the subject do not change, their offspring will be thus fed and fondled till the end of the world. What I ask is this: What entitles them to this support?

Is it, as economists say, the reward of saving or abstinence? Then many of us who are now toiling deserve to be supported in the

¹ *Ultimate Finance*, by William Nelson Black, pp. 2, 3.

² Better distribution and equal division, it must be remembered, are not the same thing.

same manner. For there have been many who likewise saved, but who by a poor investment lost what they saved. They forfeited their right to be supported by others through thus losing their savings through a poor investment. Then it is not merely saving that confers upon one this right, but saving coupled with a safe investment. Now this is something unthought of in political economy, and it sets prevalent theories at naught. For, in the first place, if saving has anything at all to do with creating this right to support, — and economic theory, I repeat, says it has everything to do with it, — then the man who saves has still some right to be supported even though he has made a poor investment, and in strictness he has just as much claim to this as before. And the reasonableness of this view is greatly strengthened by a further analysis of the process. The mere saving of wealth is not an economic benefit; it becomes such when this saving is turned to production or is used as capital. It is when the man who has saved applies his wealth to production, or lends it to some one else for that purpose, that he begins to have claims upon society for support other than those which the gradual expenditure of his principal to satisfy his needs would give. He loans his capital as wisely as he can, and herein he has done all that he can. He has made the two important contributions for the economic well-being of his fellows: he has abstained from present employment by saving, and he has turned what he saved over to society to be used by one of its representatives for the general good. Therefore he deserves support, and his posterity after him. If what he loaned is lost, it was not his wish; probably it was lost by an economic accident, a crisis or the like. Nevertheless, if one man who has saved and advanced his money to another for productive purposes is supported, every man who does the same thing should be supported, whatever be the course of what he loans. This not being done, the whole economic theory which treats capital as the result of saving, and this saving as conferring certain rights, is erroneous, and the rights that are assumed for capital on that ground are untenable, or, if valid, must be so for some new reason. But since society does not support those who do these two things, — in the degree, of course, that they do them, — but only supports those who do these and a third thing, that third thing must be the most important. And it will be absolutely proved that this third thing is most important, if society rewards the doing of it alone or in conjunction with only one of the others. Now this third thing is investing the money in a safe

way, that is, apparently, putting the money in the hands of some one who will not waste it; but even this, as we shall see, is not necessarily true. And that society does regard this third thing as the most important is seen from the fact that people who have not themselves saved money, those who have received it as a gift, or obtained it by speculation, or in other ways, or even stolen it, if in accordance with certain legal requirements, are, if they invest this money safely, regarded as entitled to support, and their descendants are likewise supported by society so long as they invest safely.¹

¹ The following speaks for itself. It appeared in the *San Francisco Examiner*, February 22, 1889, upon the death of J. C. Flood:—

“CAPTURING A MINE.

“HOW THE FIRM GAINED CONTROL OF THE HALE AND NORCROSS.

“An interesting story is told of the manner in which Flood, Mackay, Fair, and O'Erien obtained control of the Hale and Norcross mine. At that time the Hale and Norcross, like all the other Comstock properties, was selling by the foot. This mine had 400 feet, and Mr. Flood, believing that there was a large body of ore in it, advised his partners to secure the controlling interest. Sharon and Ralston, who at that time represented the Bank of California and had a controlling interest in nearly all of the Comstock mines, made their plans to break down these new interlopers.

“The contest, naturally, was very vigorous, and under the pressure of the great demand for the stock the price of Hale and Norcross rapidly advanced from \$1,200 a foot to between \$5,000 and \$6,000 a foot. The contest finally got so close that only ten feet had to be secured by either party before the desired control could be gained, but where and who the owner of the ten feet was, was a question that neither side could answer. They, however, did not remain idle, but caused diligent inquiry to be made, and had every nook and corner of the stock market searched.

“A CUNNING OPERATOR.

“Mr. Sharon, while in Virginia City, heard that the ten feet belonged to a man who had died some time before, and who had left them to his widow. She, not knowing how valuable the certificates had become, put them away and bestowed no further thought upon them. All the telegraphic business of mining men was transacted in cipher, and the telegraph operator in the Virginia City office, and through whose hands all these cryptic messages passed, had a loftier ambition than that of remaining a lightning striker all his life. He was also investing his surplus on margins in stocks, and he very naturally and methodically took a great interest in the nature of the cipher used by Sharon and Ralston. He even nursed his curiosity so far as to sit up very late at night studying over these cipher messages, and finally succeeded in deciphering them. He had already translated two or three of Sharon's messages, and had quietly profited by the acquired knowledge, when Sharon handed him a message urging Ralston to hunt up the widow and buy the ten feet from her at any price. The operator, who was a shrewd and canny Englishman, knew that

It seems at first thought as if that which society intends to promote and reward were preservation of capital, valuable to society itself, from waste, and that for this reason it supports those who select good investments. But this is fallacious. For the borrower may waste and dissipate what he borrows, and yet the right of the lender to support by society is not forfeited, provided the borrower has enough money in other things to cover this loss, that is, to repay the lender. The borrower may be a successful producer in some line, A; he may have invested and lost the borrowed money in a way, B, not affecting this prosperous business, A; but the business, B, will be taken away from him to reimburse the lender of the lost money, although through loss of its successful head this productive business, A, may fail to the detriment of the community, and the community may thereby deprive itself of the productive ability and energy of this man.

What, then, does society reward the owner of capital for, in granting him support out of the fund of production? In the last

the contest between the two syndicates was for the possession of the Hale and Norcross, and he realized the importance of the message at once.

"He quietly laid it by, and about half an hour or so afterward Mr. Mackay dropped in. He had treated the operator in a very friendly way by carrying stock for him and by doing other kind acts, and the operator was a grateful man. So he told Mr. Mackay about the dispatch that had not been sent.

"Mr. Mackay immediately wired to Mr. Flood, who found the widow, and bought the ten feet for \$8,000 a foot, and after doing so he telegraphed to Sharon to say that it was no use to fight any longer, that he had got the ten feet, and that his firm had secured control of the mine.

"THEY WERE GRATEFUL.

"Mackay and Fair were as grateful as was the operator, for that astute gentleman is now living in San Francisco enjoying the interest on \$500,000, which he realized in stocks by following 'points' given him by those whom he had placed on the right track to get control of the Hale and Norcross. Mr. Mackay introduced him to Mr. Flood, and said: 'This is the man who was so good as to be able to give us that information in the Hale and Norcross matter. Now whenever he wants you to do anything for him in the stock market, you do it.'

"Shortly after that the operator asked Mr. Flood to buy him some Sierra Nevada, and Mr. Flood accordingly bought him 5,000 shares of Union and Sierra Nevada at \$5, \$6, and \$10 a share, and when the price of the stock got up to \$70 a share he sold it, and paid Flood what he owed him. If he had lost, the bonanza firm would have footed the loss without complaining.

"The acquisition of the Hale and Norcross mine was the beginning of the bonanza firm's fortune. Out of that little bonanza alone there was taken three or four millions of dollars, and with this sum to start them they were able to enter into the larger speculations that added to their wealth."

analysis, it appears to be for being the victim of a happy accident. To be sure, shrewdness and foresight enter in usually to some extent, but sometimes they do not enter in at all, and yet the reward is granted. Moreover, the happy combination of circumstances always contains the element of chance,¹ whereas the greatest shrewdness is often thwarted by unfavorable chance, and it then goes unrewarded. And, furthermore, the element of chance is frequently the sole determining factor, for many people without the least shrewdness or foresight make good investments accidentally, and they live upon society from that day on. Very often they have a friend who by chance makes a safe outlay for them, and society supports them and their posterity as a reward for having a friend who did a certain thing accidentally.

We naturally ask if happy chance, which on analysis turns out to be the only element present in all circumstances where this support is conferred, is not rather heavily rewarded when its favorite is made the recipient of public support by the community, sometimes in the most magnificent luxury, and the duty of maintaining those whom he shall designate in the same degree of splendor is imposed upon generations yet unborn.

All this, however, is the reward of continual abstinence, it will be said by the economist. The abstinence of the man does not cease at the moment when his capital is accumulated. He might thereupon begin to spend it for unproductive purposes, for his own support, for food, clothes, parties, etc., instead of reserving it as principal and loaning it for productive uses. Now it is for this continued abstinence that he is supported and his children are supported as long as they leave the principal untouched.

This claim will not stand examination any more than the other; for a second thought shows that this continued abstinence often goes unrewarded. The man who does not make the fortunate loan abstains no less than the one who does, but he is not supported. He has saved, he has abstained, he has had the will to

¹ "Most men of business love a sort of twilight. They have lived all their lives in an atmosphere of probabilities and of doubt, where nothing is very clear, where there are some chances for many events, where there is much to be said for several courses, where, nevertheless, one course must be determinedly chosen and fixedly adhered to. They like to hear arguments suited to this intellectual haze. So far from caution or hesitation in the statement of the argument striking them as an indication of imbecility, it seems to them a sign of practicability. They got rich themselves by transactions of which they could not have stated the argumentative ground." . . . Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, p. 206.

continue to abstain, and according to the unquestioned principle of political economy he deserves support and should receive it. He has done what political economy proves to be the essential things, — the things which, according to political economy, are the basis and justification and reason of the reward. But an extraneous event occurs, one not vitiating the virtue of the essential acts performed, and the reward is withheld. The unfortunate investor does, after he has lost his money, just what he would have done had he not lost his money: he abstains from the use of it, but society refuses to support him longer in idleness. It is therefore not the continued abstinence or the will to abstinence that is rewarded. The element that remains is, as before, the element of fortunate chance.

It must at this point be further emphasized that it is not even the benefit to society through safe investment that is rewarded. Investments that are safe to the individual investing, but not safe to society in the sense of beneficial to it, are rewarded equally with those that are beneficial to society. If this is so, why does society reward with support those who do nothing for it? Let us see if this is so. To take the previous case, I lend to a man who owns and successfully operates a cotton factory enough to start a sugar refinery. The project of the refinery fails, and most of the capital borrowed of me and invested in it is sunk. The cotton factory, however, saves me from loss, and it now passes into my hands. The capital which I saved, and which entitled me to social support, is now blotted out of existence, but I have, nevertheless, not lost my title to support. It will be objected to this reasoning that it is jugglery of language, since what the borrower lost was really his own capital which he had virtually exchanged for mine, or, in any event, it was he who lost mine, and not I myself, and therefore he should sustain the penalty, loss of social support. But I reply that the two cases — the annihilation of my capital by myself and its annihilation by some one else — are not the same. I ran no risk; the other person took the whole risk and failed, and was punished for it by the confiscation and transference of all his own property to me. Had the undertaking succeeded, it would have been beneficial to society; no undertaking of this sort is unattended with risk: for taking the risk to do that which would help society, he was punished; for refusing to take the risk and doing what was sure, whether the undertaking failed or succeeded, to benefit me, I was rewarded.

Nor are the consequences to production always the same in the

two cases. By the assumption, the cotton factory was successfully producing in the hands of the borrower; but it now comes into my possession, who have no experience in the business, nor desire to engage in it, and who therefore dispose of it to a third person. Now, as facts continually prove, it is doubtful whether the new undertaker will succeed, and how far he will succeed. He may be inferior in productive ability to his predecessor, and then the community has lost something, and he may entirely fail, in which event two capitals have been sunk because I delegated the task of experimenting with my capital to some one else. Had I controlled it myself, but one could have been lost, at worst. But still I am uninjured. The second loss falls upon another man, who assumed the risk of supplying society with the things needed for its existence, and with those consumed by persons who, like me, are supported by the production of others. I still have my capital to lend to a third man, and perhaps with the same results. So far from the support furnished me by society being a reward for investments in which capital is saved from destruction, I may loan in such a way as to repeatedly annihilate capitals of equal size with my own.

Take another case. The owner of five hundred acres of agricultural land expends the rent that he receives from it on his own pleasure, but not being content with this, he borrows my capital, securing me with the land, and consumes it in luxurious living. The support provided for me by society is not withdrawn. It is true that I abstained from the consumption of my capital, and that the one who consumed it and enjoyed it is now deprived of social sustenance. But in consequence of the willingness of society to support me in inactivity, provided I invested my money securely, that is (1) where it would be productively used, or (2) where the borrower had its equivalent and gave me a lien upon it, I was enabled to place it within the power of some one else to squander this amount of capital unproductively, and if I enabled another to do a thing that he could not do without my help, or could not so easily do, it is much the same as doing it myself. It will be objected that the landowner could place his land upon the market and sell it outright and accomplish the same dissipation of capital by squandering the money received. This is true only because land is like capital safely invested: the ownership of it enables one to derive support from the labor of others. If this were not so, if the owner of land could not obtain support from it without himself laboring, and if, as we are assuming, the possessors of capital could not live in idleness by letting others use

their capital, those capital holders wishing to live in idleness would not purchase the land, since it would be useless for their purpose. To live in idleness, they would be compelled to withhold their capital from investment and consume it, after which would come labor. The only one to invest in land would be the capitalist wishing to actually work the land. To him the present land-owner wishing to live in idleness would sell. Thus the land would pass into the hands of workers. The value of the land under this arrangement might be squandered once, — by the one who sold it to get capital to dissipate, — but there would be little tendency to squander it a second time, since its possession had passed from the class of squanderers to the class of workers. The squanderers or annihilators of capital are those who have been bred to habits of living without labor, and who are calculating upon a régime where many of those who are best supported, and best supported permanently, do not labor themselves.

The loaning but inactive capitalist would disappear, and with his disappearance the motive to squander would be reduced in force in another way. Most of the squandering is gradual — one loan after another with mortgages which it is hoped to meet. Positive sale is shrunk from. Positive sale would be the only alternative if the loaning capitalist lost the privilege of being supported by society without labor. The loaning capitalist may now lend to one man who will thus squander his wealth, finally taking his mortgaged property as payment; he may then sell this property and advance the same amount to a second person to squander, and so on indefinitely. For doing this society supports him. We started out in our last inquiry to find if it was not for investing capital in such a safe way that it would not be wasted that the reward of society is conferred. We find that it is equally conferred if the capital is used to bring about the repeated destruction of amounts of capital equal to itself.

But the argument will at length meet us that these are necessary evils, inseparable from a greater good, which greater good is inducement to accumulate capital at all. Some, nay much, of this saved wealth goes into production, and but for the reward offered there would be no accumulation. To test the value of this defense, we must consider the magnitude of the reward in comparison with the sacrifice undergone. Consider first the relative pleasure to be derived from spending a capital and from leaving it intact with the outlook of permanent support from it. In the one case, after a period of comfort or luxury, poverty, loss of

social standing, the necessity of labor without the fulcrum of capital, await one with infallible certainty. In the other, anxiety is reduced to a minimum. There need be no thought of the morrow; the children need have no thought of the morrow. The reward is a steady, and in some cases practically endless, income without labor. Such, too, is the theory of the incitement. Among the prizes that men may draw for not consuming their capital are pledges of their fellow-men to support them and their posterity in inactivity so long as human society lasts. And besides making new pledges of this nature, society is fulfilling pledges made last year and last century and centuries ago, and has on its hands whole families who sip the cream of human possessions and toil and spin not.

The objection to this is that the possible prizes are so staggering and tremendous. As to the two outlined courses of spending and saving capital, the advantages are all on the side of saving. To begin to dissipate a principal is to start immediately on a downward road. To see and act upon this, a man does not need the stimulus of a similar blessing to follow his line to remote futurity. To enter upon the downward way of diminishing principal means the perceptible decrease of respect for him by his fellow-men. Instead of the natural inducements to spend being stronger and needing to be offset by remarkable counter considerations, it seems that the natural inducements not to spend are greater, and would be effective were the promised rewards much less than they now are.

To conclude, it is only necessary to call attention to the fact that this huge task of supporting in varying grades of comfort and magnificence many idle persons falls upon the real producers of each day. Besides supporting themselves, they must aid in supporting others, many of whom live infinitely better than themselves. Take this in connection with the uncertainty of modern business, at first considered, reflect also how this weight adds to the uncertainty, and we begin to comprehend why men will do almost anything to get rich quickly. If they cannot themselves live on the level of peace and unselfishness and improving moral sentiment, they may be able to lift their children to this level out of the arena and into the company of unimpassioned spectators.

Morrison I. Swift.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

THE EDUCATION OF THE ROMAN YOUTH.

As far as is known, the Roman State never contributed anything for the support of education until the time of Vespasian. He set aside a definite sum to be paid yearly to the Greek and the Latin rhetoricians. The emperors that followed took a much greater interest in public instruction, and as Rome's military glory decreased, so the government expended more time and money in the establishing of schools and employing of teachers. The standard of education was raised under Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, and Alexander Severus until mistaken ideas prevailed, and, it may be said, the whole system passed into verbal subtleties, mere superficiality, an imparting of something of everything (which meant not much of anything), in the time of Valentinian I. and Theodosius II. Consequently, the highly educated man of that day was equipped with an encyclopædia of facts, a bundle of philosophic maxims, a countless number of startling paradoxes, and innumerable hair-splitting logical definitions.

During the whole period of Rome's existence antecedent to the reign of Vespasian, the state remained almost inactive in disseminating knowledge. Augustus, it is true, made valuable presents to certain professors of the liberal arts, and Julius Cæsar had already offered citizenship to physicians and teachers that would make their home in Rome. These acts, however, had no special significance, except as precedents for later rulers.

It must not be thought that the civil authorities were wholly indifferent as to the manner and subjects in which, and the persons by whom, the youth was educated, but there was no regular and watchful supervision on their part. We know that they on various occasions interfered, but such interferences had reference to isolated cases, and usually on the ground that they were not in accordance with the customs of their ancestors.

Why did kings and consuls, even emperors, refrain from putting under state control the education of the youth? On the part of the emperors, at least, it was not out of respect for the liberty of their subjects, nor from an unwillingness to regulate their private affairs; for when Rome began to totter, undermined by lust, licentiousness, and excess of every kind, Augustus did not hesitate to prop it up by means of laws against luxury, and by edicts almost forcing the people to marry on account of severe penalties to which a non-compliance exposed them. And yet he never

touched that question, namely, the education of the Roman youth, the regulation of which would have proved far more efficacious than all sumptuary or marriage laws. More than this, it was an established and universally acknowledged principle among the Romans, that the individual existed for the state and not the state for the individual. The citizen could be called upon to make any sacrifice for its safety. The general could command him to ride among the enemy to certain death as a substitutionary offering to the Earth, or to the Gods of the Dead.

This is not a new question. Many answers, not satisfactory, have been given; the true one is, we think, not far to seek. It was on account of a principle that lay at the foundation of the family, namely, the *patria potestas*. The *paterfamilias*, or father of the family, was the oldest ancestor living on the male side. The family included the head, *pater*, the wife, if she was in the hand, *in manu*, of her husband, and all legitimate descendants related through males. A daughter belonged to her father's family, unless she had become a wife *in manu*.¹ The power of the Roman father, *patria potestas*, over his family was, in early times, almost absolute. Theoretically, this was always the case, and it was practically so for centuries. The son had no personal property, no legal right even to his *peculium*. The father could sell the son once, and if his master freed him the father could sell him again, and it was not until he had been sold a third time that he passed wholly from under the possible jurisdiction of his father.² Among the ancient Romans it was easier for a slave to acquire freedom than for a Roman. Now the Roman state was founded on the family. It was nothing but a large family with more numerous branches. Whatever would tend to weaken the power of the father over the children weakened the power of the head of the larger family, that is, the state, over the children, that is, its subjects. Children were not responsible to the state, but to the father, their lawful representative.³ Cæsar, Augustus, and

¹ A woman might be a lawful wife (*matrimonium justum* or *legitimum*), whether she was *in manu* of her husband or not. If she was not a wife *in manu*, she still belonged to her father's family, although her children would be in her husband's family.

² According to Gaius, *Epit.*, i. 6, and Ulpian, x. 1, a triple sale was only in the case of sons; other descendants, both male and female, were emancipated by one sale.

³ A son when of proper age could vote, hold office, or be a guardian, independent of his father. Any pay or emolument resulting therefrom would go to his father. *Digest*, i. 6⁹; xxxvi. 1¹⁸.

more arbitrary rulers often hesitated to fly in the face of tradition or the *mores majorum*, preferring to carry out their plans by a seeming deference to the will of the people or of the senate. The politic Augustus did not venture to wrest from the father this authority over his children, lest there follow insubordination toward the natural head, which might be the forerunner of rebellion in the larger family, of which he himself was the political head. This element, the influence of the state, which among other nations would be found powerful, need not be taken into consideration by us while discussing the education of the Roman youth.

The prevailing belief among the Greeks and Romans was that life was not desirable. This crystallized itself into the proverb, that by far the best thing for man was not to be born, and the next best thing, to die as soon as possible. Lucretius, the most gifted of Latin poets, describes the condition of the new-born infant in the following words: "The babe, like a sailor thrown up by the cruel waves, lies naked on the ground, speechless, in need of every aid to life, when first nature by throes of birth has cast him forth upon the shores of light; and he fills the place with his piteous wail, as it befits one for whom it remains to pass through so many ills in life."¹ The words "on the ground" in this passage refer to the practice, in vogue among the Greeks and Romans, of exposing infants. The sight of the helpless and forsaken child in a public place must have excited the pity of many an on-looker and helped to form the proverb, and have suggested to Lucretius the lines quoted. A misshapen or deformed child was put to death without having been given even this chance of life, and a babe that the parents did not desire for any reason to bring up was put down in the street for any fate that might befall it. The poor pleaded poverty in justification for such heartlessness, but those who were wealthy did not shrink from ridding themselves in this way of their offspring. If the child was to be reared, it was laid upon flowers and sacred herbs, and the father, or one appointed by him, lifted up the infant, thus becoming responsible for it thereafter. By means of messengers and the daily bulletins, the event was announced, and nine days afterward in the case of a boy, or eight days if it was a girl, the day of purification was celebrated. The friends assembled, bringing presents. The first, and by far the most important one, was an oval flat disk, sometimes resembling a locket, given by the

¹ V. 222-227.

father. It was called a *bullā*, and was suspended from the neck to ward off the influence of the evil eye. The *bullā* was made of Etruscan gold or of silver. If the father was poor, a knot made of a leathern strap had to suffice.¹ At this ceremony the name was given to the infant.

Even at this early stage in the child's life, its training and education would depend upon the period of Rome's history in which it was born. If this was before the subjugation of the East, or 150 B. C., the strictly Roman system in all probability would be followed; if later, Grecian influence would act upon it at every step. There was no clearly defined line separating these two systems; for some Romans adopted the customs of the Greeks before 150 B. C., and, on the other hand, we know that in certain families the excellent traits of early Roman education were never effaced.

Before foreign elements began to demoralize home life, there were constantly held up before the child integrity, *honestas*, dignity, *gravitas*, and manly virtue, *virtus*. There was added to these refinement, *urbanitas*,² which had about it nothing reprehensible. It was the opposite of rusticity, embracing the results of life in the city as far as pertained to refinement. If a man was praised, he was said to be good, upright, one who was honorable, and an attentive father of his household. These terms show what qualities parents desired their children to possess.

The predominating feature in the education of the young in this early period was the mother's influence. The child was said to be brought up in the mother's lap, *in gremio matris educari*. She was a constant companion, never giving her son or daughter entirely into the charge of others, from the day the *bullā* was hung around the neck until the lad formally passed out of boyhood or the girl wedded. The mother did more than form character. She watched most carefully the child's language, not only that it be free from what was obscene, but that it be pure. Cicero says³ that it makes a great difference whom the child hears daily at home, with whom he speaks, how his father, mother, and instructors speak. He tells us that the Gracchi were brought up not only in the lap, but also in the language, of their mother Cornelia. He mentions other women who, choice in their use of language, fashioned the lisping lips of future statesmen. Curio, who ranked third among the orators of that time, had no knowl-

¹ Juvenal, v. 163 f.

² Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.*, iii. 7⁵.

³ *Brutus*, lviii., lix.

edge of poetry, had read no productions of orators, had made no historical collections, was not acquainted with law. He knew, moreover, almost nothing of literature. His reputation was due to his pure and refined phraseology, the result of the correct and polished language used at home.

In the education, the mother was sometimes assisted by a faithful friend, but the children were not given over, as was the case in a later age, to a Grecian underling. Although there were schools, the home instruction was the more common, consisting of little else than reading, writing, and arithmetic. Literature, and especially poetry, was not held in esteem. Cato's words are: "Honor was not shewn to the art of poetry. If any one devoted himself to poetry, or frequented banquets, he was called an idler." A slight knowledge of the laws was imparted by the father to the sons, and the mother taught the daughters spinning and weaving. If the father tilled the soil, the sons wrought by his side, and from him they learned also how to swim, ride, and defend themselves with fist and weapons. Although there was but little formal instruction, and no clearly defined principles were followed, nevertheless we can discern definite aims; for example, physical health and strength, fear of God, respect for the laws, modesty, self-control in word and action, propriety of conduct in public, practical activity, confidence in one's self, and a firm belief in the great destiny of the state. For these the daily routine served as a school. Whenever the father sacrificed in the house, or at a shrine of the clan, the sons performed the subordinate offices, and thus there were awakened and quickened in them religious feelings. When the master of the house received his clients early in the morning to discuss matters of business, or when, on festal days, he brought forth the images of ancestors that had conferred glory on the family, or when the table-songs were sung recounting the deeds of heroes, and orations delivered commemorative of former statesmen, the sons were bidden to be present, that, by the examples set before them, they might learn their duties in life and be spurred on to rival their forefathers.

The sons of senators once enjoyed an advantage, especially in the line of statesmanship and judicial life, that did not fall to the lot of others. It was this: each senator had a right to take his son, or sons, with him into the senate chamber. The following incident, recorded in the "*Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius*," i. 23, explains how this privilege was lost. One day, a young man, Papirius, went with his father, as was his custom, into the senate

house. A matter of unusual importance was introduced, and the further consideration of it was postponed to the next day. It was resolved that no one should make any mention of the subject of debate until there had been an official announcement. When young Papirius went home, his mother inquired what the senators had been discussing. The youth replied that secrecy had been enjoined, so that he was not at liberty to tell. This increased the mother's curiosity, and, with great vehemence, she demanded an answer. Papirius, seeing her importunity, determined upon a humorous fiction. He said the senate had seriously considered the question, whether it would be more beneficial to the state for one man to have two wives, or for one wife to have two husbands. The mother was greatly agitated, and went in great trepidation to report the news to her neighbors. On the morrow, the matrons betook themselves, in a body, to the senate, and, with tears and entreaties, implored that one wife might be suffered to have two husbands rather than one husband two wives. The senators were astounded, but Papirius advanced into their midst and explained all. The senators were delighted with his integrity and ingenuity, and yet a law was passed that, thenceforward, no youth, except Papirius Prætextatus, should enter the senate house.

Such was the education of children in the early period of Rome, bearing from first to last the stamp of the parents', and especially of the mother's, influence. One generation following in the footsteps of another gave a wonderful stability to the nation, but shut out all progress in art, science, and culture. The Greeks aimed at the harmonious development of the whole man, something never dreamed of by the Romans. Morally, however, this one-sided and crude education was vastly superior to that of the Greeks, and if the Romans had retained this foundation, and built upon it after the Grecian model, the structure would have been unequaled among the ancients in solidity and beauty.

The youth at about the age of sixteen (although the extremes were twelve and nineteen) passed into man's estate. The *bullæ*, which he had worn since his ninth day, was hung up as an offering to the household gods. The toga prætexta, with its broad purple stripe, was laid aside, and the toga of manhood, of pure white, was put on. He went, accompanied by father and relatives, to the forum, where he was enrolled as a citizen; thence to the Capitol, where he sacrificed. Notwithstanding he was now legally a man, and possessed of all the rights of citizenship, it was expected that he remain a passive bystander for one year. He was called a *tiro*, and was said to keep his arm at rest under his mantle.

This year was spent in preparing himself for one of the three careers open to the sons of the best families; the judicial, the military, or that of a state official. This was done by becoming the constant companion of some prominent orator in that special line of jurisprudence to which he wished to devote himself, as Cicero, in later times, accompanied Scævola, or by joining the retinue of some officer, or by going as a subordinate official to one of the provinces.

Passing to the next period, extending from 150 B. C. to the fall of the empire, we shall find radical changes in the system of education followed by unforeseen results. The rage was, on all sides, for what was Grecian. The Greeklings, as Juvenal calls them, penetrated into every department of Roman life. If wealthy and high-born, they were courted and petted. Even to the Greek slaves a certain deference was shown, and they supplanted the home-born slaves in the confidence of the master. As heretofore, the family and friends assembled on the ninth or eighth day, the *bullæ* was hung around the child's neck, a name was given it, and then, instead of being kept under the mother's protection, the infant was consigned to the care of a nurse. Believing that this innovation affected ultimately not only the stability of the family, but also of the state, we shall refer to a passage in the "Dialogue concerning Orators," commonly attributed to Tacitus, in which are described the persons who now took the mother's place. The import of section 28 is, that in former times the infant was not given into the charge of a hireling nurse, but was brought under the close and affectionate supervision of the mother. The chief praise of a woman was to manage her household affairs, and to devote herself to her children. A matron related to the family, and distinguished for purity of life, was set over the young offspring. In her presence, not one disgraceful word was allowed to be spoken, and nothing dishonorable to be done; but now (section 29) the infant is committed to the care of some Greek nurse, and of a slave or two, generally the worst in the household, and not fit for any important service. These fill the tender and untrained minds of the young with their stories and errors. Not a slave in the whole house cares what he says or does in the presence of his young master. Moreover, also, the parents themselves accustom the young children to wantonness and to deriding. Gradually all sense of shame is lost, and likewise respect for self and for others. The minds of the youth seemed to be taken up wholly with actors, gladiators, and horses.

A conclusive proof of the close relationship existing between these nurses and the children is the fact that the word of endearment, *mamma* (literally breast), by which the child formerly addressed its mother, was applied also to the nurse. And, moreover, the common word for mother, *mater*, had become so ambiguous that in Plautus, *Menæchmi* Prologue, l. 19-21, the term designates both the nurse and mother, and yet it is used in such a way that we must come to the conclusion that by the word *mater* the nurse was more commonly understood than the natural parent.

At about seven years of age, when the child could understand intelligently, it came into the keeping of the pedagogue, likewise a Greek or foreign slave. The pedagogues were not teachers. It was their duty to train boys in morals and manners, and to give them a practical knowledge of Greek, as preparatory for entering upon school duties. These pedagogues were polished, had a thorough acquaintance with the world, and knew how to smooth off the corners of their young wards. They have been described, however, as most shameless, self-conceited, without real education, and morally worthless. Their greatest solicitude was about the lad's table manners: that he use the right hand in preference to the left, that he eat fish and meat with two fingers of the right and bread with two fingers of the left hand; and, above all, that he properly throw his cloak around his left shoulder. The pedagogue conducted the boy to the school of the grammarist, *grammatista*, *litterator*, before daylight. Here he was taught reading, writing, and simple arithmetic. The pupil learned the names, order, and pronunciation of the letters, passing then to syllables, words, and sentences. An earnest but unavailing effort was made to introduce the syllabic method, the advocates thereof claiming that the learning of the names and order of the letters was a waste of time. Distinct pronunciation was acquired by practicing difficult combinations of sounds. The text-books were the Laws of the XII Tables, treaties, afterwards the writings of the earliest Latin poets, and, in later times, the productions of the classical and the post-classical period. The materials used in writing were waxen tablets, and an iron stylus sharp at one end and blunt at the other for the purpose of erasure. A good portion of the time was spent on arithmetic. The Romans made use of the duodecimal system, dividing the units into twelfths in measures of length, capacity, weight, and time, and in money. The grammarists were not very kind. They are spoken of as shouting and fond of flogging. One of Martial's epigrams (ix.

69) is as follows: "What have you to do with us, you rascal of a school-teacher, a person hated by boys and girls! The crested cocks have not yet broken the silence, but you are already making a thundering noise with your savage growling and blows." And in xii. 57, he complains that the school-teachers will not let him live in the morning, and the bakers will not at night.

The boy was promoted to the school of the Greek and the Latin grammarian, *grammaticus* or *litteratus*. This literary element was something new in Roman life, since it was far removed from what was practical. Many preferred that the instruction in Greek should precede that in Latin. 1st. Because the pupils would necessarily make progress in Latin on account of their surroundings. 2d. Systematic instruction demanded that the study of Greek, the parent language of Latin (according to their ideas), should be pursued first.¹ The preliminary course, both in the Greek and Latin schools, treated of grammar proper. The scholars now studied theoretically what they had learned practically. There were included the declensions, conjugations, and rules of syntax. Selections from the poets were to be read understandingly, attention being paid to pronunciation, emphasis, and, above all, to enunciation. The way to the second course was thus opened. Here was developed and cultivated a literary and critical taste. In the Greek school, everything revolved around Homer. In the Latin, Livius Adronicus, Plautus, Terence, Vergil, Horace, and later writers were the text-books used. The instruction included a discussion of the author's rank in literature, of his personality and life, of the metre of the production, its philosophy and ethics. References to phenomena in nature were explained, and especially whatever pertained to the rising and the setting of constellations. The only practical aim was the power of ready and correct expression of thought. The fables of Æsop, and similar stories, were recited, and the pupils were obliged to re-write them, varying the style. Compositions and essays were required on such subjects as Homeric verse, The Departure of the Wanderer from Home, The Peasant's Thoughts at the First Sight of a Ship. Once a month a contest was held, which consisted of reading essays and delivering orations in the presence of parents. The contestants were ranked according to the merit of their performances, and kept that rank until the next contest, the thirtieth² day afterwards, came round. In connection with these literary studies, the scholars were taught drawing, higher arithmetic,

¹ Quintilian, i. 1st.

² Quintilian, i. 2nd.

geometry, astronomy, and music. These embraced the liberal arts. Geometry was one of the number, chiefly on account of its disciplinary nature. 1st. In geometry, order is absolutely necessary. It proves what follows from what precedes, what is unknown from what is known. 2d. Geometry teaches close syllogistic reasoning. Although music was included, no prominence was given it, even in the time of Augustus. It could not be proved from his writings that Cicero had a musical education, notwithstanding the contrary assertion is made in Tacitus, *Dial. de Oratoribus*, section 29. Among the Greeks, the study of music was never neglected, and Cicero himself refers to this difference between the Greeks and Romans. Cornelius Nepos deems it necessary (*Pref. to De Excellentibus Ducibus*, etc.) to apologize for Epaminondas, because he was acquainted with the art of music and could dance. Alexander Severus, who excelled both in vocal and instrumental music, would neither sing nor play in the presence even of friends. Quintilian¹ is very guarded in recommending the study of music. He restricts it to the songs of heroes and to a knowledge of the principles. Also dancing, which was part of a Greek youth's training, was not held in good repute. The opinion of the Romans was expressed in the words: "You will scarcely ever see a sober man dance, unless he is insane." We have in mind here music and dancing as forming part of a youth's education, and do not refer to the choral dances and songs for special occasions, nor to those persons who took part in public entertainments.

Many went no farther than this, and if they were of proper age laid aside the insignia of boyhood. Girls often engaged in these studies either under tutors or at school. No youth, however, could say that he had completed his education until he had taken the next step, which was to visit the lecture-room of a rhetorician. This was the nearest approach to a professional school. Not that such was intended, but the instruction prepared, in a great measure, for the forum and the senate. The schools of the rhetoricians were established by the Greeks and conducted in the Greek language. The first rhetoricians from Greece were summarily dismissed by the senate 161 B. C. They returned not long afterwards and were welcomed. Orators of high reputation put themselves under their training. In 92 B. C., Latin rhetoricians made efforts to organize schools in which the language and literature should be Latin, but the Censors issued a decree which forbade

¹ I. I.².

the continuance of these schools, because : 1st. Latin schools of rhetoric were contrary to the customs of their ancestors.¹ 2d. The Greeks were more systematic in their instruction and had a broader range of knowledge. 3d. The instruction by the Latin rhetoricians resulted only in volubility and shamelessness. After a short time this edict was not heeded. The schools were founded and almost entirely supplanted the Greek institutions. The rhetoricians dictated their system and the students committed it to memory. A partial outline of one of the lectures is as follows : Every oration is (1) demonstrative, that is, laudatory or vituperative ; (2) deliberative, that is, something should or should not happen ; and (3) judicial, either accusing or defending. Every oration must be treated with reference to five things : (1) the matter, (2) arrangement, (3) memorizing, (4) style, and (5) delivery. The matter has the following subdivisions : (1) the introduction, (2) statement of the case, or circumstances, (3) proof, and (4) conclusion. Under proof we have (1) the fact, did or did it not take place, (2) the law in the case, and (3) if it took place (in the case of homicide) was it justifiable — and so on. The themes for essays and debates were *suasoriae* for the younger and *controversiae*² for the older pupils. Some of these subjects were very good ; for example, How far should a lawyer believe his witness ? The credibility of tradition ? Many of them, however, were absurd, presupposing impossible circumstances and involving points in law which would never occur in practice.³ A favorite exercise was to deliver panegyrics of illustrious men. The task the rhetoricians undertook was to enable the orator to speak on any subject convincingly, using the choicest language, delivering the oration in the best manner, in accordance with the dignity of the subject, the relations of time and place, and to the delight of his hearers. This drill, in principle excellent, often produced a mere fluency of language, a juggling with words, so that frequently lawyers would not let their clients tell them the particulars about their case until they had come into the court-room, and some of the lawyers were so vain that when it was their turn to speak they would ask some one near by for an opening sentence as far removed from the subject as possible. They prided themselves on being able to make this sentence a proper introduction to their

¹ This is interesting, because it shows how long a *practice* existed before becoming a *mos majorum*, about seventy-nine years.

² Tacitus, *Dial. de Orat.*, xxxv.

³ See *Declamationes* of Quintilian and of Seneca.

oration. The intellectual discipline of the young men was not at an end, unless they went abroad to Athens, Alexandria, or elsewhere.

Thus far we have made no mention of physical training. Neither the exercise of the gymnasium nor of the *palaestra*, as a part of a youth's education, found favor, until the empire began to decline. The Greeks made it compulsory for lads to take part in systematic physical exercise under the control of masters. There was not a Greek city in which there was not at least one gymnasium. The Romans set value on a strong body, graceful carriage, activity, and agility, but they thought the Greek system was (1) immodest, (2) a waste of time, not preparing at all for military service, and (3) corrupting. So many young men coming together among so many idle and worthless spectators would be demoralized. They assembled, however, in the Field of Mars, and vied with each other in leaping, wrestling, boxing, fencing, throwing the spear, and riding. The only form of exercise they took from the Greeks was hurling the discus, not at a mark, but as far as possible. Swimming, and ball-playing especially, were favorite diversions.

Their greatest activity and regularity in these exercises were during the last year of their rhetorical schooling and the first year of manhood. No laws compelled young men to engage in these athletic sports, but their absence from the Field of Mars for a considerable length of time brought them into disgrace.¹ The pedagogue kept a watchful eye over his charge, and took special delight in seeing him foremost in these contests.

Leaving these details, we shall revert to the general principles, already touched upon, that seemed to underlie this whole system, and shall inquire wherein they were sound and wherein defective.

The first of these was that the education of the youth should be utilitarian; how was he to make his way in life? This was a wise principle, and should never be lost sight of, but the early Romans seemed ignorant of the fact that some things which, at the time, seem non-utilitarian, may in after life greatly further the interests of the man by unexpectedly turning to account his practical training. We find those Roman families in which there was the greatest conservatism in adhering to this utilitarian system did not become the powerful and wealthy families of Rome. They could not successfully cope with the cultured and refined foreigners from

¹ Horace, *Carm.*, i. 8.

Greece and the Orient, nor with those Romans whose education had been liberalized. Even if the object of life were the amassing of wealth, the so-called utilitarian education would not conduce best to this end. Studies that may be carried on at the moment only for culture oftentimes assist and even make practical those that were preëminently regarded as such.

Another and baneful result of this principle among the Romans was the insatiable desire for money. In no other literature do we find the avaricious man mentioned so often. This character and that of the poetaster are the most prominent in the *Satires* of Horace and of Juvenal. Horace describes the young and old as going up and down with their writing materials and counting tablets, wholly absorbed in money calculations. Their song the live-long day was, "Make money honorably, if you can; if you cannot honorably, in any way at all."¹ The race for money was one constant struggle, which nothing could stop, neither the boiling heat of summer, nor winter's intense cold, nor fire, nor sea, nor the sword. Warehouse after warehouse was filled with grain, and sack after sack of gold buried in the earth.² To show how strong was this passion for money and what it led men to do, Juvenal³ says that no vice of the human breast mixed more poisons or oftener attacked one with the knife than the fierce desire for an immoderate income; for "he who wishes to be rich wishes to become so quickly." And in describing one who threw overboard all his valuables to save himself, he exclaims in mock admiration, "Where else in the world in these days, I say, will you find another one who has the daring to prefer his life to silver and his safety to his possessions; for they make fortunes not for the sake of life, but basely blind they live for the sake of making fortunes."⁴ Where avarice was not the motive, it might be vanity or a desire to gain popularity. The love of display and fondness for extravagance were seen in their palaces and villas, gardens, household furniture⁵ and decorations, in their food, drink, and clothing, in the number of slaves, in the spectacles given to the people, and also in the funerals. The richer a man was, the more clients he could have to greet him in the morning and escort him on his rounds. He could be carried through the streets of Rome in his litter with a line of Romans clad in white preceding and follow-

¹ *Ep.*, i. 1, 45-66.

² Horace, *Sat.*, i. 1, 35-53.

³ Juvenal, *Sat.*, xiv. 174 f.

⁴ *Sat.*, xii. 48 f.

⁵ Pliny, *N. H.*, viii. 29, mentions a citron-wood table that sold for 1,400,000 sesterces, over \$60,000.

ing. If he had a knight's wealth, he would be allowed, according to the law of Otho, to sit in one of the first fourteen rows of the theatre.

The licentious man would have another motive prompting him to get money, even if he killed his guest-friend sleeping in the very sanctuary of his home before the household gods. In brief, among no people was the god money so worshiped as in Rome,¹ and this was the legitimate result of the utilitarian education.

A second fundamental principle was that the individual existed for the state and not the state for the individual. To a certain extent, this is sound doctrine, but when the state and political head are made identical, it is most pernicious. The manly and sturdy Romans never considered them as identical. Kings might be dethroned, consuls banished, and decemvirs deposed, yet the state still existed, and it was the citizen's duty as much as ever to die in its behalf. Two instances will suffice to prove this. Tarquin the Proud gave great strength to Rome and made it the head of the Latin Confederacy. Nevertheless, for the sake of a woman's honor, imperiled not by the king but by the king's son, he and his family were driven into exile, and the army before Ardea renounced all allegiance to him. Again, when Appius Claudius, the decemvir, was enamored of Virginia and in order to gain possession of her claimed that she was his slave, and when her father appealed to the other decemvirs in vain, and at last in despair stabbed his daughter, saying, "No way but this to keep thee free,"² the people of high birth and low, in city and camp, did not hesitate to rise up against the decemvirs and overthrow their power. These two instances cannot be paralleled in the history of any other nation, where attempted violence to woman twice wrought a revolution. Among these Romans the ruler was but the minister or servant of the state. As cycle after cycle, however, went round, the identity of the state was merged in that of the ruler, so that under Cæsar, Augustus, Nero, Domitian, we find the senate and the aristocracy willing to put up with almost any grievance. The people were nearly always ripe for rebellion, either in the city or in the field. Likewise there were those of the aristocracy that were ready to rise up against tyrants, but this was not the rule. It was sweet and glorious to die for one's country, but the country was embodied in the person of the one that sat upon the throne.

It was, moreover, a good thing to teach self-reliance, and like-

¹ Juvenal, i. 112 f.

² Livy, iii. 48.

wise the great destiny of Rome. The result, however, was pride, haughtiness, and arrogance, both in the individual and in the state.

The last principle was that of home training. The good side was the belief in the necessity of this, the bad side a belief in its all-sufficiency. The heterogeneous elements at first could offer little to the child that would be an improvement on what he might learn from his parents. This exclusively home education was then a necessity, and remained so long enough to become a custom of the ancestors, which gave it almost a religious sanction. Rome was, however, coming out of its isolation. Latium had been brought into subjection, Carthage rendered powerless, and Greece taken captive. The Orient also yielded, and Rome became the metropolis of the world. The staid, conservative Roman matrons began to realize they were uneducated, unrefined, partook of rusticity, and that their nation was classed by the Greeks among the barbarians. Their sons and daughters had not elegant manners, and could not vie, in social life, with the conquered but yet conquering Greeks. A change in the education of the children was imperative, and but two courses lay before them. One of these was for the mother to retain strict supervision over the children and to have home instruction, supplemented by the best teachers, not resigning her authority to a nurse or pedagogue. This course followed Aurelia, the mother of Cæsar, Attia, the mother of Octavianus Augustus, Porcia, the wife of Brutus, and Julia Procilla, the mother of Agricola. In this way, the sterling integrity, nobility of character, and all of the higher qualities of the Romans could be developed, and at the same time the youth be rounded off and polished, so that he need not feel ashamed in the presence of the courtly strangers.

The other course, the one taken by the majority of the matrons, was to surrender everything. The reins of authority were handed over to the Greek or Syrian nurse and then to an immoral pedagogue. The lad must learn those things that make a well-bred gentleman of the times, to wit, Greek and Latin literature and fine manners, but nothing was done for the higher qualities of his nature. This change in education, along with the almost universal prevalence of the looser form of marriage (*sine in manum conventionē*),¹ did more to bring about the downfall of Rome than any other internal cause, for the mother no longer taught the fear of the gods, nor did the father sacrifice in company with his

¹ Ulpian, xxvi. 7.

sons. Every idea of responsibility to a divine power was effaced. The service in the temples became ritualistic, and was retained only to awe the lower classes. A single sacrifice was repeated thirty times on account of some oversight. Long strains of music would be reproduced again and again if a pause had not been properly observed. Greek philosophy was naught but a skeleton. Greek mythology confused the minds of the people. Temple, shrines, sacred groves, were often neglected. No honor was in reality shown to the gods. As Juvenal tells us in regard to perjury, "it is so easy, and one is so prone to despise the gods as witnesses, provided no mortal knows the sacred oath."¹

From being skeptical the higher classes became superstitious, resorting to enchantments and fortune-telling. This was the *first* result of the mother's abandoning the child to strangers and foreigners, who did not either by example or precept teach it to believe in divine oversight and man's accountability.

The Roman oak still looked fair. It budded and put forth leaves, the admiration of all, but its tap-root had been cut.

The *second* result of this thrusting aside of the child was almost universal immorality. Women at first indulged in luxury, and the steps downward were of easy descent. Clandestine correspondence flourished on every hand. The mother sent love messages and tokens, the little daughter, too, wrote letters to her favorites at the mother's dictation. The lad still in the toga of boyhood was found at the gaming table. "Every vice," says Juvenal, "had reached its climax."² Those who spoke in defense of morality and in behalf of pure patriotism were laughed at as hypocrites.

The oak still stood. The leaves dropped earlier than their wont, here and there a branch was broken off, but still they called it the mighty oak that would last for ages. The tree had, however, rotted at the heart.

The *third* result of this utter neglect of the child by the mother was the breaking up of the family relations. Children did not show outward respect for their parents. The father too long-lived was throttled by the son. Husband left wife and wife husband from mere caprice and without form of law, neither one losing social position.³ The exposing of children on the highways became more common. Marriages were formed only as a matter of convenience; for example, to be able to gain an inheritance, or, on the

¹ *Sat.*, xiii. 75.

³ *Sat.*, i. 149.

² Seneca, *de Beneficiis*, i. 9; iii. 4, 16.

part of women, says Seneca, to give them greater license. The vices practiced as the outcome almost transcend belief. The third result, the breaking up of the family, foreshadowed what was impending over Rome. This was not immediate, for the Roman world was like Homer's hero, who in his failing strength exerts all his power and stands erect, only to fall back into greater weakness. Yet it was not long before there sprang up a breeze on the steppes of the Volga and around the Caspian Sea, where roamed the Huns, and the winds caused a rustling in the woods beyond the Danube, where dwelt the Goths, and a gale swayed to and fro the Black Forest of Germany. These forces warring with each other increased in fury, until at last the storm sweeping southward, blast after blast, struck the Roman oak. It snapped in twain and laid bare its hollowness.

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INFLUENCE AND INDEPENDENCE.¹

Agatha. But why should you wish to bring Miss Norton to your point of view? Why not allow her to arrive at things by a mental process of her own?

Julia. But suppose you believe that life can only come in its fullness from a certain conviction? It seems to me that the independence which most people are so jealous of in friendship is curiously false. They are constantly afraid of infringing upon each other's intellectual rights or feelings, and the result is that friendship, among women at least, is often dwarfed to a mere matter of practical service or personal affection, and deprived of much that is most precious in human intercourse, of the higher sympathy, the free give and take of mental effort or achievement. No, I cannot follow you there, Agatha. I cannot believe in your *laissez-faire* principle in friendship. On the contrary—

Agatha. Will you please explain to me what is the contrary of a *laissez-faire* principle in friendship?

Julia. That is a question which comes with peculiar grace from a young woman who will not allow her friend to sit peacefully

¹ The following discussion of Individualism by two accomplished writers has been cast into a dialogue, to give better expression to both sides of the question, and to carry out the discussion into the details of personal life.
— Eds.

on a damp haycock in a thin dress and enjoy the sunset. Your proceeding last night was the contrary of *laissez-faire*, and I may add the reverse of consistent with your indifference as to the attitude of your friends in intellectual matters.

Agatha. That was on what you are pleased to regard as the lower plane of personal affection. But what a terror of consistency would be the young woman who should insist upon her advice being followed on all points.

Julia. I wish she were purely hypothetical instead of being a hard fact and a painful reality of every day. Are we not going on? We sat down on this stone wall to enjoy the view, and we have both forgotten its existence. *En avant!*

They descended from their perch and stood for a moment looking at the neglected view. It was one of those complete bits of composition which one comes upon now and again in the course of a long walk or drive through a broken country, scattered like little vignettes or tail-pieces in a pleasant text. At the foot of the slope before them the river described a wide curve of exquisite grace; its course, above and below, was hidden by foliage, so that it seemed to pause and to find repose like a lake. The curves of low mountains around and beyond it were in harmony with its own; the stream took the color of the banks to its bosom with a fidelity which almost obliterated the distinction between substance and reflection, and the bit of blue sky which it caught between them was the centre and life of the whole, its link with the strong clear firmament above. As the friends walked along the narrow country road, the picture was still before them, but it was soon lost behind an intervening thicket; their eyes returned to the wayside border of hazel bushes, clematis, and tall, straggling flowers, and the thread of their talk was resumed.

Julia. Perhaps you will say that I resemble that "terror of consistency." And I confess that sometimes, seeing the baneful results of the various attempts to "exert an influence," watching the energetic people who want to make puppets of their neighbors and to pull all the wires themselves, the advocates of Christian science who revile you from their couches of nervous prostration for not accepting their theory of the non-existence of disease —

Agatha. A theory, doubtless, in many instances founded upon fact.

Julia. I am half tempted to ask myself whether my ardent desire to help Edith out of perplexities that are painful and

cramping to her, and to bring to her something that her whole nature needs, does not belong to the same category. But one cannot be deterred from a course that one feels to be right because of a merely logical resemblance which it may bear to some false one. There is a distinction between the mere crude effort to convert to an opinion and the longing to share with others the faith that has come to one. And would you not agree with me that the highest thing in friendship is progressive fellowship in truth?

Agatha. If the joys of friendship are measured by degrees. Progress, or motion, is the life of the soul, and fellowship one of those superfluities which are *choses nécessaires*. Yet permit me to say that there is an ethereal quality in your idea of friendship to which the actual thing can hardly be expected to attain.

"Two minds with but a single thought,
Two hearts that beat as one,"

is held up to us as the ideal of love, not of friendship. And is it heresy to suggest that in any relation of life such a state of things might fall upon one? I should prefer, myself, that the other mind should discover a fresh thought and the other heart beat with a degree of variation.

Julia. Yes, entire agreement would be monotonous, and leave little room for conversation. But there can be abundant variety in sympathy, and it is sympathy that we crave in fellowship, that is to say, the removal of barriers, the contact of mind with mind. How can such contact be possible, unless each shares with each wisdom and doubt, hope and achievement?

Agatha. It is hardly possible on any other terms. But if Miss Norton accepts the results of your wisdom and achievement as her own, what becomes of her contributions to those large ends? What is fellowship in truth, when we come to look at it? The association of two minds cannot absolve either from the necessity of seeking and assimilating for itself, for truth cannot be apprehended in any other way. Though it spread over the whole world, it must still remain, like poetry, a message to the individual heart. It is, no doubt, a peculiar joy when the same revelation comes to two friends, as to Augustine and Alypius in the garden, but that cannot always happen, even where the sympathy is unalloyed. It seems to me that we accept the results of friendship as we accept the friend, finding, perhaps, less than we had bargained for, and also more. The tie between two persons, each of whom has had a glimpse of truth in his heart, may

be the stronger for that consciousness, their comprehension of each other more perfect. By the very fact of their friendship each gets an outlook into regions which he might not have been led to investigate alone. One joins one's friend's acres to one's own. To deny all these subtle and lovely and legitimate influences would be like denying the power of thought or love, of truth itself, to move us. But when you talk of influence as a special instinct, or duty, you seem to make it a thing apart from the whole life of a friendship, and to give it, so to speak, an aggressive air.

Julia. I do not mean to make it aggressive. Practically, the people who differ from us are often much more interesting than those who agree with us. I am in accord, too, with what you say about the loneliness of thought. Truth is both a bond and a division. It comes to the individual, and often by the very force of its hold withdraws him, for a time at least, from his fellows. But what does it mean to me when suddenly in this whirl of human life which stirs me, and yet leaves me alone, I find a friend? Is it simply that life is quickened by a subtle, unspoken sympathy? This, indeed, but also more, I think. The solitude of truth is shared by love. It is the invasion of life's loneliness for which I thank my friend, who becomes my friend by the very fact that our natures can drink of the same fountain and our eyes behold the same glory. The highest companionship, I must believe, implies full communion in the highest life, and I feel that friendship must start, if not from the existence, at least from the possibility, of such communion. And believing thus, I must feel the constant though patient desire to bring my friend to the conscious need, and finally to the acceptance of the truth for which I live. I know the fanatical air of such a confession. I acknowledge the superior attractions of a mild and universal tolerance. I know that I am pointing to a state of unrest where one would look for peace. Yet I cannot escape my conclusions.

Agatha. No, to do that you would have to look a little closer into your premises. If we both accepted without reserve your view of the responsibilities of conviction, it would plunge us at once into a discussion as to the relative value of our convictions, and that might prove to be what I heard a popular orator eloquently describe as a "depthless abyss." Do you think, on a day like this, with glorious clouds doing nothing in particular in a whole ocean of blue, that I am going to be tempted into an argument on the ancient theme of authority in matters of belief? It

is worse than our "Infinite" of last year. "Come down, O maid," as the shepherd sang, and let us partake of a few blueberries.

Julia. Now you are trying to exert an influence, but I shall proceed on a course of independence, and follow up this path into the woods. An opening between the pine-trees is an invitation hard to resist. See how perfect the fern shadows are on that rock.

Under the red-columned pine-trees there were large brown spaces of shadow, on which the afternoon light lay in warm glints of auburn. There was little underbrush, but the decayed logs lying about were green with moss and fern; the pipsissewa, or Princess pine, drooped its rosy, waxen blossoms, and bunch-berries grew in set bouquets of coral, circled with dull green leaves. The carpet of pine needles was smooth underfoot, and the whisper of the wind in the boughs overhead seemed only to emphasize the stillness of the woods. They walked more slowly than they had done in the road, gathered the delicate wood flowers and scarlet berries, and might almost have forgotten what they were talking about, if they had not been possessed of so inveterate a pleasure in tracking a subject.

Julia. What is the use of being bored by a question simply because it is old? That is merely a cropping out of Yankee independence on your part. Is not that "ancient theme," as you call it, one which we must all face and grapple with? What else is the meaning of the injunction, "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good"? The seed falls back for renewal into the same ground in which the tree is rooted. Countless generations have lived before us, but we also have to live, and the old problems are given us to solve. The old question is perennially fresh and emphatically real.

Agatha. And forever open. We go back to the primal mystery, but are we forced to return to all the interpretations heaped upon it?

Julia. Shall we accept no gain from those who have lived before us? Is not tradition a means of revelation, as evolution is of creation? If we look simply at history, the interpretation of religion is found to be, as far as we can tell, coexistent with the problem. That of Christianity claims to proceed from, nay, to be identical with, the source of the mystery, being the light set as a guide in the darkness; the answer, what was before the question and gave birth to it. I come back to influence and to the responsibilities of faith. Is not this one of the highest, to help others

to gain that joy and blessedness to which one has been admitted one's self? It is the tolerant who divide thought into "your doxy" and "my doxy." "You be fair to my opinion, I will be fair to yours," is very simple, if it is a mere matter of opinion. But to the Christian it is not, but of a revelation which alone makes the light of life. The wider his sympathies, the deeper his love for those to whom that revelation has not yet come, the stronger will be his craving to bring them to the perception of that higher love. The necessity lies in the very nature of the revelation itself.

Agatha. It seems to me to lie largely in that of the mind that receives it. I cannot but believe that the deepest reverence, the strongest conviction, may feel, in face of the illimitable power and mystery before it, that not one but endless revelations are possible to such a power; nay, that contradiction, denial of any good, is the sole thing impossible to it. Considering the diversity of gifts and diversity of functions among us, I do not see why the fragment of fact or of truth which each one may hold necessarily needs championship or even acknowledgment from everybody else. Neither do I see why my fact should be expected to tally exactly with my neighbor's. Mine is a fragment: if his is complete without it, I congratulate him; if he tells me it is the whole truth, I petition, like Charles Lamb, for a candle to examine his lamps.

Julia. No mind of any insight claims to have the whole truth. The whole in which we believe lies beyond our perception. But if the truth which I cling to were not absolute, of supreme adequacy to the needs of man, it could claim from me no lasting allegiance. If it were fitted to my mind, and had no meaning for the thousands who live and suffer around me, it would leave me perplexed and unsatisfied. The attitude which you are assuming would lead one to stand still in life. You seem to me to leave out the duty and the privilege of living and working for the truth.

Agatha. The way to live for it is to live well. Truth and love are adequate to all needs, though often, alas, unattained, and seemingly unattainable; and no expression of them which can help or elevate any human soul will be thrown away till it has ceased to help, nor has any proved itself universally adequate. The diversity of interpretations may have its origin not alone in the contradictions of human nature and its liability to error, which would soon tend to upset any established unity, but also in a law of adaptation to the manifold needs and workings of life. And the danger of endeavoring to impress our own conviction in its

integrity upon another mind lies first in the possibility of disturbing by our speech any whisper of the still small voice that may be already heard there; and, secondly, in that of imparting as mere form what in our own heart was inherent, vital, and true.

Julia. Do you think that I ignore that danger? It is a source of constant dread to me. Apart from the evil of a purely mechanical or conventional influence, which is to be avoided by keeping one's sources of inspiration alive and fresh, there are more subtle possibilities of wrong in even the most earnest attempt to impress one's faith upon others. Particularly, in intercourse with the young there is the danger of imparting to them ideas and convictions for which they are not ready. Much of the curious unreality of the life of youth comes from this source. How many of us have that to look back to? The great book came to us too soon; we received it with a certain eagerness, but with minds too crude or weak for its deeper teaching; its finer truth was overlooked in excitement, or lost in dullness, and later it had become inert, useless to us. The friendship which might have enlightened our lives came too early, and the result was mere restlessness and misunderstanding. We lead sham lives in our youth, and the sham knowledge deadens for us the reality.

Agatha. Yes, we act life as a play before we come to face it as a fact, and go through a good deal of pasteboard experience before we get to the real. But is not the struggle from false to true the history of the soul? Would you solve the problem by picking the youth up, as the genius did Bedreddin Hassan, and setting him down at the end of the journey?

Julia. That is too often just the effect of teaching or influence over the young; it seeks to impart results to start with, and the outcome may be merely the stimulating of an excited fancy, instead of creating conviction. And then the stimulus is withdrawn; Bedreddin rubs his eyes, and behold it was a dream.

Agatha. Yes, these are snares and pitfalls. But all the same, — you see I am coming round to the side of influence, now that you have deserted it, — we must not forget the inestimable benefits of that power which is in persons. Whole lives and events turn on it. You would not include a teacher like Dr. Arnold among unfortunate examples of influence.

Julia. The two people whom I had most vividly in mind were Dr. Arnold, and Green of Oxford. These men, of beautiful personality and intense conviction, achieved with notable success the kind of power aimed at by all teachers and preachers. They

made their own earnestness alive in others. They forced their own attitude, their own principles of life-interpretation on all the finer minds which came under their sway. And yet, reading in English literature and biography the results of their teaching, noting the subsequent struggles and difficulties of some of their pupils, I cannot but feel that the benefit was a doubtful one.

Agatha. It seems to me that the disciples make a very fair show. But do you think your two examples can be lumped together in that way? Both, perhaps, aroused thoughts which in a normal development might not have come till later, if at all; but this was less the case with Dr. Arnold, who aimed rather to impart a sort of earnestness and enthusiasm along lines already laid out, than with Green, whom the "Saturday Review" accuses, perhaps with some measure of justice, of having made the undergraduate think he could think.

Julia. You have to think you can think before you have the courage to begin thinking. My objection to such work is that it forces natures, whether on old lines or new, into a depth of experience for which they are not ready. The reaction, exaggerated with the crudity of youth, disgusts many of them permanently with the truth which might later have uplifted them.

Agatha. As Mrs. Malaprop appropriately says, "Train up a child and away he do go."

Julia. As far as that goes, the old iron régime of discipline was not so unlike the new methods, for its excellences were apparent, and its chief defect was that it relentlessly imposed the attitude of the mature character upon the undeveloped one.

Agatha. I must confess the densest ignorance of education as a science. But don't you think you exaggerate a little the effects of teaching?

Julia. Of course, in many instances no effect whatever is produced. The union of a soul and a truth is like the fusion of two chemicals; both must reach an exact point of heat before it can take place.

Agatha. Yes, and the rousing of enthusiasm is the heating, the preparation for thought. I do not agree with you that the first condition for thinking is to think that we can think. It is enthusiasm for the thought of others, to take fire from it, to immerse ourselves in it, and get material on which thought may work when it develops.

Julia. Then you hold the function of teacher or preacher to be rather to quicken life than to impart conviction?

Agatha. Emphatically. So far as he aims to persuade, he runs the risk of which we have spoken, of making the experience of his hearers unreal, conventional, or antagonistic. In seeking to arouse, he is acting in harmony with the laws of life.

Julia. I feel you to be right in a measure, although it is a perplexing question; for, granting the waking up of earnestness to be the important matter at a certain stage, still one cannot be indifferent to the exact nature of the result which it may bring about.

Agatha. Can we reasonably expect to determine the exact nature of results?

"Nor knowest thou what argument,
Thy life to thy neighbor's creed has lent."

The effect of influences, and of intercourse, the benefit of friendship, is something incalculable. I need my friends in order to be myself. They heal wounds that they never know of, and do good in ways that they do not suspect. Influences are "unsubstantial, airy things."

Julia. And therefore not to be avoided. In friendship, besides all the intangible benefits, there are definite, tangible ones, and among them this of a real interchange of thought, an actual transference in some instances of faith. Here the dangers which we were speaking of in the intercourse between older and younger minds need not be taken into account. Thought can be imparted without adaptation, and not only its letter but its spirit comprehended, and carried, perhaps, to fuller meaning. In any intercourse where influence can act freely and truly, it must be as wrong to refrain from exercising it as to refuse to be helped by it. Either course is a negation. It seems to me that many people nowadays shut themselves up in a solitude of mind from sheer dread of being influenced, and in their determination to live by their own thought deprive themselves of the opportunity of having any.

Agatha. To do that is to forget that a large part of thought material already exists as thought.

Julia. Let me tell you about Edith Norton. You have often heard me speak of her, and have been struck by some of her verses. You see in her high qualities, and my anxiety to rouse her from a certain attitude which has become more and more the habitual pose of her mind may have seemed to you like restlessness or impatience. But do you realize what that attitude is, and

how common it is? It was not merely my immature enthusiastic friendship, but the general opinion of the most observant people whom she met that assigned to her in her girlhood mental powers of a very high order. I have seldom met with a personality of such subdued force and fire. The bitterness which repelled many I felt to be incidental to a difficult youth; the reserve which sometimes hindered her social success I ascribed to the truthfulness of a nature which sought to comprehend and to gain assurance, and would not allow itself to be led into a too ready or fluent expression. She had then, like most thoughtful young people, no settled convictions; and I honored her subjection of desire to integrity, and waited for the clarifying process of time. But the process has never taken place. In the full maturity of her thought, she stands where she did at the beginning. The years have brought her to no definite achievement, inward or outward. Her life has been dominated by a morbid fear of yielding to influence. This fear of receiving an undue bias has gone so far that she has distrusted all external aids to development. She will not even read. I have urged on her again and again books which I knew would throw light on some corner of her perplexities, but she turns from them reproachfully lest they should injure the integrity of her thought. Three external lines were open to her. She has declined the opportunities offered her in the way of teaching; she criticises the current methods of instruction, yet is distrustful of the value of her own instincts, still more of her right to influence the young. She will not write; her mind, she says, is not direct nor individual, but imitative, reflex. Marriage, she feels, is not for her. She is keenly alive to sympathy, and it has happened to her to find herself strongly moved by another personality; but the feeling has been checked by a question whether it were anything more than the mere force of the masculine will reacting on her own. Better the poise and sincerity of solitude. Thus her life reaches no external fulfillment; not that it is unoccupied, but the occupations are more or less automatic, not, as Swedenborg would say, the expression in ultimates of the law of her nature. Thus she grows into ever deeper silence, but I fear it is no longer the silence of expectation. She distrusts everything that threatens to sway her; not only books and friends, not only the appeal of definite organizations, but even her own desires, which she scrutinizes till they vanish, her own intellect, which is to her the mere echo of inherited illusion. She cannot understand how a sensitive con-

science can commit itself to any religious organization ; for such a course involves the association of heterogeneous elements as well as allegiance to " forms," which are to her mind necessarily the enemies of spontaneous thought. Thus rejecting by instinct all that she does not care for, rejecting by conscience all that she craves, she lives a life of mere endurance, of renunciation, it is true, but needless renunciation ; a life, the attitude of which is shown in some verses which she sent me last winter, and in which, I confess, there is something that haunts me. They are painful to me ; they have no light, no charm, but they recur again and again to my mind : —

Be silent, heart : what if thy pain be great ?
 What if thy sorrow cannot be forgot ?
 Thy questions cannot cease, thy doubtings wait ?
 It matters not.

Think'st thou that in the universal woe
 That holds the world's great heart, thy tiny jot
 Of anguish counts for aught ? I tell thee no ;
 It matters not.

Then silence, O my heart. And if thou be
 Victim of inward flames that burn too hot,
 Die silently. For, if thou live or die,
 It matters not.

Agatha. There is a ring of endurance and of sincerity there, and such qualities form a tough fibre. You talk as if the attitude of your friend were final, but as she is your contemporary, I should hardly look upon her as on the declining side of life, and the state of mind which you describe seems to me peculiarly one of transition.

Julia. Transitional states are more common, perhaps, than the strength to emerge from them. Where can it end ? Does not such constant suppression tend to stagnation ? What becomes of a body of water which has neither inlet nor outlet ?

Agatha. There can be no doubt that it is a grave mistake to shut out from us the stream of life, to deny it access through any medium. It is true that " we receive but what we give," and equally true that we can give only what we have received. For a nature which feels itself to be imitative, it seems to me peculiarly a mistake to avoid reading. What we take for imitation is often receptiveness and a means of growth, not a hindrance ; to lose one's self in another's thought is to enter the region of thought and to acquire its habits.

Julia. People want to be pioneers at all hazards, forgetting that true pioneers have followed the road as far as it led them, and that if there is no virtue in using the highway, there has been none in providing it. Do you not see this individual tendency all about us, in the artists who refuse to be bound by the laws of art, in the writers who will read no other books than their own may be wholly original?

Agatha. Yes; they think the bricks acquire an additional value for being made without straw.

Julia. Imagine a scientific man who should refuse to accept the labor of his predecessors for fear of being biased. As a matter of fact, we cannot have a spontaneous, instinctive sort of art any longer in any line. Wide critical knowledge must lie at the foundation of all creative work, for art must nowadays gather to itself experiences not only direct but reflective. See how our creative artists have begun their work. George Eliot stands to me as the type of the modern artist; years of patient thought, translation, discipleship; years more of laborious critical work, one step nearer to the ultimate right of individuality of attitude; then the whole superb nature, responsive at every point, is turned full upon the world of men and women, and we get an Adam Bede, a *Romola* and a *Middlemarch*.

Agatha. Yes, it is a beautiful prelude, the growth of a mind which was not withdrawn from life by reading and study, but brought into closer sympathy with it and deeper comprehension of its meaning. *Turgueneff* and *Tolstoi* have also had at command the highest resources of culture. On the other hand, if *Miss Austen* were reborn into the life of to-day, a very slight alteration in the turn of her sentences would be all the change needed for depicting it. We must not draw the lines of art rule so narrowly as to exclude the artists. The test is still the same, nearness to the primal truth; and the possibility of a direct perception of that truth is the hope and life of art. Nothing comes amiss in literature that is true. I remember standing once with *Edward Strahan* before two pictures in a loan exhibition, one a *Millet*, a rich, sombre twilight, with toil-worn, stunted figures, bowed above the darkening earth; the other a *Baldini*, painted in his freshest and happiest manner, — little balls of cotton floating audaciously in the blue for clouds, and gayly-dressed figures grouped in bouquets of color on the green sward, the whole full of air and light and life. *Mr. Strahan* said, "They talk of subjects being exhausted, but Nature is holding out pretty well when two artists can see her so truly and so differently."

Julia. And perhaps both hands have been trained by submission to the same laws.

Agatha. What an artist must avoid is not imitation alone, but conventionality, imagining that he sees a thing when he does n't see it; in another word, cant.

Julia. And that is not to be avoided by turning away from the achievements of others.

Agatha. Of course not; for they also are among the things to be comprehended. The thing is to glance from life to books and back again, and to look at both directly, with the "open heart and eye" insisted upon by Carlyle. Much of the objection to reading, of which you were speaking, seems to me not an assertion of individuality, but rather a concession to the popularity of ignorance.

Julia. I see in it only one example among many of the spirit of self-assertion, the rejection of authority. The people who inveigh against all organizations on the ground that they fetter individuality are influenced by the same ideas. "Our fathers believed it, therefore it is to be revered," was the old formula. "Our fathers believed it, therefore it is superannuated," is that of to-day. You know Alice Carter, with all her pretty ways and whims, as unregulated as an April breeze? We were talking one day of "Looking Backward," and she said, with a little shrug of her shoulders, "I should hate to walk under the same umbrella with the rest of the world. I like my own individual umbrella." I talked of economy of materials, of giving shelter to the shelterless, but it had no effect upon her; and after all, she expressed what is the common objection to Mr. Bellamy's scheme.

Agatha. It is no doubt irritating to see people outside the general umbrella when you are under it yourself; but I confess I share the disinclination to take refuge from the rain under Mr. Bellamy's. Its construction is admirable, but somebody will have to catch the drippings.

Julia. But can it be right for people to stand aloof and refuse to join in the providing of a race-shelter, or to accept the thought which binds man to man? The system of competition, of every man for himself, has been well tried, and a good many people have caught the drippings.

Agatha. Yes, my assertion was a supposition relating to a state of things *in posse*, and yours is an undeniable, painful, and long-existent fact.

Julia. And yet you are grasping the handle of your individ-

ual umbrella as tightly as ever. On artistic lines, you seem to agree with me. You feel that art can find its true life only in subjection to already ascertained law —

Agatha. Applied with individual sincerity.

Julia. But in life you appear to deny this principle. If it is true in art, I hold it to be no less true in the world of action, and even, in some mysterious way, in the world of intellect, that individualism of mind must learn the humility of subjection before it can enter upon its true freedom. Here, too, the joyous acceptance of death leads to the higher life. Growth begins in reverence and in submission.

Agatha. If any of my random remarks are in contradiction to these sentiments, I withdraw them without hesitation. The losing one's self to find one's self, I take to be not alone the foundation of religion, but of that comprehension of things which makes what we call the intellectual life.

“We live by admiration, hope, and love,
And even as these are well and wisely placed,
In dignity of being we ascend.”

Julia. Yes; you too plead for reverence, but for reverence towards individuals. I feel the necessity of reverence towards the great religious or social systems, the recognized bonds which hold society together. Do you remember Sill's lines?

“Do you dare to be
Of the great majority?
To be only like the rest,
With heaven's common mercies blest;
To accept, in humble part,
Truth which shines in every heart;
To be lost except to God,
As the grass-blade in the sod
Under foot by millions trod?
If you dare, come with us, be
Lost in love's great unity.”

We cannot escape from influence, and it is by the conscious surrender to inevitable law that man enters upon the full benefit of the law. Why try to deny this, *Agatha*?

Agatha. We are all of the great majority. If you prick us, do we not bleed? The susceptibility to influence belongs to us all. But as Nature has in the higher organisms set apart the individual, at the same time providing in the family a bond which unites him to the race, so the individual in society has still the responsibility on his own shoulders, though there are numberless

ways in which he may merge his interests in the lives of others. The main thing is, amid all the influences that surround us, to find our own; then, for the sake of proportion, to take into account the outer world, the not our own. Man cannot escape the responsibility of being his brother's keeper; but he cannot eat, sleep, and think for his brother.

Julia. No, but he may associate with him in these acts.

Agatha. I should hope so. And now as this path of adventure has made a circuit and come back to the road, suppose we take the homeward turn? I confess I feel starved to any degree of acquiescence, and if we must live upon a basis of entire altruism, I will go home and eat your supper, and you shall have *carte blanche* to do the same with mine.

S. K. & V. D. S.

SOME CRITICISMS ON THE ANDOVER MOVEMENT.

WHEN a new train of thought first comes before the public, it is safe to say that the form it wears is not its permanent form; and therefore if judgment is passed on it then, allowance must be made for incompleteness in expression which will be filled up, exaggerations which will be dropped, distant relations which will be discerned and allowed for, a clearer discrimination between essentials and accidentals, — a whole process of ripening which will take place before the thought stands complete in its identity and ready for the world's judgment. The Andover movement was begun half a dozen years ago, and may now be fairly supposed to have had time enough to pass through this stage of childhood and to have become its mature self. So we may question it without feeling that we are asking questions prematurely, and be confident that it is old enough to answer without embarrassment.

In regard to a movement that has behind it such learning, intellectual power, piety, and broad influence as has the Andover movement, there are very few persons whose opinions are of any importance. Certainly I have not the slightest idea that mine are, or have in themselves any claim to be heard. But I have not the presumption to imagine that I am not typical. Many others must be feeling towards this movement in the way I feel. And, therefore, if I regard myself as a type, when I formulate my own position I shall express not a particular thought, but one that will have more or less of generality.

I have had from the first a very hearty sympathy with Andover's new departure. It has, in my opinion, brought more healthy life into the religious world of New England than any other movement of the century. It has stimulated thought, deepened piety, enlarged the visible horizon of the kingdom of heaven, set a wonderful example of Christian courtesy in polemics, and saved the Congregational body from destruction at the hands of the intellectual deadness and narrow ecclesiasticism of its own High Church party. Its influence is now established. The new theology has reached the stage where men are supposing that they have of course believed all along the views it presents; and it is preached from many a pulpit and editorial chair where it is not at all recognized as Andover theology, but is unconsciously supposed to be Theology itself, the only normal and proper thing. What greater success can any scheme of thought desire than to lose its distinctive name and supersede itself? The history and present position of this movement are a promise that the intelligent thought of the next half century in New England shall find no necessary breach between itself and Congregationalism, and therefore to some degree a promise that the thought of the whole country shall find less of a breach between itself and religion. For as it has been demonstrated that a gain in numbers to one college is not a loss to the other colleges of the country but a gain to them also, so any real growth in one church is a gain to all the other churches.

And yet there are some, and some not only like myself, outsiders, who think they discern in this movement signs of incomplete or arrested development, signs which show that it cannot, without change in its present condition, become the redeeming force it promised. There is, perhaps, no annoyance so annoying as a friend so good that we feel he ought to be better. Andover has seen so clearly, and laid the future under so deep a debt to her, why can she not see a little more clearly and become a power for the world, and not only for Congregationalism? This question of the future of the movement has to some an intensity of interest from the fact that they are members of the church in which the problem is being worked out, and so their own position is more or less affected by it. To others of us, who are not members of the Congregational Church, but who have towards it the kindly feelings that spring from an ancestry, birth, and education surrounded by its influences, the matter has the interest attaching to any movement which concerns the Church Universal, and which, therefore, must ultimately concern every branch of that church. These latter

persons are not affected in their ecclesiastical position, one way or the other, by any view they may take of the movement. Have they, then, have I, no right to speak concerning it? Andover, with her uniform courtesy, would be the first to welcome kindly criticism from every quarter. The criticisms I am about to make are offered solely with the desire that the weak places I seem to see in her armor may be speedily strengthened, so that she may be invincible in the battle she is aiming to fight.

In estimating character, conditions of birth are important. In case of the Andover movement, they are more than usually important, for they have stamped a mark upon it that yet remains. The movement had its origin in two practical exigencies. A candidate for a professor's chair in Andover Theological Seminary was accused of holding the belief that death is not the end of possible change in moral character, which view, it was asserted, was inconsistent with the Seminary's creed. Some of the professors came to the support of the candidate, and maintained that even if this view were held, no inconsistency would exist. They were, of course, at once charged with being guilty of similar views and inconsistencies themselves. During the discussion of the theological and legal questions involved, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions discovered that a missionary about to be sent back to his former station in the foreign field declined to disown the view charged upon the candidate and professors at Andover. The Board refused to allow him to return. Other intending missionaries were found to entertain similar doubts and were rejected. Theological students began to be deterred from offering themselves to the Board. Andover Seminary then came into the field as the champion of a larger missionary policy; and, as the possibility or non-possibility of change after death was the test by which the Board insisted that the orthodoxy of its appointees should be tried, "second probation" came to be the battle-cry of the opposing parties.¹ These two practical ends then constituted Andover's primary aim: to vindicate the qualifications for a seminary professorship, and to send missionaries into the field.

¹ It should be borne in mind, however, that Andover explicitly denies that she holds the belief that after death a second opportunity will be open to all to obtain salvation. "We do not argue," say the Andover Reviewers, "for a second probation, nor for a probation indefinitely prolonged, but for a Christian probation some time and somewhere." *Prog. Orth.*, p. 253. (The articles which at first appeared in the *Andover Review* embodying the positions of the New Theology were afterwards collected in a book with the title *Progressive Orthodoxy*. I refer to it rather than to them, for the sake of convenience.)

There was a great advantage in the practical character of these ends, especially of the latter. They formed an issue which everybody could understand, and in which every one was interested and took a side. Andover might have piped or mourned for a generation, and no one would have thought of dancing or weeping, if it had not been for this readily apprehensible, practical element in the aim which she held up. It got its upholders a hearing. It sifted the spectators into enemies and friends. It stamped Andover as the champion of missions. Even now, when there is a lull in the battle, it is still felt that the sending off of every fresh missionary somehow scores a point for Andover.

But there was a decided disadvantage, too, in all this. In fact, it was, for the permanent influence of the movement, a grave misfortune. Having her attention kept busy with practical interests, Andover had no time to be philosophical. Her positions bore the appearance of having been taken up under fire, with as much order and logic as could be commanded at the moment, but still with the smoke of battle about them. They did not seem to be the quiet, natural, inevitable developments, clearly seen and ordered, of a central thought. At all events, whether her positions were taken hastily or not, they have different characters. Some of them have the invincible basis of necessary thought beneath them, and some have as basis the fragments of one and another system dating anywhere from St. Anselm to Professor Park. The result is, of course, an incongruity, a bit of philosophy side by side with a bit of mediæval scholasticism. Perhaps the most striking examples of this occur in treating those standard bugbears of the theologian whose philosophy is less stalwart than his kindliness, the heathen and the pre-Christian Jews. These are always a test of the philosophic insight of a theological system. If when it approaches these it begins to murmur about exceptions, its character is gone. For to allow exceptions in a philosophical system or in the multiplication table is to betray ignorance of the nature of the thought on which philosophy and mathematics are based. The boy who should put in as plea for the wrong answer to his problem that he knew two and two were four in most cases, but this was an instance where they were not, would probably be marked down in spite of his ingenuity. Exceptions naturally bore a prominent place in the older theological systems, because, as their God was a more or less modified Oriental potentate, the divine will was always more or less an arbitrary one. The thought of the divine will as a divine neces-

sity, and of law as an eternal fact, an aspect of God's character unvarying except in point of view, — this was impossible to an unscientific age. But to-day every theologian must reckon with these data. In scientific theology there can be no exceptions. A systematic principle must be found large enough to embrace them.

And one would expect not to miss such intrepidity in Andover, which has never been charged with hesitancy to apply logic. And yet the writers of the "Review" can say: —

"To these questions we must reply, as we replied before, that the knowledge of God granted to the Jews was different in kind from the knowledge attainable by others, and that we therefore are not justified in arguing from the Jews to the Gentiles. The Jews occupied an exceptional position."¹ "As to Abraham and his descendants, the instance is clearly exceptional. . . . While their salvation proves that knowledge of the historic Christ is not absolutely necessary, still they were recipients of that which was preparatory of the gospel and directly predictive of it. And besides, it has always been believed that for the completeness of their redemption they had clearer knowledge after death of God's love revealed in Christ."²

What is this necessity that is not absolutely necessary? We are familiar with such from the lips of weak parents, but even as children we were bright enough to see that this meant no necessity at all. And it is because this inconvenient case will not come within the system that a little annex must be built on for it, as in the sentence last quoted. The fact is that all the objections to Andover's position in regard to probation hereafter would have vanished, or been transferred to other grounds, if she had but thought out and settled the fate of these ancient Jews. It was the apparent anomalies in the orbit of the planet Uranus that enabled Le Verrier to calculate just where the hitherto unknown planet should be that would explain them and give unity to the solar system. Well do the Reviewers say in another connection: "We question the advantage or the right of modifying the natural and reasonable conditions of Christianity under the stress of exceptional cases."³

Now if that view of the universe is correct which regards it as a self-consistent whole, — and this is what we mean by philosophy, — every part will be what it is by necessity of this self-consistency. Any fact which cannot show the nature of the case as the ground

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 246.

² Page 85.

³ Page 135.

of its being must be content to pass into the realm of conventionalities, things which may be decided this way or that way by agreement. The existence of God and of the multiplication table we believe to be absolute truths. Forms of divine worship and church-government we believe, most of us, — those of us who do not mistake the "Tracts for the Times" for the Ten Commandments, — to be relative truths, necessary, indeed, in some form, but not necessary as to this or that particular form. Any truth, then, which cannot show as its basis the nature of things cannot demand universal acceptance. Here is the opportunity for the great work of constructive theology the next generation may contribute, to show the same necessary basis which we recognize in mathematics, in case also of the existence and attributes of God, of revelation, sin, redemption, the Incarnation, the Church, a future life, in short, in case of all the main doctrines of the Christian religion.

Now Andover had — or may the present tense still be used? — a unique chance to serve as the prophet of this new dispensation; unique, because the spirit of the age is longing for just such constructive guidance on an absolute basis; because, having been so fortunate as to create a disturbance and gather a crowd about her, a word from her would at once find an audience; and because she had herself appreciated in part this very gospel of inevitableness. For example: —

"Christian thought, having established itself on the intrinsic, absolute right and on the inexorableness of law so firmly that these may be accepted as postulates in all the inquiry, . . . is going forward now to learn if any ethical ends are secured by the revelation of God in Christ."¹ "There is a movement of thought which has gone beneath or has gone back of the thinking which at one time was satisfied to rest in the sovereignty of God. All commands, penalties, favors, blessings, issue, it was once thought, out of the will of God. . . . But the conviction is now clear that the will of God is directed by the reason of God; that instead of saying it is right because God wills it, we should rather say, God wills it because it is right. Right and wrong, goodness and badness, holiness and sin, have their own intrinsic qualities according to what they are. . . . What we are now emphasizing is the marked tendency of thought to recognize the intrinsic, necessary character of law and right, and the inevitableness of the results of conduct."²

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 51.² Page 47.

This is excellent. There could be no better recognition of the inherent nature of things as the basis of the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the character of God. But then, just as in swimming we sometimes pass suddenly from comparatively warm water into a streak of much lower temperature, why must we here meet a cold streak like this? —

“God does not become propitious because man repents and amends, for that is beyond man’s power. He becomes propitious because Christ, laying down his life, makes the race to its worst individual capable of repenting, obeying, trusting; and He does this in such a way that God’s abhorrence to sin is realized, the majesty of law honored, the sinner and the universe convinced of the righteousness of the divine judgments.”¹

Here are the regular forensic phrases, still in their melodramatic and mediæval dress. No one who knows the difficulties of expressing abstract thought will quarrel with a theologian for using any algebraic signs he pleases. But we may rightly demand of him either to translate them into the language of the day, or to see at least whether they are capable of such translation, or are anything but counsel-darkeners. It is the scholastic habit of regarding relations as entities apart from the wholes in connection with which alone they can be understood, that gives rise to this forensic method, neither truly historical nor real, of treating eternal processes.

This failure to apply the test of philosophy to its words as well as to its thought has led to a lack of definition of fundamental terms. Surely the series of articles in “Progressive Orthodoxy” should have been saved from this, at least, by the presence of one of its *dramatis personæ*, Socrates, that much-enduring man, who is apt in theological discussions to bear the part of the awful example in a temperance lecture. One would suppose that if nowhere else, yet in the discussion of eschatology, a definition would have been given, or would have been privately arrived at, of salvation. But in the chapter on this subject one looks in vain, not only for such a definition, but for any clear conception of it. There seems to be still the old misty idea of some beatific state to be entered upon only after death. Of salvation as always salvation from sin, not only the pages, but the thought behind them, shows little trace.

The same confusion hides in other phrases covering fundamental needs of thought. “The gospel,” “accepting Christ,” “faith,”

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 58.

"nature," — it is assumed that these have no need of definition. And as two meanings are possible in each of these cases, confusion is inevitable, especially since the real root of the difficulty is that Andover is dissatisfied with one meaning, and has abandoned it in feeling while still holding to it in thought. She has jumped off the boat without having reached the wharf. For example, in regard to the relations of the human and the divine, either of two opposing views may be held. The one is that human and divine are mutually exclusive terms, so that whatever is divine is *ipso facto* not human, and *vice versa*; the other, that the infinite does not exclude the finite, but that every attribute essential to perfect humanity belongs necessarily to divinity also; and of this it holds the Incarnation to be the revelation and complete, crowning instance.

Now it would seem at first sight as if there need be no question which of these positions is held by the Andover Reviewers. They have felt that tendency of our time, which, indeed, has been the primary motive-power of this whole movement, which identifies all that is best in humanity with divinity. They say: —

"We add a single remark upon the general philosophical conception of God and his relation to the universe which underlies these essays. It is a modification of a prevailing Latin conception of the divine transcendence by a clearer and fuller appreciation (in accordance with the highest thought of the Greek fathers) of the divine immanence. Such a doctrine of God, we believe, is more and more approving itself in the best philosophy of our time, and the fact of the Incarnation commends it to the acceptance of the Christian theologian."¹

If this conception had been consistently followed out, there might have been a much greater Andover controversy, but the present one, never.

Other passages show that the Reviewers have apprehended this truth in its relation to the Incarnation, the truth that the human spirit is not different in kind from the divine nor alien to it, but that humanity raised to its highest power is divinity.² In treat-

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 16.

² "It (the human nature of Christ) is finite, and the Word who created it is infinite. But we do not move in our thinking, if we think correctly on this subject, merely on this plane of contrasts. We may not forget them, but they are only parts of the truth. The divine and human natures in Christ are essentially related to each other. The human nature is the divine nature humanly expressed and realized. The one should be as closely connected with the other in our conception as a word with the thought it utters. The relation is

ing the doctrine of revelation, also the inward revelation which comes through the highest exercise of man's powers is claimed as truly divine.¹

Now these positions are corollaries to the proposition that God not only transcends the world and human nature, but is immanent in them. They are logically tenable on no other ground. And it would certainly seem from the above quotations that it is upon this position that the Reviewers desire to take their stand. But we soon come across phrases whose uniform wakes grave suspicion that they belong to the opposite party. We hear of "the light of reason and science without any revelation whatever;"² of "the light of the unaided reason."³ They tell us that repentance and amendment are "beyond man's power;"⁴ and they antithesize "personal attainments in character" and "personal appropriation of the righteousness of Christ."⁵ These and many similar expressions can know no other ancestry than the former of the opposing views just mentioned, and compel us to think that the Reviewers would draw a distinction between the human reason acting by itself and the divine reason imparting a revelation, between the impulse that leads men to turn to God and the promptings of the Holy Spirit, between "Christ in you," and "Christ the hope of glory."

One cannot read "Progressive Orthodoxy" without a growing conviction that the authors have never seen the unity of the two last-mentioned terms. Many of the results of the doctrine that God is immanent in the world and in man they have apprehended. Of the results of the corollary, that Christ is also thus immanent, they have apprehended but few. Now one cannot study the New Testament without discovering in it a growth in the conception of Christ. To the Synoptists, He is Jesus of Nazareth, the historic being whom they or their friends had seen and walked with in Gali-

as intimate as this, but it is of a higher kind. . . . The human nature of Christ is in finite form the personal word of that eternal Word. It is not a foreign nature. . . . The new and fundamental thought in modern Christology is the essential relation of the two natures, so that either can know and realize itself in the other."—*Prog. Orth.*, pp. 28, 29.

¹ "Now if it should please God to produce a book of oracles by sheer and stark miracle, or to dictate the contents of one to a scribe or number of scribes, the teaching would not come more directly from Him than when a soul in vital connection with Him freely utters, under the leading of his spirit, the truth which is the element in which it lives."—*Prog. Orth.*, p. 203.

² *Prog. Orth.*, p. 247.

³ Page 108.

⁴ Page 58.

⁵ Page 134 n.

lee and Judæa, and whose words and deeds they were chronicling. Their conception of personality is that of a unit encased in a body and exclusive of other similar units. When, however, we come to the apostle who had received the best theological education the time afforded, we find a somewhat different conception. St. Paul had little interest in the historic events of the life of Jesus, apart from the final ones. In the résumé of his "gospel" (1 Cor. xv. 1), he mentions only Jesus' death, burial, and resurrection, and interviews with many afterwards. Why he limits his vision to these, since parts at least of the previous life of Jesus were known to him,¹ it would take us here too far to inquire. Now his pages are studded with the name "Christ;" it flashes upon us, directly or indirectly, from almost every thought. But it has passed with him from a title of Jesus of Nazareth to a designation of the ideal man, the embodiment of all that is best in humanity, the expression of the possibilities of the soul of the individual and of the race. "Christ" stands with him for the human side of God, and therefore for the divine side of humanity. Turn to his Epistles almost at random, and the thought meets us. "The fact, which was but vaguely seen by previous generations, that God was leading you Gentiles to salvation," he says to the Colossians (Col. i. 25-27), "is now plain. And this rich, glorious process that has been going on is Christ in you, the hope of glory." St. Paul never stops to define, but a description from him is sometimes a definition. "God's dear Son," he says (Col. i. 15), "who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature." Remembering the Hebrew usage (Gen. xlix. 3), by which the firstborn is regarded as the highest type of its kind, perhaps we shall find no better modern equivalent for this phrase than that which we gave above, "the human side of God, the divine side of humanity." The apostle longs to attain the resurrection of the dead (Phil. iii. 11), which, he says, he has not already attained, a remark which would be superfluous if resurrection meant to him a reëndowment of life in a future state. But he will attain this, or, as he more fully defines it, he will become perfect, if he may know Christ; not merely the facts of his

¹ The only events previous to the Last Supper to which he refers are the Davidic descent of Jesus (Rom. i. 3; ix. 5; xv. 12; Acts xiii. 23; 2 Tim. ii. 8), the preparatory ministry of John (Acts xiii. 24, 25), the lowly condition and poverty of Jesus (Phil. ii. 7; 2 Cor. viii. 9), his unselfishness (Rom. xv. 3), a remark of his not elsewhere preserved (Acts xx. 35), and possibly a part of the first charge to the twelve apostles (cf. 1 Cor. ix. 14 with St. Matt. x. 10).

sufferings, death, and resurrection, which he already knew, but the power of his resurrection and the fellowship of his sufferings and the likeness of his death. If these same processes take place in him, — and of course he thinks of himself only as a type of every man, — they will constitute in him the ideal for the sake of which God seeks him. He will apprehend that for which he is apprehended. He will then be in Christ.

These passages set forth with sufficient plainness St. Paul's conception of Christ as the spiritual expression of humanity. It must not, however, be supposed that in saying that Christ was to him a spiritual being, it is implied that He was not also a historic being. Passages constantly occur in which the word "Christ" has a direct reference to the historic life of Jesus. Now one and now another of the great conceptions which go to make up his idea of Christ is prominent and gives accent to the special thought in hand. Now it is Christ as the Logos, the operative side of God; now as the side in common with man, the human side; now it is that Jesus who was the complete embodiment of God under human conditions; now it is the spiritual processes in himself, in every man, which produce and constitute the lofty ideal of humanity; now Christ is external to the soul, the giver of all its true life; now He is within the soul, the soul's very life and essence. From one to another of these great conceptions his expression hurries, as it is now this now that aspect that he has mainly in view, though he never quite forgets any one of them. They tangle his thought into inextricable sentences. They reveal to us conceptions which are likely to be new, — those ordinary-seeming phrases "in Christ," "to whom coming," "Christ in you," — conceptions as to the inclusiveness of personality. The mystery of the mingling of human and divine in the soul and in the race so overcomes him that he bursts out into poetry and a torrent of prepositions: "For of Him and through Him and to Him are all things; to whom be glory forever. Amen."

The endeavor which we see so prominent in the apostolic age, to demonstrate that Jesus was the Christ, was but a form of the necessity which the thoughtful world is to-day more than ever feeling, the necessity of discovering an essential link between historical and spiritual religion. It was the conviction that this necessary link had been found that made St. John exclaim with passionate eagerness, "Who is a liar, but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ?" We cannot stop to show how this thought

of Christ as the presence of God in the soul permeates St. John's writings. In order not to see it there, one must translate in terms of time and place the expressions which refer to the union of Christ with those who are his, and thus vacate them of value.

Now in the scheme of the Andover Reviewers, this mode of regarding Christ as immanent is conspicuous by its absence. To them the gospel, the knowledge of which is to save the world, is as follows:—

"The gospel is an earthly historical religion, wrought out in the deeds and sacrifices of the man, Christ Jesus, who lived under the conditions of a human earthly life, who dwelt in the cities and villages of Judæa, who walked in the valleys and on the mountains of Galilee, and who died on a hillside of this earth."¹

In their doctrine of the Atonement, God, Christ, and man are three beings, each external to the others, trying to come to an agreement:—

"Man, left to himself, cannot have a repentance which sets him free from sin and death. . . . If man unaided could become truly repentant, he would become holy and be the child of God. . . . It is not true that repentance without Christ is availing for redemption, for man of himself cannot repent; but, on the other hand, it is not true that Christ's Atonement has value without repentance. Christ's sacrifice avails with God because it is adapted to bring men to repentance. He is one, in with the race, who has the power of bringing it into sympathy with his own feeling towards God and towards sin; and so God looks on the race as having this power in Christ."²

But it is when they come to the special question at issue, to eschatology, that this non-recognition of Christ as potentially immanent in the soul becomes most apparent. They have been driven to the position they have adopted by this argument: The knowledge of Christ is essential to salvation. The history of Jesus is essential to the knowledge of Christ. That every human being should have a chance to pass upon the claims of Jesus Christ is essential to the justice of God. Since many men do not have such chance in this life, they must have it hereafter.³

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 76.

² *Prog. Orth.*, p. 55. The omissions in quotation are made solely for the sake of brevity, not with the attempt to force any difference of shading from that which presumably the authors intended.

³ "Whoever will not believe on Christ is incorrigibly and hopelessly impenitent. . . . Wherever the gospel is proclaimed, Christ is already testing men."
— *Prog. Orth.*, p. 74.

Now here is a plentiful lack of definitions. Apart from those we have mentioned — what is meant by Christ? and what is meant by salvation? — here are others: What constitutes a sufficient “knowledge of Christ”? What determines whether the opportunity for getting that knowledge was sufficient? What is “passing upon the claims of Christ”? Or, to put these in concrete form: suppose I am one of the Masai of the Soudan; the “Andover Review” would work out my personal equation, — we trust we are not misconceiving its decision, — that I have indisputably never passed upon the claims of Christ because I have never had the knowledge of Him, and never having had a sufficient opportunity for getting that knowledge here, I shall therefore have these matters presented to me for my decision hereafter. Now suppose, again, I am a street Arab in New York. I am, alas! but too familiar with the name of Jesus; I have been once or twice to a Mission Sunday-school, and heard that Christ lived and died centuries ago. Have I knowledge enough to pass upon the claims of Christ? Is my chance hereafter to be taken away because I have already had my opportunity of hearing the gospel? How unfortunate that I let myself be enticed into that Mission School! Or again, suppose I am one of that not small number of men who scorn a lie, and value honor as life, and are generous, even lavishly generous, in helping a fellow-man who is in need, but one whose parents have taught him that religion, meaning thereby the system of which the various churches are the exponents, is an anachronism; who regards the Bible with esteem, like the Odyssey, and the history of Jesus, with which he is perfectly familiar, as having somewhat more value for a modern student than that of Julius Cæsar. What is to be done with this most inconvenient person?

Of course, the readiest way of getting rid of him is to leave him

“The gospel is an earthly, historical religion, wrought out in the deeds and sacrifices of the man Christ Jesus.” — *Prog. Orth.*, p. 76.

“The personal appropriation of Christ in his life and death constitutes a sinner a Christian.” — *Prog. Orth.*, p. 143.

“A natural inference from these premises is that every one will know God as He is revealed in the love and sacrifice of Jesus Christ. If Christ was given for the whole world, and if no one can be saved except by faith in Christ, we are almost driven to the conclusion that Christ will be made known to every individual of the human race in all the generations, past, present, and future, and that everlasting destiny is determined for every person by his acceptance or rejection of Christ. . . . We frankly admit that it seems to us probable that those who in this life have no knowledge of Christ will not be denied that knowledge, with its corresponding opportunity, after death.” — *Prog. Orth.*, p. 242.

to what the Reviewers call, with a proper touch of sarcasm in condemning this proceeding in others, "the ambiguity of the uncovenanted mercies" of God.¹ But they would not themselves be guilty of such indolent agnosticism. They would recognize the obligation of their system to provide a place for such a one hereafter. And yet, what that place would be it is a little difficult to discover. He knows of the life of Jesus, and yet he — whatever the Reviewers might be kind enough to do for him — would not call himself a Christian. On the other hand, if lofty character is the aim of religion for man, our friend has many elements of the loftiest moral, nay more, Christian character. Is he, with such traits, to be lost? Some of us would be as reluctant to consent to this as are the Reviewers to consent to the loss of the African savage who has never had his opportunity of "passing upon the claims of Christ." And yet it would seem as if they were only deterred from saying "Yes" to the appeal for condemnation, through a feeling that it would not be quite courteous; for they say in rejecting a similar case: —

"This is more like salvation by merit, or moral character, a kind of salvation perfectly plain and intelligible, but not, as we had supposed, a kind accepted and advocated by the rest of the church. The church-doctrine of salvation we had assumed to be that of justification by faith. Paul and Luther evidently did not rely upon personal attainments in character, but upon the personal appropriation of the righteousness of Christ."²

Certainly the Reviewers should know that any system which holds that the attainment of lofty moral character here is no warrant for salvation hereafter, has committed suicide. Certainly they should have read their time carefully enough to be aware that there are thousands of men who have drifted away from religion because its terms in regard to the next life are unreal when transferred to this, — men who are saying to the churches, "If your salvation that you talk about is other than the perfection of personal character, keep it; we want nothing to do with it. Salvation by character is, as you say, a kind of salvation perfectly plain and intelligible, and it is good enough for us." Certainly the Reviewers should have theological insight enough to see that in this men are but clamoring for that very doctrine of the Incarnation which they themselves profess to hold, which makes all religion centre in Christ, and Christ to be the ideal of perfected humanity. And yet the only answer the Reviewers have for cases like this is: —

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 92.

² Page 134 n.

"But were there not pious Jews before the time of Christ who were saved, and who at death entered immediately into blessedness? . . . The Jews occupied an exceptional position."¹

The Andover theology most emphatically and truly says: "The decisive fact for every man is his relation to Christ."² This is his "judgment," his *κρίσις*. What needs explanation is whether it regards this relation as one of the intellect to certain opinions and historic facts, or as one of man's spirit, his will and affections, to the spirit of Christ. The questions, what were the facts of the life of Jesus? what was the metaphysical nature of the being they show, and what his relations to God and man? — these are questions of deep importance. But they are questions which demand a high degree of intelligence and trained judgment to answer, and they are not therefore for each man the questions of first importance. Those questions are, what is the attitude of my spirit to the spirit of God? do I love what He loves and hate what He hates? It is these questions that decide moral character. Of course, to the majority of men these questions never come in conscious form. Unquestionably, it is of great advantage that they should come in conscious form and should receive a deliberate answer; but unquestionably it is not essential to their receiving a right answer. Is the man, that is, the character, in conformity with God, so far as man can be, that is, with the human side of God, with Christ? It is this that, making no exceptions, decides the moral character of infant and adult, Jew and Christian, heathen and ecclesiastic. Here, as in so many cases, the Reviewers take back with one hand what they give with the other. They would maintain that men are saved through Christ vicariously. But what is vicarious salvation? It is that salvation from sin which comes to a man not through his intelligent perception and choice of Christ, but through such a portion of Christ's spirit as has filtered into him through inheritance, society, custom, law. The community having been moulded in these respects by those who have a conscious knowledge of Christ, his saving power is thus mediately transferred to thousands in whose case conscious contact is wanting. It is only in this sense that men are saved by the merits of Christ. For if by this phrase is meant Christ's merits in relation to God, a forensic substitutionalism results, which is degrading to both God and man. But Christ's merits in relation to the religious community are a source of vicarious salvation wide as the community's influence, for they may permeate

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 245.

² Page 241.

every man within that influence, be appropriated by him, and therefore imputed to him. And yet the Andover theology does not recognize this as salvation, partial or complete, nor make use of it in solving its eschatological problem. "Progressive Orthodoxy" would perhaps demur to its right to be called salvation at all. But while the opposing sides are wrangling as to whether such spiritual motion is possible, "*Solvitur ambulando*," we may exclaim, and, following the example of our Lord, take a little child and set him in the midst of them. Surely, even an ardent Paysonian, if such could now be found, would hardly maintain that the salvation of this little being was contingent on its apprehension of the intellectual aspects of religion and its conscious choice of Christ as Christ.¹ That there is here a salvation, that is, deliverance from sin, is plain. How it comes, is a question which has made many a theory of the Atonement totter, and puzzled many a theologian whose heart was more imperative than his logic. According to the Reviewers, infants and heathen are shut up in together in the pen of invincible ignorance, and are only let out one by one in this world or the next, through the gate of intellectual apprehension and conscious choice.²

To repeat again for clearness' sake. The test of salvation, we must believe, is whether the man, the character, the soul, is like that of Christ. This harmony with Christ may be clearly apprehended by its possessor in its relation on the one hand to Jesus, the incarnate Son of God, and on the other to himself, through understanding and choice; or it may be unrecognized and unnamed; but in either form it may be genuine. And that in its latter form it can be efficacious is demonstrable from those many cases where there is to a great degree deliverance from sin and likeness to Christ, and yet no clear apprehension of a scheme of

¹ "From the first development of his moral powers, his mind was more or less affected by his condition and prospects as a sinner. It is among the accredited traditions of his family that he was often known to weep under the preaching of the gospel when he was only three years old. That these were not mere transient impressions seems probable from the fact that in subsequent years his mother was inclined to the belief that he was converted in childhood. The evidences of his piety, however, were at this period far from being conclusive." — Cummings's *Memoir of Edw. Payson, D. D.*, vol. i. p. 18.

² "We think it more reverent, as it is certainly more reasonable, to believe of infants and heathen alike, that according to the development of moral agency they are brought into conscious relations to Christ, and that according to their needs they are enabled to personally appropriate his redemption." — *Prog. Orth.*, p. 135.

salvation. It is this latter, we suppose, which has been called harmony with the essential or spiritual Christ.

The objections which the Reviewers apparently have to this term, and to what it seems to them to involve, have blinded them to what it aims to express. Their main objections, in the somewhat curt allusions which they make to it, are that it takes away the personality of the Holy Spirit and the significance of historic Christianity,¹ and that it is "perilously akin in its postulates to the Deism of the last century."² Now the cause of the failure of Deism was not that it identified the human reason with the divine, but precisely that it did not. It, as well as the Apologists, took for granted that human and divine were different and opposed. The alternative then arose, is religion divine or human, which? supernatural or natural? The Apologists said the former, the Deists the latter. The thought of the time was not yet ripe for any one to say, "Both." It is a matter for thankfulness that the church, as a whole, sided with the Apologists; for if either horn of the harmful dilemma were to be chosen to the exclusion of the other, the former was far more potent and beneficent for its day, and offered more of spiritual promise for the future. But we and the Andover Reviewers believe we have arrived at "a modification of the prevailing Latin conception of the divine transcendence by a clearer and fuller appreciation of the divine immanence;" and this enables us to see the Deistic dilemma shaking its horns at us without feeling obliged to impale ourselves on either of them. The thought of our day need not be frightened out of its path by any such creature.

It is perhaps no wonder that a recognition of a likeness to Christ in the spirit of men as in very truth the presence of Christ himself should seem to the Reviewers to take away the significance of historic Christianity. For here again the two lines of Christian thought have persistently tended to get themselves into a dilemma, and to challenge on-comers with a *which*. "Which do you hold to, the Christ without or the Christ within? If the former, you run the risk of being a Jesuit or an Evangelical, worshipping the memory of a historic being, and reducing eternal processes to *opera operata*. If the latter, you are a Mystic, a Quaker, who have no use for the first century, and are given over to the tyranny of individual fancies. Now which?"

This venerable dilemma has so far succeeded in imposing the belief that there is a necessary opposition between historical alle-

¹ *Prog. Orth.*, p. 124.

² Page 89.

giance to the Christ of the gospels and ethical allegiance to the claims of spiritual life, that it is, as has been previously said, one of the most serious questions of our day, pressing upon the intelligent, unprofessional mind, to settle the relations between historical and ethical religion; and it is largely this motive that is impelling those many intelligent men and women, earnestly devoted to the cause of right and truth, who are turning away from the churches, because they seem to them to be hopelessly wedded to the worship of ceremony and history. It is, then, perhaps no wonder that the Andover Reviewers should suppose, with others, that a recognition of what has been called the essential Christ must take away the significance of historic Christianity.

Now the position of the Incarnation in the divine plan of revelation is well stated by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by a son" (Heb. i. 1, 2). Thus the Incarnation is not the sole act of revelation, but is its climax, characterized above all other acts, as the author goes on to say, by the unique nature of its attractiveness and definiteness. Historic Christianity, then, has as its province not to create spiritual life in the race *de novo*, but to be its inspirer, its guide, the revealer to it of heights hitherto unknown. If to-morrow the Gospels were discovered to be false, the spiritual life of man would remain, but it would be infinitely poorer — weaker in motive-power, narrower in range, with fewer questions answered, with fewer questions which it cared to ask. And this we find to be in general the condition of those who have little or no hold on historic Christianity. Their spiritual life may be real, but it is thin, saving them from much of evil, but with a narrow horizon and feeble, not calling upon the strongest of the directive powers, a clear purpose intelligently and consciously held. The value of historic Christianity, then, is not diminished by the Pauline doctrine of the immanence of Christ, for by it this historic element is held necessary to the completeness of the spiritual life of the race. Of course, the more the spiritual life of the individual holds in it, absorbed from the community, elements which are the direct inheritance of historic Christianity, the more will it approximate to that completeness which is possible only to those who know in whom they have trusted. But that one who has an eager love for whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, just, pure, lovely, — that he has, *ipso facto*, salvation, cannot be denied by any one who holds salvation to be

deliverance from sin. And if he is so saved, it must be either that he is saved without the knowledge of Christ, or that in these very things he has the knowledge of Christ. For ourselves, we prefer the latter alternative.

This objection, however, runs deeper. There is a feeling that to allow devotion to that which is true, honest, just, to be essentially the same as devotion to Christ would be subversive of his personality. And it is a form of this objection which "Progressive Orthodoxy" expresses in saying that this view takes away the personality of the Holy Spirit. Love for a person is concrete, we are apt to say; devotion to a principle is abstract. Earnestness for truth, justice, goodness, is indeed desirable, but it is not the same as love for Jesus. To ascribe to one person, say the Reviewers, what belongs to another is an infringement of personal rights, at least a confusion of personality. Now this is true, if our idea of personality is still dominated by the thought of separate embodiments. We ordinarily think of personality as necessarily exclusive, mine of yours and his and every one's. But in order to understand man's relation to God, and all the higher human mutual relations, we must recognize that personality is inclusive. The more truly it is personality, the more does it comprehend all true persons; "I in them and thou in me." This conception is needed to explain the participation by man in the life of God, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the presence of Christ in the church, all true friendship and marriage, the mutual life of the living with the dead. Any one who has exclaimed triumphantly in the face of separation by distance or death, —

• "We are wed,
For we shall carry each the pressure deep
Of the other's soul,"

will feel it intrusive emptiness to be told that the power that ministers spiritual comfort to him is not the presence of Christ with him, because it is the presence of the Holy Spirit. If our Lord could declare, "All mine are thine, and thine are mine;" if He could say of one and the same event, "The Father shall give you another comforter, even the spirit of truth. I will not leave you comfortless; I will come to you;" we are compelled to believe that this was no "confusion of personality," nor a mere agreement of mutual courtesies on the part of the different members of the Trinity, but that it was because our Lord dwelt in a region where the difference between mine and thine had vanished, where the words had ceased to have distinctive meaning.

Let us sum up, then, the objections to the Andover system we have been endeavoring to express. The conviction forces itself upon us that the system, as at present developed, can never be a permanent power in the world, nor meet the great opportunity before it. It has no universal philosophic basis for its thought. It has not freed itself from the old opposition of finite to infinite, nor from the method of regarding revelation as consisting of facts superimposed on the human mind from without. Its belief in the immanence of God has not been absorbed into its teachings, while of the immanence of Christ it has hardly a conception. It has glimpses of the truths corrective of all these defects, but it has never seen them systematically. Owing to its materialistic view of the finding of Christ by the soul, it is compelled to assert for each soul an occasion when it shall settle its eternal destiny by consciously passing upon the claims of Christ; and owing to its desire to save the justice of God, it is compelled to posit such an occasion in the next life for those to whom it has not come in this. This assumption of a future opportunity of the kind it postulates, we cannot but think to have not the slightest warrant in the nature of things, nor in Scripture, because neither reason nor Scripture asserts that such an opportunity is in this life the gate of salvation; and to maintain that the conditions of salvation hereafter are other than they are here would be contrary to our belief in the continuity of life and law, and therefore suicidal. Its Christology vacillates between the old forensic view of Christ's work, caused by the attempt to drag a historic event bodily into the domain of the spiritual and make it do duty as part of an eternal process, and a perception of St. Paul's use of the term "Christ," as not only the title of Jesus, but the elucidative name of those eternal processes which were taking place in his soul, and in the soul of humanity, of which the historic Jesus of Nazareth was the climactic and complete revelation. The exigencies attending the birth of the Andover movement have unfortunately prevented it from developing itself calmly and harmoniously, and have given its utterances a tone now apologetic and adaptive, now aggressively polemic. The reader of "Progressive Orthodoxy" cannot fail to see that it is largely local difficulties that the scheme is designed to meet, cannot fail to hear an exculpatory tone, and almost to feel embarrassment at finding himself present at the family quarrel of some well-bred household. One may both be proud and may smile to note that some of its chapters could not have been written outside of New England. This gives the book

a certain provincial air. Local polemics there must be, but Andover's time for this ought now to be past. She ought to have produced not an *Apologia*, but an *Institutio*.

Philosophy and science are to-day making to theology a contribution of preëminent value, and this contribution is a question. Theology has had no such precious opportunity for being questioned for three and a half centuries. The question is, "Does the infinite exclude or include the finite?" The answer which any school of thought gives to this is the test of its depth and the prophecy as to its permanent existence and influence. We may arrange side by side the two opposing hypotheses with their corollaries, so that a glance will show us the genealogy of ideas. If the infinite excludes the finite, all knowledge is relative, real knowledge of God impossible, and the union of divine and human in Christ becomes a mechanical, uninstrusive one. Certain conceptions become opposites; for example, supernatural and natural, grace and nature, revealed and natural religion, will and law, conversion and education, the church and the world, the priest and the man, faith and reason, the claims of the next life and those of this. If, on the other hand, the infinite necessarily includes the finite, real knowledge is possible; knowledge of God is absolute, though not complete; the union of divine and human in Christ is essential and typical; the opposites just mentioned become different aspects of a common unity. According as we hold the one position or the other, revelation is a process outside the mind of man or within it; faith is a body of truth or an attitude of spirit; the Atonement is satisfaction to God or harmony with Him; the Incarnation was an exhibition of humiliation or of life in its highest development, full and glorious.

On which of these two sides is Andover to take her stand? At present she stands on neither.

Frederic Palmer.

ANDOVER, MASS.

EDITORIAL.

DR. VON DÖLLINGER.

HERMANN GRIMM has remarked that from the Italian point of view all the Germans are heretics alike, the Roman Catholic Germans being simply heretics a few degrees lighter than the rest. An Italian Catholic, he says, simply asks: Are you a heretic? If you are, he wants nothing more to do with you. A German Catholic asks: Why are you a heretic? But this very question has in it a germ of heresy. It implies that a Catholic is under obligation to weigh the grounds of a dissenting opinion, which cannot be conceded without implying a possible obligation of accepting it. This is exemplified in the history of the illustrious man who has been called away from earth on the eve of his completing the ninety-first year of a life which continued in full activity up to the close.

We are apt to imagine, in view of Dr. Döllinger's later position, that he had always belonged to one of the Protestantizing schools, or, at least, to the Gallican school of Catholicism, whereas, until he was fifty years old, he was known as a peculiarly intense Ultramontane, and a peculiarly bitter antagonist of Protestantism. In view of the fact that the Reformation in Germany had so long had *de facto* historical rights, it might have been expected that when in Bavaria Protestant soldiers protested against being required to kneel to the host, so enlightened a man as Döllinger, however intense a Roman Catholic, would have given his voice on their side. Even such an Italian pope as Benedict XIV. would hardly have urged the abstract rights of the church against them. But Dr. Döllinger spoke for coercion and against the rights of conscience. And as to the claims of the church generally in face of the state, notably as respected education and mixed marriages, he appears to have supported the most arrogant pretensions of the priesthood. But he was a German, one of the greatest of scholars, and a Christian after the German pattern, that is, one whose religion rested primarily on personal conviction and experience. And the more stanchly such a one champions the theories of a Boniface VIII., the more danger there is, in some unexpected crisis, that these will suddenly collapse under his hand. And so it happened to Dr. von Döllinger. There seems to have been all along a preparation for this in a latent but deep dislike of Jesuitism, and a deep sense of all the unspeakable mischief it had wrought to his country, as well as to the world. Many years before his breach with Rome, he has used language in remarking upon the Jewish scribes, and their substitution of perverting casuistries for a living faith, of which his late work, in conjunction with Professor Reusch, in development of the history of Jesuit influence in the field of morality, might be called an amplification. Indeed, as he himself has since said, in describing the ordinary experi-

ence of a German Catholic, it is hard for such a one to realize that he and the people of Calabria, with their idolatry and magic, profess the same religion, while on the other hand, a German married couple, Protestant and Catholic, will easily maintain family worship for twenty years together without the consciousness of a jar. Indeed, those many German priests who preach justification by faith with greater zeal than their Protestant neighbors often exhibit appear to do so quite independently of the particular opinions which they may hold respecting papal infallibility or the rights of the church.

The change which transformed Dr. Döllinger from an Ultramontane into the great antagonist of Ultramontanism appears to have been mainly a silent ripening in his own mind, in the ten years between 1848 and 1858. It might have been expected that the great convulsions of the former year would only have confirmed him in his inordinate ecclesiasticism. But they seem to have wrought (for we can hardly suppose them to have remained inoperative) exactly the other way. He doubtless saw in them the judgment of God on institutions that were outworn. The divulsion between him and his old associates began when the latter, and Pius at their head, clung with such insensate fury, virtually treating it as a point of the faith, to the Pope's regal rights in Middle Italy. Döllinger's graduated doctrinal and historical sense must have been shocked beyond measure at this confusion of Christianity with one of its mere accidents. The hysterical Pope and he knew thenceforth that they "were of a different spirit."

It is a sad pity that he had not given more decisive expression to his mental attitude until his long concurrence in the evil domination of Rome had ripened its most evil fruits. When he presided over a gathering of German Catholic scholars, at which the rights of investigation over against mere authority were energetically maintained, and consented at last to quiet the fears of the agitated Pope by sending him a message that the meeting confessed knowledge to be unconditionally subject to authority, he helped to betray German Catholicism by leading it over the edge of an inclined plane, on whose slope, as a Bavarian Catholic bitterly remarked after 1870, it was impossible to stop before it landed in the pitiable collapse of the German episcopate at the council. At the last, Döllinger himself escaped, and a noble band of the Catholic scholarship of his country, few by count, but many by weight. He himself (Hefe apart) easily outweighed all the bishops together. But possibly an earlier courage might have done much more than to rescue a fragment from mental prostration, precious as that fragment is in itself.

We must not, however, judge of the effects of von Döllinger's late protest, and that of his companions, merely by the number of those who have formally constituted themselves into a distinct organization. Only within these three years, a German nobleman has written a book in which he declares that though many, himself among them, have been socially

precluded from giving a formal adhesion to the Old Catholic movement, yet they recognize in it a pledge of the ultimate deliverance of German Catholicism from Rome. It is usual to smile pityingly at Father Hyacinthe's isolated endeavors in France. Yet a bishop in full communion with Rome has privately written to him that his courageous action has brought nearer the day of his brethren's release by a hundred years. "What do these feeble Jews?" is a taunt dear to the hearts of the Sanballats and Tobiahs of all ages, but for which the children of God have small occasion to care. Döllinger himself never took anything but a reluctant and discontented part in a movement to which, nevertheless, his eminent personality gave its strongest impulse.

One of the best effects of the Old Catholic movement is likely to be produced upon the Church of England. It is evident that she is coming into an organic relation with those many continental Catholics who are becoming tired of Roman repression that will ultimately convert them into outlying adherents of Anglicanism. And as their Catholicism is of a more certainly authentic stamp than hers, and the validity of their priesthood confessed even by their enemies, their influence must react upon England for a higher appreciation of the Reformation than a great many Anglo-Catholics seem now to entertain. No tribute to Luther that we know of has been quite so grand as that rendered, in his lectures on the Reunion of the Churches, by Dr. von Döllinger. Once emancipated from Italy, it is simply impossible that German Catholicism should not prove a healing and mediating influence. It can never — as Anglo-Saxon movements can only too easily — find a central interest in mere matters of organization and rite.

It cannot, of course, be pretended that Ignatius von Döllinger was a great creative personality. But neither was he a mere student. His vast stores of knowledge were not accumulated but absorbed, worn lightly, and turned to living ends. And therefore he will remain a living memory for Christian mankind.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF MR. COVELL; WITH CORRESPONDENCE.

THE correspondence in the case of Mr. Covell, published in our last issue, closed, as our readers will recall, with the minute of the Prudential Committee postponing further action till after the completion of Mr. Covell's Seminary course. This minute was adopted, as we are informed in Dr. Storrs's recent letter in the "*Independent*," because of the impossibility of securing Mr. Covell's immediate appointment, though this was advised and urged by the President and Vice-President of the Board. It had been stated in the minute that there was a disagreement of opinion among the members of the Committee; still it had been also there stated that the action was taken "in the strong desire and hope that if the appointment is to be made it may be made with entire unanimity." Just

how an appointment which at that time could not secure a majority vote was to be made six months after with "entire unanimity" did not at first appear very clear to Mr. Covell. But from personal letters from the rooms, which followed the minute, similar in purport to Dr. Thompson's open letter to the "Congregationalist," it became evident, as there avowed, that "the change hoped for was not in the Committee but in the candidate." And when this fact was manifest to Mr. Covell, namely, that his appointment was practically conditioned upon further study in eschatology with a view to a change in his opinion, it seemed to him that the only honorable course for him to take was to withdraw his application. As he very clearly shows in his letter, he could not reopen the question of eschatology in the spirit of honest search after the truth, when his appointment seemed to be made dependent upon his reaching a given conclusion; and he would not allow himself to appear to be doing what he could not do; to trifle with a matter of so serious concern. This, as we know, was Mr. Covell's immediate and unalterable conviction. And however much we may have wished, in common with many of his friends, that the situation had allowed a different interpretation, we can see no course equally honorable with that which Mr. Covell determined to pursue. It was in entire consistency with the candor and honesty which had marked his whole course from the hour of his application for appointment as a missionary of the American Board. We do not wonder that the Committee in their reply are moved to express their "hearty appreciation of his evident conscientiousness both in presenting and withdrawing his application." And we may add that we think the Prudential Committee may well thank Mr. Covell for having by his straightforwardness relieved them of the immediate embarrassment of their singular action. We do not know that Dr. Storrs calculated the rebound of his words in the following sarcasm which he aimed at Andover, but he could hardly have done more execution in the rear by a direct shot at the Prudential Committee. "About the last thing," he says, "which I should do for a young man of ardent and receptive mind, in this dubious state, of whom I wanted to make a missionary, would be to discourage his missionary impulse, and send him back to Andover, with a more or less keen sense of repulse, to get further light on eschatology. . . . With all respect for the accomplished and industrious teachers who occupy its chairs, I would far sooner send one to Zululand or Japan, on a mission for Christ, than to send him to them, as an inquiring student, to get correct views of what some of them regard as 'the larger hope.'" Very well. This was precisely what the Prudential Committee did, and in so doing were guilty of the absurdity here held up to derision, or were guilty of the insincerity of sending Mr. Covell back to Andover for further study in the expectation that his opinions would be so confirmed and established that his rejection might be secured. Mr. Covell would not be a party to the action which Dr. Storrs has characterized after this fash-

ion. Young men may not always show the wisdom of Mr. Worldly Wiseman, but when they are true to their instincts and convictions, they not infrequently show that higher wisdom which compels admiration and in the end acceptance.

The reply of the Prudential Committee to Mr. Covell's letter of withdrawal suggests at once the proverb, "Blessings brighten as they take their flight." Mr. Covell is assured that "on account of all that it has heard about and seen of him, it would rejoice to put him in the missionary field if the way should hereafter open for so doing;" he is informed that "it has had no thought of requiring any other majority for his appointment than is required for all such appointments;" and he is told that "the way will always be open to him to renew his application, if at any time he shall be moved to do so, with the assurance of the most careful and candid consideration of it by the Committee." We are reminded, as we read this language, of the clerk, who having been discharged by his employer received so fulsome a recommendation that he at once presented it for reemployment. If all this could be said of Mr. Covell and to him, why did not the Committee refuse to accept his withdrawal; why at least did they not explicitly remove the condition which made his withdrawal necessary? Reference to the official letter accompanying the minute will show that the same insistence is placed upon further thought and study upon the questions under consideration.

The withdrawal of Mr. Covell serves to expose the method of the Prudential Committee in passing upon the theological qualifications of candidates for missionary service. The method is that of protracted correspondence or of frequent interviews, in the endeavor not to ascertain what the candidate believes, but what he can be made to believe or unbelieve. We submit that no method could be devised more unsuited to times of controversy or of discussion in the church. More than this, we believe the method to be absolutely pernicious in its effects. It is in danger of becoming a school of sophistry and deceit. Not every man will be able to carry himself with the simplicity, the candor, and the consistency of Mr. Covell. More frequently we fear that candidates will take refuge in silence or in ambiguous statements or in unworthy compromises. At best, the method leads to fine distinctions in words, rather than to the clear, frank, and honest statement of the actual belief. If the Prudential Committee is a theological board (an assumption which we are not prepared to accept), if it has the functions of an ordaining council, let it use its powers like a council. Let the candidate present his statement of faith before the Committee, and, as with councils, let it be in public; then let him be examined as fully as may be necessary; and then let him be accepted or rejected, so far as his theological views are concerned. We are sure that no other method will give the Committee, working upon the basis of a theological committee, what they are

supposed to desire to know, namely, the mind and heart of the candidate, and we are sure that no other way can protect the candidate from the moral perils of ambiguity and sophistry, or the outward danger of misrepresentation and public distrust. Better by far that every candidate who cannot accept theological tests of the Committee be rejected on the spot, than that the convictions or even the doubts and questionings of young men be subjected to such a process. Who can tell the difference between a theory or hope which is without the *support* of the Scriptures, but which is "probably, but not certainly, indicated by the famous passages in Peter;" or between a theory or hope which is not a part of a *speculative* scheme, but which is "possibly, but not certainly, involved in the universality of the Atonement"? In all these things, it is a mere matter of definition, not of fact. What any one can distinguish in his own mind and make clear to others is the difference between a gospel and a hope, the message to be delivered, the glad tidings to be declared, and the hope which has its origin in the intimations of Scripture, or which attaches to the believer's apprehension of the spirit and scope of Christianity. The last man whom we should wish to see sent into the foreign field would be the man in danger of making a hobby of the hope of the Christian opportunity for all men, or who held it in polemic or controversial attitude toward his fellow-workers. But if the entertainment of a hope in this direction is to be excluded on the ground of its effect upon the "spirit of missions," there are other hopes or theories with which the spirit of missions must have a reckoning. If we are to change the ground from what may be true, Biblically or theologically, to what seems to be practically expedient or inexpedient for missions in the holding of truth, the discussion must take a much wider range than it has yet assumed. But in the examination of candidates, whether the end aimed at be theological truth or missionary expediency, let the examination be after the general method of a council, and let the decision be immediate and final. A candidate might be rejected, but he would not lose his self-respect. And the Committee might save by this method the time which it now loses in discussing the meaning of correspondence, or the form of minutes.

We do not concede the underlying conception of the Board as a theological body in urging the analogy of a council in the examination of candidates. It was the stout contention of Dr. Hopkins that the American Board was not a theological body, but a missionary organization, and that its executive committee was not a theological committee but a prudential committee. And until this primary and fundamental question of the real function of the Board is settled, there can evidently be no agreement about the routine methods of the Prudential Committee in determining the theological qualifications of missionary candidates. But under the present assumption of power by the Committee, it is fair to claim that there must be some restrictions upon the method, above all

things that the method must be open in its workings. If the choice must be, for the present, between the process now in use and the method of a council, by all means let the Prudential Committee resolve itself into a council, and conduct its examinations and make its decisions, according to well-established Congregational usage.

The withdrawal of Mr. Covell has this further significance, that it is the protest of a young man against the use of missionary candidates for opening the doors of the American Board. "Had I not supposed," Mr. Covell says in the conclusion of his letter, "that the New York meeting was intended to open the way for young men holding the position which I occupy, I should not have made my application." The Springfield meeting left the doors of the Board shut and bolted against young men from the liberal seminaries. It was so understood and accepted by these young men and by their friends. The Prudential Committee will bear witness that no applications from these sources disturbed the quiet transaction of their duties from Springfield to New York, except possibly in the case of Mr. Noyes, who appeared before them at their request, in accordance with the advice of the Ordaining Council to the Berkeley Street Church. From the Prudential Committee point of view, everything was proceeding in a satisfactory manner. But the churches were becoming restive. The signs of discontent in the denomination were increasing. The chief organ of the denomination raised the alarm as the time for the annual meeting of the Board approached. At the meeting there was a constant undertone of dissatisfaction, unrest, and discontent. At last the gathering feeling found expression in ways which the most unyielding conservative did not dare to ignore. No one can tell what the result at New York would have been, whether a division of the Board, or, a modification of previous action, or a change of administration, had not Dr. Storrs offered himself as a peacemaker, standing on the platform of his letter of acceptance and affirming upon his reelection to the Presidency the recognition of the two wings of the Board and their respective rights. The offer was accepted, and by none more gladly, as it seemed at the time, than by the extreme conservatives. And in the spirit of mutual concession and of working fellowship the meeting adjourned. Then came in its natural time the application of Mr. Covell, with the result which is now before the public. We need not say that we, in common with all liberal friends of the Board, were surprised and pained at the refusal of the conservative members of the Prudential Committee to accept the President's interpretation of the case before them, or to give him in the three meetings at which he was present their willing or unwilling support. And it is only because of this action that we are now not surprised at the attitude of the "Advance," the organ of conservatism in the West, toward Dr. Storrs's last letter, and at the open dissent or singularly guarded assent

which characterizes so many of the letters of the conservatives called out by the questions of the "Independent." The point to be remembered in recalling the New York meeting is that the settlement there reached was not a theological or even a logical settlement, but of the nature of a personal agreement, and so requiring practical unanimity in the after action of all concerned to make it permanent and effective. Officers may be chosen and resolutions carried by a majority vote, *but a policy of peace calls for unanimity* in the consenting vote, and then for prompt and hearty good will in the action necessary to support it. When unanimity is wanting either in the vote or in the action which may follow, *the policy fails as a policy of peace*. And this is precisely what has happened to Dr. Storrs's policy. The policy itself may yet succeed, and we withdraw nothing in spirit or in word from the support which we have given it, but it is evident that it cannot succeed through the coöperation hoped for and to have been expected. It must now succeed, if at all, through the earnest, persistent, and definite purpose to secure its accomplishment. Something must be *done* to give effect to the statement and restatement of the policy in question.

The fact is now apparent that the New York meeting did not open the door for young men from the liberal seminaries of the denomination. And the question is, who shall open it? Shall it be the young men themselves? The withdrawal of Mr. Covell is a respectful answer declining the task. And in his declination he interprets, we think, the feelings of the young men who may be in agreement with him in his missionary purpose and in his theological opinions. "We are willing and eager," they are saying, "to serve the cause of Christ in heathen lands, we are not afraid to undertake the work or to endure the privations for which it may call, but we have yet to see why we should force ourselves through an unwilling organization." And in this conclusion we think that the young men are right. Those of us who believe in opening the Board have no right to transfer our responsibilities to those who would go in our behalf among the heathen. There are appropriate methods and appointed means for accomplishing the desired end. There is the President of the Board, who accepted his reelection upon the platform of an open door. There is the Committee of fifteen chosen to bring the Board into working harmony with the churches. There is the Committee of nine, nominated for the express purpose of considering the management of the Prudential Committee in regard to this particular matter. And there is the corporation itself, available for direct action in its annual meetings. The agencies for effecting a change in the methods or management of the Board in its relation to missionary candidates are not wanting to those who have the desire and the purpose to use them. The responsibility for the present situation rests altogether upon those who refuse to support in good faith the platform of the New York meeting. The responsibility for its continuance rests upon those who, believing in a

more liberal policy, are content to leave young men to make their way through the Board, or to find their way outside the Board into foreign fields.

CORRESPONDENCE.

ANDOVER, MASS., Jan. 7, 1890.

To the Prudential Committee of the A. B. C. F. M., Boston, Mass.

DEAR SIRS, — I have received official notice of the action of the Prudential Committee taken on December 17th; also a copy of the minute then passed.

In accordance with the instructions in your "Manual for Missionary Candidates" I applied for appointment in October, 1889, "near the commencement of the senior year." I applied to you with the sincere desire that I might be sent as a foreign missionary. There had been very serious obstacles in the way, obstacles known only to myself and a few intimate friends, but these obstacles I determined to overcome, and in that determination made my application.

My request for immediate appointment, repeated in several letters, has been refused on the ground that my views on eschatology are "essentially immature, and may take wholly different form and character in the months to come." I do not wish to discuss the question of my immaturity, but you will recall the fact that Dr. Storrs presented to the Committee a written report of a conversation in which I stated that I had held my present views for more than two years. You also doubtless remember that I gave you, through Dr. Storrs, my *pledge* that if appointed, and any important change took place in my views before leaving the country, I would notify you of such change. And I may add that I have been led to believe that if I would modify my statements, the question of my immaturity would disappear, and I would receive immediate appointment.

After careful study of the minute, I can reach no other conclusion than that the end sought by the postponement of my case is the unanimity of the Prudential Committee, and from letters since received in explanation of the minute, I am also forced to the conclusion that the desired unanimity can be reached only by a change of my views. I think you will see that I cannot reopen the question of eschatology and study it with the spirit of truth when my appointment seems to depend upon a change of my opinion. In my letter of November 25th I said, "If my application were withheld from the Prudential Committee until I had studied questions of eschatology more thoroughly, I might feel a constant tendency to intellectual dishonesty. The circumstances would not be conducive to that poise of judgment which one should have in the search for truth." And again in my letter of November 23d I said, "Whatever my views may be in the future, I should at least want to have the *liberty* of holding the same doctrines and hypotheses that I now hold." I have given careful consideration to the matter, and the difficulty of reopening the question of eschatology increases with time and thought. The passages quoted above from my letters I should emphasize even more strongly now than when I first wrote them. I feel that it is morally impossible for me to make any special study of eschatology under the present pressure, and therefore I prefer to withdraw my application for appointment. Had I not supposed that the New York meeting was intended to open the way for young men holding the position which I occupy, I should not have made my application.

Yours truly,

A. J. COVELL.

AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.
CONGREGATIONAL HOUSE, 1 SOMERSET ST.,
BOSTON, Jan. 15, 1890.

Mr. A. J. Covell, Andover.

DEAR MR. COVELL, — Your letter of the 7th inst., which was received here upon the 8th and was acknowledged to you upon the same day, was presented to the Prudential Committee at their next meeting, held yesterday afternoon, and the following minute was unanimously adopted, as given in the inclosed copy.

There is but one feeling on the part of all connected with these rooms toward yourself, a warm personal interest with the desire that further thought and study may make all clear as to the important practical truths under consideration.

I remain, yours truly,

E. K. ALDEN,
Clerk of Committee.

[Minute adopted unanimously January 14, 1890.]

The Prudential Committee hereby acknowledges the reception of the letter of Mr. Covell of the 7th instant, delivered at the Missionary rooms upon the 8th, withdrawing his application for missionary appointment, and desires to express to him its hearty appreciation of his evident conscientiousness both in presenting and in withdrawing his application. The Committee desires also to state distinctly to Mr. Covell that its own action, as communicated in its previous minute of December 17th, in no sense prejudged his case, but only postponed decision upon it; that it has a most sincere and cordial regard for him, on account of all that it has heard about and seen of him, and would rejoice to put him in the missionary field if the way should hereafter open for doing so; that while it has earnestly desired to be unanimous in any favorable action taken in his case, it has had no thought of requiring any other majority for his appointment than is required for all such appointments; and that the way will always be open to him to renew his application, if at any time he shall be moved to do so, with the assurance of the most careful and candid consideration of it by the Committee.

A true copy.

Attest : E. K. ALDEN,
Clerk of Committee.

BOSTON, Jan. 15, 1890.

COMMISSIONER ROBINSON'S REPORT.

We published in 1886¹ such documents as were important to a correct understanding of the prosecution then begun against several professors in Andover Seminary. We have also given the text of the judgments rendered by the Board of Visitors and the Board of Trustees;² and the substance — mainly in his own words — of Mr. Justice Allen's Report and findings upon questions pertaining to the correctness of the Record, filed by the Visitors, of their proceedings in the trial of Professor Smyth.³ Following our custom of publishing important texts and

¹ *Andover Review*, vol. vi., pp. 523-534 (November, 1886).

² *Ibid.*, vol. viii., pp. 71-80 (July, 1887).

³ *Ibid.*, vol. x., pp. 404-412 (October, 1888).

findings, while abstaining from discussion of questions still before the appointed tribunals, we now give in full a Report recently filed at Salem, Mass., by Hon. George D. Robinson, formerly Governor of this Commonwealth. The document is so explicit as to the nature and scope of the inquiry submitted to its Commissioner by the Court before which Professor Smyth's Appeal is pending, that little needs to be said by way of introduction; and it is so clear in its findings as to make comment, for the most part, superfluous. A few points may, however, be particularly adverted to, since in certain quarters they seem to have escaped the attention they deserve; also a few facts may profitably be recalled from previous stages of the prosecution.

Towards the middle of February, 1888, the Trustees of Andover Seminary filed a bill in which it was charged that during the pendency of the prosecution of Professor Smyth before the Visitors, and prior to judgment, Dr. Eustis "knowingly allowed himself to be submitted to, and was submitted to, undue and improper influences; and that said Eustis formed and repeatedly expressed to many persons an opinion upon the case of the said defendant Smyth before hearing the same: all of which was contrary to his judicial duty and rendered him incapable of sitting in judgment upon the said defendant Smyth." On the 28th of the same month, Professor Smyth, who eight months earlier had appealed from the Visitors to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, signed a document entitled "Additional Causes of Appeal" (filed May 15, 1888, and amended November 23, 1888), which charged Dr. Eustis with "partiality and prejudice against the appellant," and set this accusation forth in eight articles or specifications. Upon petition, the Court decided to appoint a Commissioner to report the evidence in the case, and selected for this service a gentleman widely known and highly esteemed for his conscientious and able discharge of high public trusts. The order of appointment reads:—

"*Ordered*, That the additional causes of appeal, together with the additional specifications made thereunder, filed by the appellant, be referred to George D. Robinson, Esquire, of Chicopee, as Commissioner, to hear the parties and their evidence, to find the facts and report the same to the Court, together with such portions of the evidence before him as either party may desire."

The Commissioner has understood this order, as no doubt it was intended, to restrict his function to that of sifting and reporting the evidence offered to prove the charge of prejudice and partiality. In his report he follows the specifications. He finds no proof of submission to undue influence, nor of personal prejudice against Professor Smyth, nor of any intentional perversion of justice. Dr. Eustis "gave to all the evidence and arguments that were offered in the appellant's case intelligent and honest consideration, with the purpose and desire of making a fair and just decision." If the question at issue turned on proof of personal animosity toward the appellant, of intentional dishonesty in dealing

with evidence, or the like, the Commissioner's report would be a virtual acquittal of Dr. Eustis. The charge, however, as preferred, and as understood by the appellant's counsel, is something quite different. "We submit," remarks Professor Baldwin in his printed brief, "that no honest man, no Christian man (and Dr. Eustis was both), could have fallen into such an error, on a point so vital, unless blinded by a preconceived opinion."¹ The bias charged was one that made it morally impossible for him in the case before him to administer justice impartially. The charge of "partiality and prejudice" is thus set forth in Article 2 of the "Additional Causes of Appeal:"—

"During the pendency of said prosecution against this appellant before said corporation, and before the final hearing thereon, said Dr. Eustis formed and repeatedly expressed to divers persons the opinion that this appellant was guilty of the matters charged against him in said proceedings by the complainants therein."

The Commissioner's finding on this specification is as clear and emphatic as his acquittal of Dr. Eustis of corruption or personal animosity. He certifies, in substance, that Dr. Eustis, before he heard the accused professors, repeatedly pronounced them to be guilty as alleged, and that he characterized their conduct as lacking in conscientiousness, as to him irreconcilable with honesty, as insincere and unscrupulous.

The significance of all this as respects the question of "partiality and prejudice" is brought out by a further fact reported by the Commissioner, namely, that Dr. Eustis affirmed:—

"The Board of Visitors are called upon in the case of Professor Smyth to examine and decide whether his views published and declared accord with the Seminary creed thus interpreted and therefore with the intent of the founders. *This is the sole question before them for adjudication.*" [Italics ours.]

Knowing this to be "the sole question," Dr. Eustis affirmed, before hearing the accused professors, of whom Professor Smyth was one, that they "were fundamentally heretical, judged by the Andover creed," etc., etc. The Commissioner fixes definitely the time of these utterances. It was after the charges were filed and before the hearing of the cases. He makes equally definite that the judgment expressed was not simply upon the meaning of the Seminary creed, but upon the persons accused; that it was in every respect upon the precise issue concerning them which he was to try. An eminent judge is reported to have said that he would talk law with any man, a case before him with no man. Dr. Eustis violated this rule of judicial conduct. And he not only discussed the cases before him, but prejudged them; and not only prejudged them, but argued for his prejudgment; and this not only privately, but so as to make a record of his prejudgment in the community where he was a pastor, and in the denomination in which he "occupied a leading position as a thinker

¹ Brief of appellant, p. 28.

and preacher." This record was for a time not widely known. But Dr. Eustis was well aware of its existence when he went up to Boston from Springfield to sit as a Visitor in a "judicial capacity," charged with the duty, as the Commissioner reports, of "administering justice impartially." His own self-consistency had already been put by himself into the scales of justice, and he knew that this was so. If he acquitted the accused Professor, he had a record to face when he returned, a record of his own creation in the precise matter of which he was to judge. He sat, therefore, with his associates and heard the accused professor and his counsel not only with an opinion in his hand, but one already, as it were, delivered; an opinion to which he had, in a way which must inevitably become known to the public, fully committed himself.

The Commissioner refers to the Court the question whether such prejudgment of a case is consistent with judicial impartiality, and what bearing the decision of this question should have on the ultimate issue of the legality of the Visitors' judgment removing Professor Smyth from his office. These are the questions which will now come before the Court to whom the Commissioner has made his report of the facts. His finding, it will be observed, does not decide either question. It is a Report, — not a decision, even upon the charge of "partiality and prejudice," but a determination of the facts by which the Court will decide whether this charge is sustained or not.

One other remark seems also to be called for. As the history of the case shows, the issue respecting Dr. Eustis's disqualification as a judge is not a part of the Appeal as originally made. If the "Additional Causes of Appeal" had proved to be groundless, those on which it was first made would remain to be heard. The decision of the Commissioner supplies further reasons; it withdraws none which lie outside of the scope of his commission. As he himself intimates, it remains for the Court, either upon the facts he reports, "taken alone, or in connection with what shall appear of record before the Court," to decide upon Dr. Eustis's judicial conduct. It also remains for it, after argument, to pass upon the validity of the judgment of the Visitors in view of a great variety of considerations wholly independent of the question of Dr. Eustis's partiality. These considerations constitute the original grounds of appeal, and are also, in other and appropriate relations, set forth in the Trustees' Bill of Complaint, and in their application to be made parties to the Appeal. The Commissioner's Report, we hope, will open the way to a speedy hearing of all these causes on their merits, and to such decisions as the supreme tribunal before which they will be presented shall see to be competent and just.

The following is the Commissioner's report: —

Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

*Essex ss. Supreme Judicial Court.*EGBERT C. SMYTH, APPELLANT, *vs.* THE VISITORS OF THE THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION IN PHILLIPS ACADEMY IN ANDOVER.

COMMISSIONER'S REPORT.

THE undersigned, to whom, as Commissioner appointed by the Court in the above entitled cause, the additional causes of appeal together with the additional specifications made thereunder were referred, with authority to hear the parties and their evidence, to find the facts and report the same to the Court, together with such portions of the evidence before him as either party may desire, having fully heard the parties and their evidence, respectfully submits his report.

First. The appellant charged that the decree of the appellee corporation, from which he appealed, was procured and made by reason of undue influence used by third parties toward and upon the Rev. William T. Eustis, D. D., a member of said appellee corporation, and, specifically propounded in his third article as amended, by Rev. Dr. Edwards A. Park, Rev. Dr. J. W. Wellman, and Rev. Dr. John M. Greene and others whose names were unknown to the appellant, were in communication with Dr. Eustis at sundry times before the final hearing on the charges against the appellant, and before the final arguments had been made, and that by reason of such communication Dr. Eustis allowed himself to be, and was, submitted to undue and improper influence in favor of convicting the appellant of the said charges. The appellant failed to offer evidence, either in direct testimony or by just and proper inference, to sustain this charge as to the persons specifically named or as to any other persons whatever. I therefore find that Dr. Eustis was not in communication with persons as alleged touching the truth and sufficiency of the charges or any of them, and the conduct of the prosecution, and the evidence in support thereof, in such manner that he thereby allowed himself to be and was submitted to undue and improper influence in favor of convicting the appellant of the charges made against him, and that he was not unduly influenced by any persons whatever, and that the decree appealed from was not procured and made by reason of undue influence exerted upon or over said Dr. Eustis.

Second. The appellant further charged that said decree was procured and made by reason of the partiality and prejudice of Dr. Eustis against the appellant. The appellant particularly set out the grounds of this cause of appeal in his articles of specification other than the third.

As charged in the first article it was shown, and I find, that Dr. Eustis voted to sustain the charges against the appellant and for his removal from office. The Court having decided it to be immaterial how the other members of the appellee corporation voted, I make no finding as to them.

It was shown in the evidence and stood unquestioned that Dr. Eustis was during the years 1886 and 1887, and for many years prior thereto had been, the pastor of one of the largest churches in the City of Springfield; that he occupied a leading position as a preacher and thinker in the denomination to which he belonged; that he was outspoken and earnest in the utterance of his views on any question; that he held and declared decided opinions on the theological questions which were then under general discussion, as the doctrine of

future probation, the inspiration of the Scriptures, and the atonement ; and that his position in the church, and his views and teachings as a Christian minister were well understood by all who knew him or read his writings ; and that he was openly and strongly opposed to the "New Theology" and to the teachings of "Progressive Orthodoxy," believing them contrary to Scripture and reason.

Further it was proved, and I find as facts, that for a considerable period prior to the date when the formal prosecution against Dr. Smyth and the other professors was begun Dr. Eastis was greatly interested in the subjects involved in the subsequent prosecution, and expressed his views thereon with great vigor and earnestness ; that after the charges were filed and before the final hearing he discussed with several different persons the "Andover question," as it was generally called, talking it over with some at great length ; that he expressed the opinion that the professors were fundamentally heretical, judged by the Andover creed, and their views were unsound and could not by any fair construction be reconciled with any avowed belief in the Andover creed ; that he opened conversation on this subject with a prominent clergyman in a bookstore, while the charges were pending and before final hearing, speaking with great earnestness and with quite an excited voice, and declaring that in his opinion the Andover professors could not conscientiously sign the creed, and he considered they were acting in a very insincere way in reference to it, characterizing their action as unscrupulous ; that to another person, a lawyer, during the same period, he showed a printed brief in the case (though, it did not appear which side the brief supported), and asked for an explanation of certain abbreviations, and, in reply to a question from the lawyer as to what the Andover controversy was, said the Andover Seminary was founded for the teaching of certain religious doctrines, and that the then professors were holding and promulgating views at variance with the foundation, and were being prosecuted for it ; that on August 12, 1886, he had a conversation, reference being made to the particular charges filed against the professors, with Professor Woodruff concerning the views of Dr. Smyth and other professors at Andover, saying, he did not see how men holding such views, specially referring to those on future probation and the authority of the Scriptures, could honestly retain their positions ; that between the filing of the charges and the final hearing he had a conversation with a book-seller at New Haven in which he expressed himself strongly against the doctrine held by the Andover professors, and expressed his opinion that they were unfit by reason of their theological opinions to hold their positions ; that by those who were acquainted with him it was well known through his public discourses and his conversations that he declared the views given in "Progressive Orthodoxy" and the doctrine of future probation were in conflict with the Andover creed, and not in harmony with the Scriptures ; but I find that he did not make the "Andover questions" so called, or the position and views of the Andover professors, the subject of his pulpit discussion or comment during the time between the filing of charges and the final hearing, although he did treat upon these questions before his congregation before the charges were filed, and after the hearing was closed.

Touching the substance of articles 4 and 5, I find and report that at the commencement of the prosecution complaints were filed jointly against all the professors, but that upon objection by the counsel for the professors the Board

of Visitors directed the charges to be made separately, and they were so made. The trial of Professor Smyth was begun December 28, 1886, and was concluded December 31, 1886. At the conclusion of the hearing of the charges against Professor Smyth, on December 31st, it was agreed that all the evidence and arguments then in as to his case should be considered as in as to the other professors, and they could present supplementary evidence and arguments. January 3, 1887, the trial of the other professors was taken up, but Dr. Eustis was not present, having been detained at Springfield to attend a funeral. He notified by letter and telegram his associates that he could not attend the meeting, and further stated that if the hearing was adjourned till the evening of that day or to the next day, and he was notified, he would be present.

He made arrangements at his home to proceed to Boston immediately after the close of the funeral services, but was stopped by a telegram from his associates announcing, much to his annoyance, that the hearing was going on without him. In consequence of the absence of Dr. Eustis, it was understood and agreed by his associates and by all parties interested, and so announced then, to wit, January 3, 1887, that the hearing against the professors (Dr. Smyth's trial having been concluded at a former day) might proceed in the absence of Dr. Eustis; that the statements and arguments of the professors presented in their defense should be submitted afterwards in print or writing, and that Dr. Eustis might act with his associates in the cases of these professors in the same manner and to the same effect as if he was present at the hearing. The hearing thereupon was continued and concluded, and the statements and arguments of the professors were afterwards submitted to Dr. Eustis in ample time for consideration before June 4, 1887. Dr. Eustis did not assent to this agreement, but stated after he became aware that the hearing had gone on in his absence that if he had been present he would have asked certain questions to the professors and that their answers thereto would have determined his course with reference to their cases.

In reference to the specifications made in article 6, I find and report that after January 3, 1887, the Visitors met from time to time until and including the 4th of June following, when, all the Visitors being present, the decree of removal of the appellant was passed, Dr. Eustis voting in favor of it, and upon the cases of all the other professors Dr. Eustis did not vote at all.

At the several meetings after January 3, 1887, and prior to June 4, 1887, the Visitors considered the cases of Dr. Smyth and the other professors together, and there was no separate oral discussion of Dr. Smyth's case, nor any intimation from Dr. Eustis that he would decline to vote in any of the cases. At one of these meetings of conference in May, 1887, Dr. Eustis presented a paper of great length showing his views upon the case of Professor Smyth. It opens with "The respondent is charged in sundry complaints and citations, etc., etc.," and after some argument continues, "The Board of Visitors are called upon in the case of Professor Smyth to examine and decide whether his views published and declared accord with the Seminary creed thus interpreted and therefore with the intent of the founders. This is the sole question before them for adjudication." In several other places Professor Smyth is mentioned in the paper, and nowhere is any reference made to any other professor. The closing paragraph of this paper is as follows; "The Visitors decide that to maintain or inculcate such a doctrine is not justified in any of

the doctrinal statements of the Andover creed, but is inconsistent with its direct affirmations, and was repudiated expressly by the Framers of the creed." It appeared to Dr. Seelye upon reading this paper that the Visitors were not likely to reach a unanimous verdict, and that these conclusions, if adopted, would cause the removal of the entire faculty at Andover; thereupon Dr. Seelye intimated, informally, that the consequent reorganization of the faculty would impose too severe labor upon him in his state of health, and that he would feel compelled to resign, but nothing more was afterwards said or done about his resignation, nor was there any connection between Dr. Seelye's intimation and Dr. Eustis's subsequent action. Until this paper was presented by Dr. Eustis he had expressed to his associates no opinion as to any of the professors, nor had he intimated how he would vote as to any of them, and he did not June 4, 1887, indicate how he would vote (unless it could be inferred from said paper) as to any professor except Dr. Smyth.

Subsequent to the last hearing on January 3, 1887, Dr. Eustis consulted with an eminent counselor as to his duty in the cases of the professors other than Dr. Smyth in view of his absence from the last hearing. He stated to his counselor that he had failed to attend without fault on his part; that if present he would have asked certain questions, and thought his mind would have been influenced thereby. He was thereupon advised that under the circumstances he would be entirely justified in declining to act.

Third. So far as the main statements made in the various articles of specifications have been found by me to be facts, I report that they first came to the knowledge of the appellant after June 4, 1887.

Fourth. I further find that Dr. Eustis was not actuated by personal hostility or animosity toward the appellant; that he did not act corruptly; that he was not swayed or influenced by any personal bias or prejudice against him; that until the paper was presented in May, 1887, no one knew how he would vote on any of the cases; and that he gave to all the evidence and arguments that were offered in the appellant's case intelligent and honest consideration with the purpose and desire of making a fair and just decision.

Upon the specifications under article 8 I find that the statutes of the Founders of the Institution require, among many other matters stated therein fully and particularly, the Visitors always to administer justice impartially; and further provide that in case of an equi-vote on any matter before said corporation, the question shall determine on that side on which the presiding member shall have voted. I specially report to the Court said statutes in full as submitted to me in evidence.

The foregoing are all the facts found by me within the scope of the inquiry authorized by my commission bearing upon the appellant's additional causes of appeal and specifications thereunder, and they are the only facts established within the limits prescribed to me upon which it may be determined by the Court whether, upon these facts taken alone or in connection with what shall appear of record before the court though not committed to the consideration of the commissioner, Rev. Dr. William T. Eustis was incapacitated to sit as a member of the Board of Visitors during the trial of the appellant, and whether the decree against the appellant was invalidated because of his vote in favor of its adoption.

With leave of the Court I will defer reporting the evidence until the parties in interest have indicated, after examining the contents of this report, what portions of the evidence they desire to have reported.

GEORGE D. ROBINSON, *Commissioner*.

January 15, 1890.

Filed Jan. 20, 1890.

ARCHÆOLOGICAL NOTES.

THE Eighth International Congress of Orientalists was opened September 2, 1889, in Stockholm by the scholarly king of Sweden and Norway in person. It closed with a banquet, in which each guest found beside his plate each course poetized in some Eastern language. Such were Chinese, Sanscrit, Hieroglyphic, and Japanese, not to mention the grace in Persian by a poet of Ispahan. The boundless hospitality of court and people was the feature of the gathering. King Oscar awarded two gold medals. The first was to Professor Noeldeke, of Strasbourg, in the History of Semitic Literature. The second was to Dr. Goldziher, of Buda-pesth, for work in the field of Arab Civilization before Mohammed. Dr. Hildebrandt gave an interesting account of the Oriental coins discovered in Sweden, some 50,000 of which have come to light, dating from the age of Abd-el-Malik to the end of the tenth century. Dr. Zehnpfund described with success the exact form of the stylus used by the Babylonian scribes. It was a cube with a pointed end, wooden, not metallic. With such a pen he was able to write the cuneiform characters on the clay as swiftly as German on paper. Dr. Haupt, of Johns Hopkins, Professor Lanman, of Harvard, and Professor Harper, of Yale, were among the American members present at this body for the concentration and dissemination of light from the East. The former took advantage of a "short but incisive communication on the death of Sargon" to express the hope that the next meeting but one of the congress would be in America. The proposal strikes us as a good one. Why might not New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore be ready in 1895 to welcome the stars of Oriental learning with no less warmth and to much more work than even Scandinavia?

North of the Black Sea was the primeval home of the Norsemen. South of the Black Sea we touch the track of the Hittites. Dr. Wright has shown us how rapidly our knowledge of this peculiar people has advanced. Less than twenty years has elapsed since European scholars derided the notion that the inscriptions of Hamath were Hittite remains. Now Winckler, of Berlin, and Sayce, of Oxford, agree that the letter of the king of Arzapi to Amenophis III. is probably Hittite. *Mi* is made out to be "mine," and *bibbi* to be "chariot." Iron and silver were their currency. The king of Assyria received 250 talents of the first, and the pieces of silver found among the calcined ruins of Troy were evidences of the second, even to their weight. The Bible speaks of the Hittites as inhabiting towns. Conder has identified Kadesh, the capital on the Orontes, and Skene Carchemish on the Euphrates, whose maneh survived the conquest of Sargon in 717 B. C. Hittite art seems to Professor Ramsay to have left its imprint on the art of Phrygia with its flat

figures and cut-away background. Call their government a confederacy or an empire, their monuments are multiplying toward the north and northeast of Palestine and in Asia Minor's central plateau. They are the people whose feet were encased in snowshoes, and whose weapon was the double battle-axe. Perrot has figured for us their bronzes, Ward their sculptures, fringed and moving like the Assyrian; and Conder has sketched their faces without moustache, whose outline is like the Accadians of Tel-lo. We see their yellow complexions and Mongoloid features. There is more of Uriah's strength than Bathsheba's beauty. What shall we say of their deities standing on mountains, on priests, on panthers? The new Berlin Museum will answer, possibly, for it contains the Hittite reliefs of Boghaz-Keui with their perplexing problems. With them are arranged the Hittite sculptures of Sindjirli, which constitute the fortunate and famous find of Herr Humann in a mound of Northern Syria. We may be on the eve of the decipherment of the speech of Lycaonia, and about to grasp the secret of the Lions of Mykenæ.

There is always peril in a specialty. Professor Sayce, in his capital book on the Hittites, errs, perhaps, in claiming too much for the Northern origin of Greek culture. Dr. Amelia B. Edwards would be thought by many to err in deriving the same culture too largely from the South. That accomplished lady has none the less put the public of Boston and vicinity in her debt by her six lectures on "Egyptology and Art," begun on the 13th of November last and ending Thanksgiving week. It was fitting that she should be introduced by the president of the Museum of Fine Arts, to which she had assigned the serene Hathor-Head. It was a merited honor that she should have a reception and breakfast at the hands of the New England Women's Press Association, with the Pyramids and Sphinx painted on her menu, for she has been a tireless and fascinating popularizer of Egyptian archæology in England. Her paper on Bubastis, in the January "Century," continues the work in America. To crowded aisles at last she explained the derivation of *ebony*, *cocoa*, and *chemist* from the language of the Nile. In Egypt was the germ of Æsop's Fables. Modern artists paint for the living, the Egyptian for the dead. The patterns on the Egyptian potteries preceded and colored the Greek. The Ionic capital was the outcurving calyx of the lily of the Nile. The harpy of the Greek mythology was but a perverted echo and reproduction of the Egyptian bird, Ba, — the soul. Miss Edwards was, however, more sprightly than judicial when she flung upon the screen the early struggles of the proto-Hellenic pencil to prove there was nothing in Egyptian art so ludicrously feeble as the prehistoric Greek vases. Yet Egyptian art was then in its decadence!

More of the Bible would have enriched the course of the authoress who has done so much to identify Rameses the Great with the Pharaoh of the oppression. Dr. Lysander Dickerman's lectures on "The Ancient Egyptians" before Boston University had this merit also. We are pleased that by a rising vote the audience should have indorsed the memorandum read by President Warren on behalf of the trustees at the end of the fifth lecture. It is in part as follows: "Whether viewed with respect to variety and freshness of matter, or to appropriateness of style, or to beauty of illustration, each lecture has been worthy of high praise." The apathy of the public to the needs of the Egypt Exploration Fund has sometimes seemed colossal. We congratulate Dr. Winslow that he can count on the sustained enthusiasm of an American to second the

eloquent English ally who is so fast melting the snows of indifference to the land of the Pharaohs!

The Book of Nehemiah furnishes the champions of a southeastern Zion, instead of a southwestern one, with their strongest arguments. Mr. George St. Clair uses thus the third chapter and fourteenth verse: "But the gate of the fountain repaired Shallum; . . . he built it, and covered it, and set up the doors thereof, . . . and the wall of the pool of Siloah by the king's garden and unto the stairs that go down from the city of David." *So the city of David includes Ophel, and the stairs descend the Ophel slope westward to the Tyropæan.* His sketch plan is published in the April Quarterly Report of the Palestine Exploration Fund. It is based on the rock contours of the survey, and on the outlines of ancient structures ascertained by Sir C. Warren. Solomon's Palace thus stands on the southern brow of the Temple Mount, much where Stade puts it. The south wall makes for him, as for Lewin, a bay up the Tyropæan valley, the Fountain gate standing at its left or western entrance. The Sepulchres of David are located on the Ophel or eastern side of the Tyropæan, southwest of Solomon's Palace. On his map the house of Eliashib is just south of the armory, and west of the Temple courts. The houses of the priests are on the eastern side of the Temple, precisely opposite. We do not agree with Mr. St. Clair in all his identifications. All the more we are bound to praise his discrimination of the reëntrant and projecting angles, according to the Hebrew text, as scholarly and helpful. We think less of his suggestion why David's house should be called the House of Millo. "Millo was at first the northern boundary of the roughly-quadrangular suburb, but it would, perhaps, in course of time, give its name to the whole of the inclosed space, or the whole of the four walls; and then, because David's house adjoined the eastern wall of the four, it was called the House of Millo."

Last winter M. Golénisheff purchased a remarkable seal in Cairo, which it is thought may have come from Tahpanhes. "The back is flat and plain; on the middle of the obverse are two blundered Egyptian cartouches; and above and below them are two more cartouches, drawn horizontally, however, and not perpendicularly. In the upper cartouche is the following inscription in Phœnician letters: L-SH-L-M. In the lower is another in Phœnician letters: Y-R-M-Y-H-U. The two together read, *Leshalom Yirmeyahu*: "To the prosperity of Jeremiah." The forms of the letters correspond with those of the Hebrew alphabet of the seventh century. It is not impossible that this may prove an actual relic of the great weeping prophet of the downfall of Jerusalem.

Nothing, indeed, is impossible after the Tel-el-Amarna tablets. This extraordinary find of the winter of 1887-88 is worthy of the attention it has received from Schrader, Erman, Winckler, and Budge. That Babylonian was the language of diplomacy and society in the fifteenth century B. C., all over the civilized East, is the greatest of archæological surprises. Sayce fills nearly a hundred pages of the June Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology with the transcription and translation of the tablets now in the Boulaq Museum, which he well-nigh lost his life to translate. He thinks the primary foundation of much Pentateuchal criticism has been overthrown. Lehmann emphasizes the "commercium" and "conubium" between Egypt and Babylonia at this early date. He says: "Of special interest it is that Buraburias of Kara-Dunias sends to Amenophis IV. five span of horses." Notoriously the horse was imported into

Egypt from Asia originally. We do not find him in the papyri or on the monuments before the opening of the eighteenth dynasty to which Amenophis IV. belonged. The period of the Tel-el-Amarna tablets is apparently the period of the introduction of the horse to the land which in Solomon's day was to export the same animal in droves for the Hittites. It was suspected that gold in rings and ingots was early guaranteed in weight and purity. In the clay letter of the Egyptian to the Babylonian king, requesting him to test and to stamp his invoice of gold, this interesting usage is first proved.

To be sure, the higher criticism in the person of M. Renan has expressed doubts regarding the genuineness of the Tel-el-Amarna tablets. Mr. Evetts replies by appealing to the internal evidence of the documents themselves. The cuneiform script, though unlike any other yet found, is in the line of development from the archaic to the modern. This the "Comparative Table" of the brilliant and lamented Amiaud shows plainly. In the Tel-el-Amarna tablets, the characters have reached the stage of decay, normal for the fifteenth century, yet not that which in the twelfth century can be seen on the cylinder of Tiglath-Pileser I. Hieratic docketts give the letters an official stamp. The very mistakes in writing are such as would be natural in using a foreign tongue, — like the Babylonian by a Phœnician or Canaanite scribe in days anterior to the Hebrew Exodus. What is said to this point is corroborated by the Kappadokian cuneiform tablets of M. Golénisheff, which were "Assyrian, but Assyrian displaying the same peculiarities as the tablets of Tel-el-Amarna."

The expedition to Babylonia of the university of Pennsylvania has not been idle the past year. Dr. Peters's indefatigable activity in Philadelphia and in Constantinople has been ably seconded by his lieutenants. Professor Hilprecht went from perils of waters to perils of robbers to examine the Nebuchadnezzar inscriptions of Wady Brissa. He found the same old characters so familiar on the bricks of Hillah, and the well-known title, "Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, decorator of the temples Esagila and Ezida, the illustrious son of Nabopolassar, King of Babylon, am I." Dr. Robert Harper rode amid cold and storm to Carchemish and inspected and described the Hittite inscription in large characters, and the lion of the shaggy mane remaining with other relics on the mound of Jerablus. The main objective point of the expedition was Niffer. This was the ancient seat of the worship of the elder Bel. Systematic excavations began February 29, 1889. Naram-Sin's name has been found. He must have been builder or restorer of the great temple of Bel. Pinches figures and translates a brick with a queen's name dedicated to the same deity. See the October "Hebraica." From Niffer, we may note two important fruits of the expedition: (1) a letter from Professor R. F. Harper, in the "*Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*" for April, 1889. This describes the large library of three collections of Babylonian antiquities acquired by the University of Pennsylvania. Here are nearly 2,000 contract, memoranda, and case tablets. They relate principally to the Hammurabi dynasty, and are invaluable for the study of this early age. (2) A letter from Professor Hilprecht concerning two tablets shows that in the fourth year of Assur-etil-ilani Babylonia was not considered as a lost province by the successor of Assurbanipal. It had been supposed that Babylonia broke away from Assyria in the year of the accession of Assurbanipal's successor, or immediately after Assurbanipal's

death, or perhaps in the closing year of Assurbanipal's reign. The newly acquired documents, attested by witnesses and priests in Nippur, prove the contrary. Here is a gleam of light on the dark period preceeding Nineveh's fall.

In less than a hundred years came the Persian conquest, and Persia, in the person of the Shah, has been protesting against the ignorance of his own language he found in London. In the smaller city of Pesth, Professor Vámbéry made a speech to him in Persian at the Academy. At the Guildhall Banquet of London, the Shah and his suite of forty persons were left to their own intuitions to know what was going on. How easy to have assigned to each Persian guest some companion from the Indian service familiar with the language of the Teheran! Next to Constantinople, London is the European city containing the largest number of Persian speakers and scholars. Why were these not summoned from the Asiatic Society, the British Museum, and the Oriental College, to do honor to the tongue of the monarch whom England is counseling to introduce English into his schools? This is of a piece with the curriculum of the proposed Oriental school which Professor Leitner so forcibly condemns in the "*Athenæum*" of August 3d. On the continent, he says, there is a broad theoretical basis of Oriental classical learning for the superstructure of conversational attainments in modern Oriental languages. Why not in London? "The collocation of subjects is logical in the French school, thorough in the German school, political in the Russian school, and hap-hazard in the English school." How does the four hours a week of two professors in Persian on the Thames compare with the ten hours a week of two professors on the Spree, or three professors thirteen hours a week at the university and sixteen at the school on the Neva?

These withering criticisms could not have been directed at the last meeting of the American Oriental Society. This was held at Columbia College, New York, October 30th. There Dr. Jackson, a brilliant young Iranian scholar, gave an admirable analysis of color-sense in the Avesta. It was preceded by the modest and masterly paper of Dr. Allan Marquand on the Influence of the Egyptian on the Greek Temple. From temenos to capital, the relation of the two sacred structures was traced with a caution, a clearness, and a conclusiveness meriting the highest praise. Nothing less can be said of Mr. Williams's study of Arabic dialects, the fruit of his recent visit to Morocco, which was as original in its inception as charming in its execution to all interested in the sons of Ishmael.

We have only space to name the valuable papers of Dr. Adler on the Shofar, Dr. Wendel on the History of Egyptian Grammar, Professor Jastrow on the Text-books of the Babylonians, and Professor Lanman on Indian Philology in India. Thanks to Dr. Gottheil, an essay was heard from Brugseh on the Land Mitani in the Egyptian Monuments.

The marvelous researches of Dr. Glaser in Arabia were brought to the attention of the readers of "*Hebraica*" in the October number of that excellent magazine. Dr. Hommel therein draws out some of the historical results of the three journeys from 1883 to 1887. Not only has the intrepid explorer, traveling at his own cost, more than doubled the number of inscriptions, he has fixed their date. Before Glaser, three great periods of history had been accepted regarding South Arabia: (1) that of the Makârib or priest kings; (2) that of the real kings of

Saba; and (3) that of the kings of Saba and Dhû-Raidan, or Himyarites, on and after 100 A. D. A fourth great period now comes to view, that is, that of the Minnæans before Saba. This terminated about 900, and began toward 2,000 B. C. To remember that from Arab sources everything pre-Mohammedan comes from the dim traditions of the last century before Mohammed, is to conceive the vast tract of history here unveiled. The visit of the Queen of Sheba to Solomon need no longer startle the skeptic. It had been conjectured that Rahmânân, in the inscriptions, pointed to Monotheism, and perhaps Judaism. Glaser has proved it, for the inscriptions read now, besides "the merciful," "the [one] God, Lord of the Heaven [and the earth]" or "of the Heavens and Israel." There was a tradition that the South Arabian king, Dhû Nu'âs, killed in 515 A. D., was a Jew. Now this tradition shines in its true historical light.

Such revelations are astounding. They may well be submitted to Dr. Robertson Smith in connection with his Lectures on the Religion of the Semites. The question has been asked pointedly, "How about the Arabic books on which Dr. Smith builds so much, of which the oldest is the 'Kitab-al-Aghani,' which contains passages of poets, and references to persons who lived not more than a century before Mohammed?" Are they original and not exotic? This is hardly credible in view of the contact with traders from afar, and the sojourn of their caravans in Arabia. Why may not, nay must not, the Minnæans of Dr. Glaser and the Sabeans have had intercourse thus with India and Persia, not to say China? If we investigate the religion of the Semites on the Arabian side, ought not such investigation to start much nearer the source? We think such queries more legitimate than the alliterative comment that the book seems based on three t's, — the tribe, the totem, and the taboo.

Nevertheless, one must be struck by the religious emphasis Totemism has received of late from Smith and Sayce, and now from Miss Amelia B. Edwards. "The living solution of some of the most pressing questions of the Egyptian religion," she tells us, "is to be sought in Western America in the animal worship common to the Indian tribes." This is an offset to the rudimentary condition and meagre achievement of the Red Man. Whatever in the savage leads upward is nobly and pathetically akin to what is highest in more civilized races. Amid much that is unscientific in method and extravagant in assumption, aboriginal archæology has a vast value. We deem worthy of notice and thanks, therefore, the paper on "The Distribution of American Totems" in the "American Antiquarian" of November last. It is interesting to know that the totems of the Iroquois were the wolf, bear, turtle, deer, beaver, snipe, hawk, eel, porcupine, heron, bird, and snake. Those of the Northwest coast tribes were the wolf, bear, eagle, crow, or raven, whale, porcupine, owl, goose. In such facts is the key to many a migration and myth, and the relation of the soul to things unseen and eternal.

The affiliation between the archæology of the New World and the Old suggests the name of Dr. D. G. Brinton. There are few greater mysteries than the Etruscans. On a late visit to Tunis and Italy, the Philadelphia professor reached the following conclusions: —

1. The uniform testimony from the ancient writers, and of their own traditions, asserts that the Etruscans came across the sea from the south, and established their first settlement near Tarquinii. Archæology thus far corroborates these traditions.

2. Physically, the Etruscans were a people of lofty stature, of the

blonde type, with dolichocephalic heads. In these traits they correspond with the blonde type of the ancient Lybians represented by the modern Berbers and Guanches, the only blonde people to the south.

3. In the position assigned to woman, and in the system of federal government, the Etruscans were totally different from the Greeks, Orientals, and Turanians, but were in entire accord with the Libyans.

4. The phonetics, grammatical plan, vocabulary, numerals, and proper names of the Etruscan tongue present many and close analogies with the Libyan dialects, ancient and modern.

Libya adjoins the Fayum. The word calls up what has been well termed Mr. Petrie's revolutionary discoveries in that quarter. True, he did not find the mummy of King Amenemhat III. in the pyramid of Hawara. Robbers had preceded him. But he did find a set of golden amulets in another tomb, which stands to ordinary amulets as Aah-hoteps jewelry to ordinary bracelets and rings. At Ilahun, at the entrance of the Fayum, he found the temple of Usertesen II., with beads in its deposit that once passed, it may be, for currency, like Indian wampum. Adjoining the temple was a town laid out by the architect for the workmen, their chambers in long lines like bath-houses, their tools of wood, flint and bronze, as abandoned 2000 B. C. Less than ten miles away was Tell Gurob, whose ruined homes of the XVIII dynasty were rich in pottery and bronze, and whose Ptolemaic cemetery abounded in papyri enswathing the dead. Mr. Petrie became sure of the falsity of the theory that supposes the Fayum basin and the Wady Rayan depression to have formed one connected sheet of water, constituting the Lake Mœris of the ancients; for the ground rose 100 feet above the level of the Nile between the two depressions. Very interesting was a household account of fourteen hundred years ago, ruled and dotted with the accuracy of a bookkeeper, of which the entry for the sixth day is appended:—

"Sixth day: birds 4 drachmæ; meat 1 dr. 1 obol; salt 3 ob; a sheep'shead 1 ob; seasoning 3 ob; fuel 2 ob; bread 1 ob; eggs 1½ ob; lentils 3 ob; oil 3 ob; a pet dog 3 ob; the man with it 3 ob; an ass 1 ob." Observe the comparative cheapness of vegetables and dogs, and dearness of salt.

Last of all must be named the great Homer Papyrus of the fifth century, "abounding in diacritical marks and enriched with marginal notes." Mr. Petrie himself was staggered most by the presence of an alphabet seemingly Kypriote, in use before 2000 B. C. He found these letters with Phœnician and Greek in connection with non-Egyptian weights and the graves of light-haired foreigners of the XIX dynasty. The archaic Greek of Thera, ninth century B. C., is the oldest hitherto known. The inscriptions under the walls of the Fayum are at least four centuries earlier. Six centuries before Psammeticus, a Greco-Phœnician tongue was spoken by foreigners on the black soil of the exclusive Egyptians.

Where did the Phœnicians come from? Herodotus, Strabo, and Pliny point to the Persian Gulf. So do the excavations in the Bahrein Islands of Mr. Bent, reported in the "*Athenæum*" of July 6th. As in Amrit and in Sardinia, the tombs had an upper and lower chamber. The bones of a large animal, perhaps of a horse, were found in the first. With these were ivories resembling those of Kameiros and those of Nimrod, now in the British Museum, by Phœnician artists. Ostrich shells also abounded. These were stratified and colored with Naukratis bands. The second chamber was not rough, but cemented. It was obviously for

the reception of the corpse. The ground was covered with fibrous earth like "snuff in its consistency." It was a foot in depth; the remains of the drapery hung on poles, and of the shrouds in which, anterior to the use of coffins, the Phœnicians wrapped their dead. Fragments of human bones were found here. Everything told of the sepulture of the race which carried their wares to every isle and shore of the Mediterranean before Greece and Rome were born.

A year ago I referred to the Roman art in Hadrian's day in Mr. Petrie's now famous series of Hawara funerary portraits. Roman numismatics confront us through M. Ernest Babelon. Where modern nations have one mint, Rome had many. Each new issue registered a new conquest. From B. C. 269 a double classification is adopted, — the chronological and the family. Now comes the first silver money of the Eternal City. On the obverse was the head of Roma; on the reverse the Dioscuri on horseback, with the inscription, ROMA. A distinguishing mark of value was stamped on denarius and sestertius alike. This was the charge of a printing-official named *Monetarius*, who held office for one year, and was responsible for the purity of the coins he issued. Suppose he debased them. His mark on the coin of his year — a fly, a spear, a prow, or the like — would identify the culprit. About B. C. 90 the head of Roma disappears. A historical, traditional, or divine personage succeeds. Not before the triumvirate of Antony, Lepidus, and Octavius does a portrait of a living man occur. The reverse changes earlier. From 160 B. C. on, each official selects some new type, either illustrating the national annals, or some event connected with his family. This medallion character of the Roman currency, already discussed by Cohen in 1857 and Mommsen in 1860, is, in 1889, made more minutely and lucidly useful to student, archæologist, and historian.

The "*Revue Archéologique*" of March, 1889, tells us, not of Rome, but of Carthage, and the excavations of Father Delattre in Carthaginian necropoli. The site was the famous Byrsa. Calined bones were discovered, as if to attest the story of Dido's funeral pyre. Inhumation and cremation both had left unmistakable traces. The tomb was a massive cube with a gable roof, like those of Sardinia. It proved by an authentic monument from the city of Hannibal that Phœnician art was the same wherever the spirit of commerce drove the galleys of Tyre.

The cedar coffins and bronze arms, with the rude red amphoræ and Phœnician letters of one tomb, were those of the first chiefs of Rome's great rival. Nearer the surface came layers of pulverized Greek vases and exquisite Egyptian jewelry, which were the winding sheet and ornaments of the higher classes of the citizens in the heroic age. The vast cemetery north of Carthage is conclusively demonstrated to be not Phœnician, but Jewish, like the Talmudic dimensions of its cells. Father Garucci had described the Jewish necropolis at the gates of Rome with Pagan symbolism of animals and genii. Father Delattre shows us a Jewish necropolis adjoining Carthage with winged genii and scenes from the vintage, in which the seven-branched chandelier was the national glory of upwards of 4,000 of the sons of Abraham.

Did it seem two years ago as if the sons of Javan had dug for themselves a sadder grave? The Greek museums threatened to bury the Greek honor. To the regret of native and foreigner at the scandalous thefts of a few succeeds corresponding satisfaction at the probity of the many. Reorganization and excavation have never been more active.

Near Sparta has been opened a tomb with golden ornaments, recalling Mykenæ. The *bulls* are spirited, the men wear a loin-cloth. New fragments of the Cyclopean wall have come to light, following the conformations of the Acropolis. The head of the Iris has been added to the Parthenon frieze, first recognized by Dr. Waldstein, of the American school. A beautiful relief of Athena leaning on her spear and looking down, as if in sadness over the disasters of the Peloponnesian war, has been exhumed. We do not know its occasion or significance. A curious inscription informs us, however, of the gold and ivory bought for the great statue of the Virgin Goddess in a single year. The gold weighed 6 talents, 1,518 drachmas, worth in silver 87 talents, 4,652 drachmas. The ivory cost 2 talents, 743 drachmas. It follows that the ratio of silver to gold must have been 1 : 14.037, and the value of the gold in the statue, which weighed forty talents, according to Thucydides, could not have been far from \$775,000. The French have searched Mt. Helicon and found the Hieron of the Muses. Yet they still claim to have incontestable rights on the site of Delphi, and protest against their discourteous supplanting by the Americans. This was apropos of the intelligence that Professor Norton had appealed to wealthy citizens of New York to raise the sum necessary to purchase the sacred shrine. We rejoice to be assured that one quarter of the price asked by the Hellenic government has been subscribed by Chicago. We may be on the eve of surprises in Delphi not less notable than the surprises of the Cave of Zeus in Crete. Certain it is that in the American School of Athens we have enthusiastic and skillful explorers, and in the "American Journal of Archæology" a competent and delightful organ of publication.

"The Land of the Four Rivers" is the third paper on the early history of Northern India published by Commissioner J. F. Hewitt in the July number of the "Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society." It is a learned and ingenious attempt to trace the Dravidian civilization to the Sumerians and Accadians of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Their social organization was based on the tribe, not on the family. Woman was mother, ruler, educator. Their exogamy brought in its train confederacy. The chief of the central camp governed at last from a central city. Allied cities were united by the bonds of trade. Every member of the community had his civil and military duties to render for the common weal under the severest penalties for dereliction. Their calendar embodied their science and theology. The year was the manifestation of the great generating power which directed the multiplication of the race. Ten months were months of conception, gestation, and birth, three months of generation. Again, the year was the measurer of times and seasons. And thirdly, the year was the cycle within which the sequence of natural changes was evolved, and over each of the three seasons of which presided eleven Gods. The first Dravidian immigrants were the Accadian moon and snake worshipers, that is, the Lunar Rajputs; the second were the Semite-Accad trading and warrior tribes, that is, Solar Rajputs. The Rîg-Veda Triad Dyaus, heaven; Agni, fire; Prithivi, earth, the home of the serpent, is compared with the Accadian Triad, Anu Bel, or Mul-lil and Ea, who was worshipped as a snake, that bound the world, and with the Greek Triad in which Zeus is heaven, Kronos is the old moon god, and Poseidon the god of the fertilizing waters. Eridu was the great port of Assyria at the mouth of the Euphrates, sacred to the great snake Ea, and the earliest home of the moon-god (sic) Bel-Merodach, and it was

"doubtless from thence that the emigrants went forth to India on the east, and Egypt on the west." Our readers will see that from such doubtful premises the writer can scarcely arrive at solid conclusions. They hang in the air, like his identification of the Eden rivers Gihon and Pishon with the Indus and the Nile.

Last year, a cry for excavation in Palestine was raised in connection with Sayce's paper before the Victoria Institute on the Tel-el-Amarna tablets. "Kirjath-Sepher, or Book-town, must have been the seat of a famous library consisting mainly or altogether of clay tablets inscribed with cuneiform characters." The fact that terra-cotta is not injured by moisture is certainly a reason for supposing that, wherever such strange records may have been, there they still are beneath the holy soil. Dr. Selah Merrill thinks the mummies of the patriarchs in the cave of Macpelah cannot now be in existence. If not robbers, then water must have long since destroyed them. He has an article in the "Sunday School Times" of December 14th, which we take pleasure in commending as the description of the visit to Hebron of the first American Christian who has stood beside the green cenotaph of Abraham.

Dr. Merrill's museum of Palestinian Antiquities has become the property of Andover Theological Seminary. The editor of the "Boston Daily Advertiser" called it, on March 2, 1889, the most extensive collection of its kind in the world. It began with a vacation trip to Jerusalem of the German student of twenty years ago. It was completed in 1886, after five years of consular life in the Holy City, by the author and explorer beyond the Jordan, during which he kept Arabs scouring mountain and plain in quest of visible illustrations of the Bible. He thus secured the jackal associated with Samson's sport, the fox of the desert to whom the prophets are likened, and the wild boar that is the symbol of Israel's Assyrian foe. In all he named "more than 300 species and 1600 specimens of birds and eggs, from the sparrow of which two were sold for a farthing to the ostrich which lays her eggs in the sand and goes her way unmindful, though the foot of the passer-by may crush it." The coins of the Herods constitute a short course on New Testament History. In the department of dress one ranges from the rude cradle of Bethlehem to the crown of thorns, never to be thought of apart from our Redeemer. Our Lord loved to use examples drawn from the farmer's life. There are countless agricultural implements in the Museum eloquent of Christ. "One may see the plough from which no man having once put his hand to it must look back; the pruning hook perhaps beaten out from a spear; the yoke for oxen, touching reminder of those wonderful words about the yoke which is easy and the burden which is light; sickles to be thrust in when the harvest is ripe; the mill for corn at which two women shall be grinding, one taken and the other left," at the last great day. When to the generosity of friends, purchasing for Andover this valuable collection of Palestinian antiquities, shall be added a donation of \$50,000 from new friends enlarging our Library Building, Dr. Merrill's curiosities can be properly housed and fruitfully studied.

John Phelps Taylor.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY IN THREE PARTS.

PART II.¹ THE TREATMENT OF CRIME AND OF THE CRIMINAL CLASSES,

Involving the consideration of the duty of society to those who have forfeited their social rights.

THE forfeiture of social rights finds its chief expression in disfranchisement. By the constitution of most of the States no person convicted of infamous crime can vote, while in some of the States the constitution further specifies that no one convicted of larceny, or of forgery, or of treason, can vote. The graduates of states prisons are thus practically disfranchised. How many these number cannot be determined for want, as yet, of complete and accurate statistics. But the number may be inferred from the present prison population of the United States, which, according to the census of 1880, was 58,609, divided between 53,604 male prisoners and 5,005 female prisoners, and distributed as follows: 30,659 in penitentiaries; 7,865 in workhouses and houses of correction; 12,691 in county jails; 1,666 in city prisons; 499 in military prisons; 350 in hospitals for the insane; and 4,879 leased out to private parties.

The social disabilities which follow conviction for crime are evident: the loss of social emoluments and rewards, the loss of public confidence and trust, and in some respects, greatest of all, the loss of earning power. The most serious drawback to the recovery of the discharged convict is his practical exclusion from ordinary employments. Enforced idleness, when work is abundant, is the price which society has set, even to its own cost, upon crime.

In studying the relation of society to crime and to the criminal classes, the inquiry will be partly historical and partly critical in respect to present means of progress. Full consideration must be given to the advance already made. Nothing in the future seems possible which is at all comparable in moral effect with the organization of justice, the development of criminal law, or the growth of humane principles of punishment. All present reform starts from the basis of law which is upon the whole just and equal. It is everything to the criminal that he is reasonably sure of receiving justice. Something remains to be accomplished in bettering the administration of justice or in preventing corruption; but the chief occasions of reform are moral rather than legal. The reformation of the criminal and the prevention of crime are the present aims of reformatory movements.

The order of the advance of society in its treatment of crime and of the criminal classes will be indicated through the following subjects which will form the topics of investigation and discussion. These topics will be presented in *alternate* numbers of the "Review" for the current year,

¹ PART I. treated of THE SOCIAL EVOLUTION OF LABOR.

PART III. will treat of PAUPERISM AND THE DEPENDENT CLASSES.

For the full outline of the course, see the January number of the *Review* for 1889.

and the authorities for reference in study will be given in connection with each topic.

TOPIC 1. THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE MEANS OF JUSTICE.

Here the advance to be noted is that from the *method of private revenge to a well-ordered system of justice*. Private revenge, which had its own method as among the Hebrews, is not to be confounded with the wild and lawless expression of it in the midst of a modern community. But the advance from this earlier and cruder method to the present system of maintaining and enforcing justice is incalculable.

TOPIC 2. THE DEFINITION OF CRIME.

The gain at this point has been brought about through such careful discrimination in respect to crime as to secure *the support of morality in the enforcement of law*. An interesting chapter in the history of crime is the record of the elimination of political and religious offenses from the list of common crimes. So long as the heretic and the agitator are on the same footing with the thief and murderer there can be only confusion or rebellion in the public mind.

TOPIC 3. GRADATION IN PUNISHMENT.

The history of punishment is not to be studied as a history of horrors. There is a philosophy in the infliction of punishment even when the form seems most arbitrary. The various attempts to adapt punishment to crime have been at once terrible and ludicrous, but they had a meaning to society. It will be of advantage to inquire into the *philosophy of punishment*, as we note the very gradual humanizing process in the use of penalty. We are not far removed from the use of capital punishment for common offenses.

TOPIC 4. THE REFORMATION OF THE CRIMINAL.

Of the ends of punishment, the expression of justice, the protection of society, and the reformation of the criminal, the last end has found tardy recognition. *The conception of punishment as in any sense disciplinary and reformatory is altogether a modern conception*. In following out this thought we pass at once into the critical study of present methods. And our investigations will cover such subjects as the history of the prison system, the principles and methods of reformatory prisons, and the discharge of the convict and his recovery to society.

TOPIC 5. THE PREVENTION OF CRIME.

At this point we pass beyond even the experimental stage into *questions of inheritance and environment*.

What are the practical workings of heredity in the perpetuation of the criminal classes?

What are the constant external sources and causes of crime?

What is the relation of crime to poverty?

What is the criminal significance of the residuum of a great city?

These subjects prepare the way for the discussion under PART III. of PAUPERISM.

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE STUDIES. Numbers 1 and 2. Published by the Faculty of Haverford College.

One of the promising signs in university life at present is the multiplication of journals for the publication of articles on distinctly scholarly topics. Some of these publications, to be sure, are devoted to the class-work of students in the preparatory stage of study, and consequently contribute little to the advancement of knowledge. Undoubtedly some, also, are projected mainly in order to advertise the institutions that print them; verily they have their reward. But the series represented by the two pamphlets named above evidently aspires to belong to a higher order. These pamphlets are printed, it appears, in England, at the Cambridge University Press. It is greatly to be desired that the attention of wealthy friends of learning should be directed to the immense service they can render by establishing, at a few literary centres, foundations akin to those of the Clarendon and other University Presses of Great Britain: establishments which may meet, in part at least, the cost of giving to the world results of scholarly research which, because unlikely to be remunerative to the commercial publisher, now often fail to see the light.

The first of the five articles contained in Number 1, and almost the whole of pamphlet Number 2, are from the pen of Professor J. Rendel Harris. The first-named article comprises notes made by him early in 1889, during a six weeks' examination of the three great collections of ancient manuscripts and books recently brought together at Jerusalem, and now known as the Library of the Holy Sepulchre. This library contains between fourteen and fifteen hundred Greek manuscripts alone; and among them the little volume in which is found the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," a tract which, since it was given to the world by Bryennios in 1883, has created a small literature of its own. Professor Harris supplements the fragmentary accounts of these treasures previously given by such explorers as Scholz, Tischendorf, and especially Coxe; he characterizes the collection as a whole by the epithets "non-classical," "orthodox," "monastic;" reproduces in uncial type two or three brief patristic and Biblical fragments; prepares the reader to welcome the full catalogue by Papadopoulos Kerameus soon to be published; and concludes with a hint at intended later disclosures respecting some of the Library's inedited rarities.

The second pamphlet, with the exception of two facsimiles of brief Esarhaddon inscriptions (one never before published) with a few prefatory comments on the same by Robert W. Rogers, is devoted to "The Rest of the Words of Baruch" or the "Paraleipomena of Jeremiah," — for the authorship of the document, as in the case of the Fathers' references to our Apocryphal Book of Baruch, is ascribed indifferently now to one of these two friends and companions, now to the other. Professor Harris has reëdited the Greek text of this Christian Apocalypse with great care and skill, by the aid of hitherto unused MSS. belonging to the library of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. In an interesting and suggestive introduction of some forty-six pages, the tangled problems of the Apocalyptic literature are adverted to, and the relations of this Christianized Baruch to its predecessors discussed. Of especial interest is Professor Harris's ingenious and plausible attempt to fix the date of the composition at or

about the year 136 A. D. For besides other slight apparent reminiscences in the document of our Gospel of John, it uses the expression *τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν τὸ φωτίζον με*, language which can hardly have been derived from any other source. If this inference be correct, we have here a new and noteworthy accession to the early testimonies for the Fourth Gospel.

The whole tract exhibits the acuteness and learning which its author has taught the public to expect in the products of his pen, and will at once secure the attention of Biblical students.

J. H. Thayer.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

ASOLANDO; Fancies and Facts. BY ROBERT BROWNING. Author's Edition. With Portrait. 12mo, pp. 114. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1890. \$1.25.

It is difficult for us to realize that this last book of Robert Browning's is indeed his last in a melancholy and double sense. Even the verbal conceit of its title — from "*Asolare* — 'to disport in the open air, amuse one's self at random,'" as we learn from the dedication — suggests that magnificent vitality, that masculine delight in the good things of the sunshine, which we associate with the poet even in his latter years. Yet this book, born as it is of Venice and of open air, crammed as it is with life, youth's love songs, and age's philosophy, closes the long message of a great poet.

While, as a whole, it cannot compete with the work of the poet's prime, that wonderful series from 1845 to 1870, which includes the incomparable *Men and Women*, it contains single pieces which take rank among the best of his shorter poems. Browning has given us few daintier or more musical love songs than *Summum Bonum*, *A Pearl A Girl*, or *Poetics*; few more finished gems than the first of *Bad Dreams*. As is usual with this most impetuous and unconventional of recent English poets, the stronger and harsher notes are not wanting. In such pieces as *Ponte dell' Angelo*, *Venice*, and *Muckle-mouth Meg*, he has, as he expresses it, "hitched into verse the thing," with his customary indifference to the code of polite letters. Yet it is with pleasure that we encounter in Browning's last book examples of so many of his varied styles, even the more rugged ones. To us who love the old faces, sundry reminiscences of an earlier manner have the charms of association. Many of the old strings are here touched for the last time. A poem is added to the group of those on painting, and one to that on music. The *Bean-Feast*, an admirable poem, recalls the *Dramatic Idylls*. In apprehensiveness, different as it is in manner, it may be set as a contrast study with *By the Fireside*. "*Imperante Augusto Natus Est*," with its superb free sketch of imperial Rome and the glories of Augustus, is in Browning's strongest blank verse, and fully worthy of a place beside such earlier masterpieces as the *Epistle of Karshish* and *Andrea del Sarto*. But perhaps one's greatest satisfaction is in the book's final reaffirmation of those deep truths on which the whole edifice of Browning's poetry is built. Fragrant as certain of its poems are with the bloom of life, touched as are some of them, as the *Prologue*, with an autumnal sadness, above all there rings out the triumphant note of a life-long and unwavering faith. That invincible hopefulness of one who believes with the full-

ness of a great nature that there is a God, and that God is good, Browning has kept undiminished to the end. In *Rephan* and *Reverie* there is the unchanged confidence not in God only, but in man; the faith that the soul shall see —

“By the means of Evil that Good is best.”

that —

“Earth at end

Wrong will prove right? Who made shall mend —

In the higher sphere to which yearnings tend?”

As we close the book, and with it the great volume of the poet's earthly work, we realize that nineteenth century England has had no loftier teacher, that English literature has produced no poet who has so fully expressed the spirit of the religion of Christ. Browning, who hoped and worked in the faith that Love was stronger than Power, has left us in the *Epilogue* his own best epitaph: —

“One who never turned his back but marched breast forward,
Never doubted clouds would break,
Never dreamed, though right were worsted, wrong would triumph,
Held we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better,
Sleep to wake.

Henry S. Pancoast.

PHILADELPHIA, PENN.

PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHURCH HISTORY. Volume I. Report and Papers of the First Annual Meeting, held in the city of Washington, December 28, 1888. Edited by Rev. SAMUEL MACAULEY JACKSON, M. A., Secretary. Pp. xxx, 271. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1889.

This volume gives the opening proceedings of the Society, with various papers presented. The first is Dr. Schaff's paper on “The Progress of Religious Freedom,” which we have already noticed. Accompanying are translations of the Edict of Nantes, and of the Revocation, also the text of William and Mary's Act of Toleration. The second paper is from Mr. Henry C. Lea, on “Indulgences in Spain.” It shows that in Spain, almost unaffected by the Reformation, and therefore scarcely touched by the Counter-reformation, the mediæval venality in the Sale of Indulgences survived in full force, if not rather systematized and aggravated. All the strenuous efforts and denunciations of the high-minded and resolute Pius V., most relentless of Inquisitors, availed naught against it. When he refused to continue Indulgences for the Crusade, supposed to be always imminent in Spain, the bishops, in their own name, coolly issued Indulgences good for a hundred years. The doctrine of the Church was monstrously distorted in their favor, and Pius V. pointed out that they were so handled as to become virtually licenses to sin. Succeeding popes gave up the contest with Spain, and under the name of alms have become accomplices in the traffic. As Mr. Lea shows, the Counter-reformation has vastly diminished the abuse, but can never really uproot it, so long as the coarse claim is preferred that the Church has a legal jurisdiction over the unseen world.

The third paper, a very fine one, is by Dr. James Clement Moffatt, of Princeton, and is called, “A Crisis in the Middle Ages.” It brings out with great distinctness the contrast between Gregory VII. and Urban II.

Hildebrand had high aims of reformation, but made force his great instrument. He was "obtrusive of his own impulses to the last extreme." His intolerable insult to Henry IV., Dr. Moffat remarks, was the pure monastic temper, an abbot trying to coerce a refractory monk. Urban II. was "a man who, without violence, knew the path to success." Of the First Crusade, with which Urban's fame is so thoroughly linked, Dr. Moffat says that it was, "in its way, a real Christian revival over against Mohammedanism, and the thousands who returned from the crusade returned with greater interest in the cause of Christ. Fourteen days later Pope Urban II. died, — too soon for him to know the depth and breadth of the influence he had wrought, or the nature of which it was. But he had left the Christian world in a better frame of mind, a more direct and practical Christian zeal." "The tenth and eleventh centuries, with their shameless immoralities, were never brought back to the Christian world again. New days dawned in brighter hopes." "The fourteenth century never surrendered her intellectual gains. Improving reformation declared itself as time went on." From 1100 to 1300 "was the period of the greatest scholastics. It was that which created the universities. It laid the foundations of our scientific theology, and created our science of the material world and our modern systems of education." The paper is a rewarding one to read.

The next paper is by Professor F. H. Foster, of Oberlin, on Melancthon's "Synergism." The author remarks that Augustine's philosophy left room for a true doctrine of the Will, but that Luther, being simply theologian, had none. To him, God's act in conversion is omnipotent, mechanical. At first, Melancthon holds the same, and owns only Intellect and Appetite. Gradually a conception of Will as distinct from either emerges, and with it a modification of Predestination, and finally a conversion of the divine activity in regeneration from a mechanical to an ethical, persuasive one, a Synergism. The author, however, remarks that Melancthon has firmly anchored Lutheran theology to the sense that invariably there is a divine initiative in conversion.

The next paper, by Professor Hugh McDonald Scott, D. D., of Chicago Theological Seminary, is entitled "Some Notes on Syncretism in the Christian Theology of the Second and Third Centuries." It is a somewhat confusing paper, because it turns on a confusing subject. The author, agreeing with Ritschl (and Rothe), allows that the Pauline converts took in very little of the Pauline depth of view, and, not being rooted in the apprehensions of sin and grace (which were not closely congruous to the Greek mind), slid into a shallower moralistic tendency, which beat about somewhat uncertainly for a basis of thought, although, in the Apostolic Fathers, always resting immovably on the Rule of Faith. Then came the Apologists, more heavily freighted with Greek philosophy than with the deep experimental theology of Paul, which fact necessarily brought in a strong Syncretistic commixture. Yet "even in the making of creeds by philosophic theologians, the common sense of the Churches was always strong enough to keep the philosophers from leaving the broad ground of the gospel. Barriers against Greek thought were (1) these Rules of Faith, (2) the New Testament Canon, (3) the rising Episcopal System considered Apostolic from A. D. 150 on." Dr. Scott rejects as too extreme, though having truth, Harnack's description of Gnosticism as a premature and acute endeavor for the secularization of Christianity.

The next paper, by Rev. E. C. Richardson, of Hartford Seminary, turns on "The Influence of the Golden Legend, on Pre-Reformation Culture History." The author of the "Golden Legend," Jacobus de Voragine, a Premonstratensian monk, afterwards Archbishop of Genoa, wrote the book about 1273. It continued in unabated popularity, in numberless exemplars, for 250 years. "The work consists, as its average name suggests, of legends of the saints, attached to a brief History of Lombardy like a dog to his tail — barring the vital connection. Here one finds the great bulk of the stories so familiar to us in art and poetry, for the author collected with the utmost assiduity everything improbable which had ever appeared in hagiologic literature. His principles of criticism were aggregation and the elimination of the probable." "It is on the temptation of men that the author chiefly loves to dwell." The author shows how it has influenced mediæval thought (and not that only) in every direction of popular belief, but chiefly in the weird region of "compacts with Satan."

The last paper, by Rev. Arthur M. McGiffert, of Lane, is entitled "Notes on the New Testament Canon of Eusebius." Mr. McGiffert remarks that Eusebius is not here criticising, but simply recording; not trying to form a canon, but merely trying to show how the Canon stood. How do the *vóthoi* stand with him? Much nearer even to the *ὁμολογούμενα* than to the *ἀναπλάσματα αἰρετικῶν ἀνδρῶν*. The author distinguishes thus: The *antilegomena* are accepted in the East as canonical, but have been sometimes disputed, or are even yet disputed. But the *vóthoi*, though quoted by some of the Fathers as canonical, had fallen out of that rank. They are *vóthoi*, not necessarily in themselves, but as to their canonicity. Mr. McGiffert explains thus why Eusebius puts the Apocalypse among the *homologoumena*, with an *εἵγε φανεῖν*, and among the *vóthoi*, with an *εἰ φανεῖν*. He could not, he thinks, put it among the *antilegomena*, because he recognizes the doubts as recent, not original. Should they subside, it would become a *homologoumenon*; should they prevail, it would fall off among the *vóthoi*, like the Pastor, the Apocalypse of Peter, and other such books.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Macmillan & Co., London and New York. The Epistle to the Hebrews: The Greek Text with Notes and Essays. By Brooke Foss Westcott, D. D., D. C. L., Canon of Westminster, Regius Professor of Divinity and Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Pp. lxxxiv, 504. 1889. \$4.00; — The Permanent Elements of Religion. Eight Lectures Preached before the University of Oxford, in the Year 1887, on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Brampton, M. A., Canon of Salisbury. By W. Boyd Carpenter, D. D., D. C. L., Bishop of Ripon, Honorary Fellow of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge. Pp. lxi, 423. 1889.

American Unitarian Association, Boston. Unitarianism: Its Origin and History. A Course of Sixteen Lectures delivered in Channing Hall, Boston, 1888-89. Pp. xxviii, 394. 1890. \$1.00.

James H. West, Boston. Evolution: Popular Lectures and Discussions before the Brooklyn Ethical Association. Pp. 408. 1889. \$2.00.

Universalist Publishing House, Boston. Essays Doctrinal and Practical. By Fifteen Clergymen. With an Introduction by H. W. Thomas, D. D. Edited by Orello Cone, D. D., President of Buchtel College. Pp. vi, 328. 1889. \$1.00; — Waiting on Destiny. A Story for Girls. By Hattie Tyng Griswold. Pp. 314. 1889. \$1.00; — The Bible and Modern Thought. By George H. Emerson, D. D. Pp. iv, 165. 1890. 50 cents.

Silver, Burdett & Co., Boston. Musicians' Calendar. Compiled by Frank E. Morse.

A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. The Sermon Bible. Psalm lxvii. to Song of Solomon. Pp. 476. 1889. \$1.50. — The Unknown God; or Inspiration among Pre-Christian Races. By C. Loring Brace. Pp. ix, 336. 1890. \$2.50. For sale by DeWolfe, Fisk & Co., Boston.

A. S. Barnes & Co., New York. The Three Germanys. Glimpses into their History. By Theodore S. Fay. Two volumes. Pp. 650, 631. 1889; — Bible Studies from the New Testament covering the International Sunday-School Lessons for 1890. By George F. Pentecost, D. D. Pp. 903. 1889. 60 cents.

Thomas Whittaker, New York. New Points to Old Texts. By James Morris Whiton, Ph. D. Pp. 255. 1890. \$1.25.

American Baptist Publication Society, Philadelphia. Saturday Afternoon; or Conversations for the Culture of the Christian Life. By Wayland Hoyt, D. D. Pp. 302. 1889; — Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. By A. C. Kendrick, D. D. Pp. 207. 1889.

Nims & Knight, Troy, N. Y. Aryan Sun Myths. The Origin of Religions. With an Introduction, by Charles Morris. Pp. 192. 1889. For sale by Damrell & Upham, Boston.

C. R. Barns Publishing Co., St. Louis. New Light from Old Eclipses; or Chronology corrected and the Four Gospels harmonized by the Rectification of Errors in the Received Astronomical Tables. By William M. Page. With an Introduction by Rev. James H. Brookes, D. D. Pp. xv, 590. 1890. \$2.50.

Roberts Brothers, Boston. A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life. By William Rounseville Alger. Fourteenth Edition, with a new Supplementary Chapter. Pp. xii, 832. 1889.

The John L. Murphy Publishing Co., State Printers, Trenton, N. J. Eleventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industries of New Jersey for the Year ending October 31, 1889. Pp. xxi, 648. 1889.

A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago. The Poetry of Job. By George H. Gilbert, Ph. D., Professor of New Testament Literature and Interpretation in the Chicago Theological Seminary. Pp. xi, 224. 1889. \$1.00.

Woodman and Tiernan Printing Company, St. Louis. Democracy in the Church. By Robert A. Holland. Pp. 123. 1889.

